

Cargo Landing Procedure.

SHANGHAI.

1. All landing charges are paid by the steamship company.
 2. The consignee is given 10 days' free storage by the steamship company from the arrival date of steamer.
 3. If not delivered to consignee within 10 days, storage is charged at prescribed rates, according to the size of the packages, &c. This charge also includes coolie hire for storing the cargo.
 4. Transportation charges for bringing the cargo from the Pootung waterfront to the Shanghai waterfront are borne by the shipping company, but are debited to the consignee.
 5. Coolie hire from the Shanghai waterfront to the consignee's godown is borne by the consignee.
 6. Marine insurance (including fire) is covered by consignee and expires 10 days after the arrival date of steamer. On the expiration of the marine policy, fire insurance is covered by the consignee.
- If the cargo is landed at Pootung and not taken delivery of within the 10 days consignee must cover lighterage insurance at the time of taking delivery.

HONGKONG.

- A. When goods are to be sold to Hongkong consignee.
- A consignee imports merchandise to be sold from his place of business in Hongkong. The cargo ordinarily is delivered into a godown (warehouse) with all landing charges paid by the vessel. The consignee is given one week in which to clear his goods without storage costs. After the cargo has been placed in the godown the consignee pays charges as follows:—
1. If delivery is not taken within a week from the date of the vessel's arrival, the consignee is charged storage on a monthly basis at a prescribed rate, and also charges for coolie hire for storing the cargo.
 2. Delivery must be taken from inside the godown, and the consignee pays the transportation charge from godown to lighters or cargo boats, which, for a general cargo, is estimated at 0.25 Hongkong dol. per ton.
 3. As all Chinese ships are at some distance from the godowns, it is necessary to transport the cargo to the Hongkong waterfront or praya. An ordinary cargo boat, which accommodates about 50 tons, costs approximately 15 Hongkong dols. per 12-hour day.
 4. The cost of coolie hire for transportation from landing praya to the shop varies according to the location of the shop. It is estimated that the cost for general cargo is about 0.25 Hongkong dol. per ton.
 5. The consignee must cover his cargo with insurance, both fire and marine, until it arrives in his shop, and thereafter for fire only. Insurance rates vary according to the locality of the shop and the commodity insured.
- B. When cargo is to be transported to the interior.
- There are, however, many cases where the cargo is loaded from the receiving godown into a junk to be transported by water into the interior. This procedure eliminates part of the landing charges involved in ordinary handling. In importing certain commodities, such as flour, the consignee sometimes prefers to take delivery of the cargo into his own lighters from the ship, and still further transportation charges are saved.

CHAPTER XXIV.
SHIPPING.

1926/27

Certain phases of this subject are discussed in the Chapters on Commerce and Labour.

The general provisions with regard to extraterritoriality govern the relations between the law of China and oceanic shipping. In most countries, inland navigation is reserved to natives of the country. In China, however, the inland waterways are open to foreign navigation. The Inland Steam Navigation Regulations of 1898, provided that vessels engaged in inland navigation must register at Treaty Ports and that they must report their movements to Customs officials. No unregistered vessel may ply inland. Special regulations were issued in August 1898 by the Commissioner of Customs, governing Yangtze navigation. "The merchant vessels of the Treaty Ports were authorized to trade at certain specified Treaty Ports and to land and ship goods in accordance with special regulations at certain enumerated non-treaty ports. Shipment or discharge of cargo at other points on the river was prohibited. However, it was provided that passengers and their baggage might be landed or shipped at any of the regular passenger stations—the baggage, however, upon pain of confiscation, not to contain articles subject to duty."

A revision of the Inland Navigation Rules followed the signing of the Sino-British Treaty of 1902. By these regulations, "British (and therefore other foreign) steamship owners are to have the right to lease warehouses and jetties on the banks of waterways for terms not exceeding twenty-five years, with option of renewal on terms to be mutually agreed upon. Such jetties, however, are not to be erected in such position as to obstruct the inland waterway or interfere with navigation. The sanction of the nearest Commissioner of Customs is to be obtained, which sanction is not to be arbitrarily withheld.

"Foreign merchants are to pay taxes and contributions on these warehouses and jetties on the same footing as Chinese owners of similar properties.

"The main object of the British Government, it is declared, in desiring to see the inland waterways of China opened to steam navigation being to afford facilities for the rapid transport of both foreign and native merchandise, they undertake to offer no impediment to the transfer to a Chinese company and the Chinese flag of any British steamer which may now or hereafter be employed on the inland waters of China, should the owner be willing to make the transfer. In the event of a Chinese company registered under Chinese law being formed to run steamers on the inland waters of China, the fact of British subject holding shares in such company shall not entitle the steamers to fly the British flag."

Registered steamers are forbidden to carry contraband.

In all ports, vessels are required to pay various dues to the Harbour Master, who is under the control of the Chinese Maritime Customs. Certain dues are also levied in connexion with conservancy work. A schedule of all dues is obtainable from the Chinese Maritime Customs.

* Quotations from Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*.

Wholesaler generally distributes to interior agents.

After the wholesaler receives his goods from the importer he ships small lots to each of his various distributing agents at interior points. This trade is carried on by junks plying on the East or West River, or by small Chinese steamboats, and payment in many instances is made by a system of barter, which eliminates the question of exchange and drafts between the wholesaler and his agent.

It is not practicable for any local importer to carry on direct sales to interior points unless he is equipped with a very large organisation, in which case he would have bonded agents at various centres to whom he would forward goods for distribution to the Chinese in the interior. It is not feasible for an individual importer to sell large orders to Chinese importers in the interior unless he can deliver from his local stock and collect payment before the cargo leaves the godown. This procedure, however, has proved impracticable, on account of the excessive cost of carrying large stocks to meet such demands. The brokers are so well established that a Chinese importer insists upon buying through them, which constitutes a barrier to direct dealing between the foreign importer and the Chinese merchant.

Shipping in 1924.

The Report on the Foreign Trade of China of the Chinese Maritime Customs for 1924 gives the following details regarding Shipping for that year :—

Whatever may have been the profits or losses of shipping companies, the Shipping tables published with this report show an increase in the tonnage which has passed through the ports of China, as 132,213 steamers (aggregating 136.8 million tons) and 54,169 sailing vessels (aggregating 4.6 million tons) were entered and cleared at the Chinese Maritime Customs during 1924, making a total of 186,382 vessels and 141.4 million tons. These figures, when compared with those for the two preceding years, show no very remarkable differences, it is true; but they represent, nevertheless, a steady increase in the tonnage from year to year, the figures for 1922 being 186,428 vessels (aggregating 124.1 million tons), and those for 1923 being 182,722 vessels (aggregating 131.3 million tons). The biggest share of the shipping went to Great Britain, with 48,886 vessels, totalling 55.7 million tons, an increase of 4,831 vessels and 3.75 million tons when compared with the previous year. Japan was next on the list, with 34.76 million tons, followed by China with 33.29 million tons. In point of vessels, China should have taken precedence, as 44,806 vessels of foreign type and 49,945 junks were entered and cleared under the Chinese flag during 1924, as against 26,294 vessels under the Japanese flag. Fourth on the list came America, which exhibited an increase from 5.97 million tons (4,994 vessels) in 1923 to 6.36 million tons (6,435 vessels) in 1924. France also advanced from 1.84 million tons (1,948 vessels) to 2.19 million tons (2,380 vessels); Norway was credited with 2 million tons (1,544 vessels); Germany, with 2 million tons (539 vessels); the Netherlands, with 1.80 million tons (547 vessels); and Portugal, with 1.05 million tons (2,912 vessels). Next on the list were Denmark and Italy, with 616,026 tons (246 vessels) and 599,513 tons (1,021 vessels) respectively, while all other flags exhibited satisfactory figures with the exception, however, of the Russian flag, which showed a decline of 78,941 tons and 185 vessels.

Overseas trade in 1924 was very much what it had been during the preceding year and does not call for any special comment. It was, on the whole, somewhat spasmodic, competition was keen, and the Conference rates were well maintained. The index-number of shipping freights, as published by "The Statist" in the issue of 21st February, 1925, was 30.8 in January, rose to 32.1 in March, and stood at 28.2 in December. For the whole of the year the geometrical average of the index-number is 29.6, which may be compared with the average for 1923 of 28.4 and for 1922 of 29.7.

Tonnage for the United Kingdom and Continent was abundant throughout the year; in fact, at times it was in excess of requirements. This was partly compensated by a brisk demand for space from Dairen for shipments of beans, which caused the freight for that commodity to rise during the last quarter of the year to 35 shillings per ton, and from Chefoo and Tsingtao for direct shipments of groundnuts to Europe. A feature of the year was the increased number of tramp steamers calling at Shanghai on the chance of picking up freight, in competition with the organised lines running on regular schedules. Freight to the United States via Pacific and via Panama and Suez advanced, in the case of silk piece goods and silk pongee, from Gold \$25 to \$30 and \$31, whilst in the case of tea it was quoted at from Gold \$6 to \$10.50, and for egg products it varied from 15 to 17 gold dollars per 40 cubic feet. Coastwise Trade was affected by excessive competition, which kept freights at a very low ebb, so that, although the movement of cargo was considerable, the running expenses of steamers were hardly covered. In fact, it is reported that steamers ran at a loss.

Conditions in Shanghai showed an increase, as indicated in the following Shanghai Customs Report :—


The tonnage of vessels entered and cleared amounted to 32,305,419, showing an increase of 2,287,179 tons over the previous year's figure, which in turn was 2,502,313 tons higher than the tonnage of 1922, emphasising the fact that Shanghai is becoming one of the world's greatest shipping ports. The following table shows the share taken by each flag in millions of tons during the last three years :—

| | 1922. | 1923. | 1924. |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|
| British ... | 10.21 | 10.70 | 11.75 |
| Japanese ... | 7.00 | 7.61 | 7.60 |
| Chinese ... | 5.22 | 5.76 | 5.68 |
| American .. | 2.85 | 3.19 | 3.40 |
| French ... | 0.66 | 0.79 | 0.79 |
| Other Flags | 1.53 | 1.96 | 3.08 |

The increase under "Other flags" for 1924 is mainly due to advances under the German, Dutch, and Norwegian flags, each of which stands with some 700,000 tons to its credit. The increase is due to the greater activity in ocean-going traffic; but, while inward cargoes have been large, there has still been a great deal of space offering on outward-bound vessels. As a first experiment of its kind, it is of interest to record that the Robert Dollar Company inaugurated in the early part of the year a fortnightly "Round the world service" for both freight and passengers. The fleet consists of seven ships. They are to touch at 21 ports and are to complete the round trip in about 107½ days. The local shipbuilding yards have been well occupied during the year. Besides the ordinary repair work, three sea-going vessels and a number of smaller craft have been built.

Shipping: Tonnage of Vessels engaged in the Carrying Trade from and to Foreign Countries and between the Open Ports.

Percentage contributed by Principal Flags, 1913 and 1924.



* Including junks entered and cleared at the Maritime Customs

The question of Russian shipping on the Sungari River attracted considerable attention during the year as is indicated in the following report by the Harbin Commissioner of Customs:—

The question whether Russian ships shall, or shall not, navigate the Sungari River was raised suddenly at the beginning of the year by a decree, promulgated in Mukden, depriving them of this privilege. It was confidently expected at the time that the measure was a temporary one, which would be rescinded before it could adversely affect any of the many trade interests involved. Contrary to expectation, however, the order has remained in force throughout the year, and none but steamers and barges under the Chinese flag have been allowed to navigate the Sungari. The largest shipping fleet concerned, which at the same time is by far the largest in Harbin, is that belonging to the Chinese Eastern Railway, consisting of 11 steamers and 30 barges, with a carrying capacity of about 1,200,000 pounds, or 18,000 tons. The next in size of the Russian fleets is that of Messrs. Soskin & Co., with a capacity of about 500,000 pounds, or 8,000 tons. There were several other small companies of less importance, which mostly sold out to Chinese owners or transferred in some way to the Chinese flag. Thus more than half the available tonnage has been laid up; for although the number of ships owned by Russians has decreased very considerably, until it now represents less than half the total amount, both of steamships and tonnage, yet its superiority in barges is very marked, the Russian barge tonnage being equal to almost two-thirds of the whole amount now afloat. The quantity and quality of the harvest exceeded all expectations, and although, owing to lack of shipping, large quantities of beans were left where they were grown, and are thus suffering deterioration, sufficient were moved to fulfil orders, which, however, were purposely restricted on account of risk. It is necessary to note that shipping has this year been favoured by the state of the water, which often enabled the fleets to work at their fullest capacity, a circumstance that is equivalent to a large increase of tonnage and to which is largely to be attributed the success of the season. The ultimate fate of the Russian ships still lies in the balance awaiting the final decision of the joint conference of Chinese and Russian delegates under the new Sino-Russian Treaty. Navigation at Harbin opened on the 26th April and closed on the 7th November.

The civil war which broke out in August 1924, dislocated shipping to a very considerable degree, the damage, however, not becoming wholly effective until 1925. A report prepared in September 1924, stated:

The arrival and dispatch of trans-Pacific cargo is as yet only slightly affected by the war, present imports consisting mainly of orders placed prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and exports being drawn from stock now in Shanghai. This condition will probably continue for a few weeks longer in imports, although export cargo is already dwindling, some steamship lines reporting as high as 20% reduction in available cargo during the past week.

Coastwise and Yangtze River trade on the other hand is greatly handicapped by the scarcity of cargo, tight money throughout the country making the free exchange of goods impossible.

As yet no Yangtze vessels under foreign flags have seen fit to discontinue their runs, but most of the Chinese operated boats are tied up in Shanghai, due to their liability to seizure.

(See also China Year Book, 1925.)

Shipping in 1925.

1925 will probably go down in shipping history in China as the worst year. The general strike and anti-British boycott which started on June 1 and did not dissipate itself until October tied up ships in all harbours, with the effect that trade was at a standstill. In Canton, the strike and anti-British boycott continued into 1926 and no British, American or French ships ply between Canton and Hongkong. A complete summary of the effect of the strike and boycott on shipping is given in

the annual report of the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company, read by Hon. Mr. D. G. M. Bernard:—

"The improvement was shortlived, as shipping business was thrown into chaos by the anti-British agitation and boycott which began in June. The nature and extent of this movement is so familiar to those resident in the Far East and in fact to the world generally, that it is unnecessary for me to enlarge upon it; suffice it to say that while it has very seriously affected our Company's earnings, it must have also resulted in heavy losses to many of our loyal native supporters. I trust that this mere passing reference to the conditions in China will be sufficient to indicate the difficulties and complication which during the period under review beset shipping in these parts.

The disabilities under which our operations were conducted were unfortunately not confined to Swatow and Canton, where vessels under the British flag have not been able to handle any cargo since last June, as the trail of malicious and unjust propaganda was in evidence in ports at the extreme limit of the navigable rivers of China. As may be anticipated, therefore, conditions prevailing during the last half of the year called for most careful deliberation in the management of the Fleet and every effort was directed to strictest economy. The uncertainty of the future, however, made any "cut and dried" scheme impossible to formulate with any degree of confidence, but I would state that all steps possible were taken to safeguard the interests of shareholders.

Apart from important connexions in the Calcutta trade our main source of revenue is derived from through traffic, from ports on the upper Yangtze such as Chungking and Ichang; to Hankow, Shanghai, Swatow, Hongkong and Canton; but with a boycott notoriously imposed in southern ports, it is easy to perceive that there must be a severe drop in our revenue. The difficulty consignees experienced in disposing of timber in Canton, occasioned a partial lay-up of our Borneo steamers.

It is customary at these Meetings for the Chairman to make some reference to future prospects. However, under present conditions, any prognostication of what the future has in store for us would be simply guesswork or at the best a mere personal opinion. Commerce and politics are so indelibly wrapped up together in China, and at no time so much as at present, that it becomes impossible to forecast what the outcome of the present state of affairs may be. It is generally thought however, and I personally share the view, that we have now seen the worst as regards upheavals in China, and the people, especially *bona fide* traders, are heartily tired of the never ending interference with, and unjust taxation in their business.

The long imposed boycott must have denuded the Southern provinces of essential imports while exports have only been moved under great difficulty. Military taxation has proved a heavy drag on trading and it is anticipated that given even a more or less stable Government there will be a large increase in trade.

The anti-British movement, as is only to be expected, has been the means of attracting considerable numbers of vessels of foreign flags to enjoy the fruits of trade built up by Companies such as ours, and there is also a great increase of steamers under the Chinese flag. I fear therefore that even when the return to normal times eventuates tonnage for a time will be in excess of demand. The presence of large numbers of cheaply operated steamers with, comparatively speaking, no overhead charges, introduces a new, and disturbing feature of competition, and the position is being watched closely.

Japanese shippers suffered almost as much as did the British, although they were not involved in the prolonged Canton-Hongkong boycott. As a matter of fact, Japanese ships were able to take over a large percentage of the Canton trade after October.

As a result of the strike and boycott, a number of foreign ships were sold to Chinese interests. A report on these sales follows:

The Indo-China Steam Navigation Company has sold four of the oldest and best-known vessels operating on the China Coast, in the str. *Esang*, *Wosang*, *Taksang* and *Loksang*. All of these vessels have been acquired by Chinese interests, presumably for operation in Far Eastern waters. The purchase price has not been divulged.

The *Esang*, which has been operated mostly on the Lower Yangtze during the last few years, is a steel screw steamer of 1,783 tons gross, built at Glasgow in 1891 for the Indo-China Company. She is 260 feet in length, 36 feet in breadth and has a draft of 22 feet. The *Wosang* is practically similar to the *Esang*, and was built at Glasgow in the same year.

The *Taksang's* gross tonnage is 1,562; she was constructed at Glasgow in 1892; and is a steel screw vessel whose dimensions are:—length, 250 feet; breadth, 36 feet and draft 15.3 feet. The *Loksang* is similar in all essential respects to the *Taksang*, but is one year older.

It is probable that the disposal of these four vessels, all of which have passed the normal age of ships in the British merchant marine, is in accordance with the policy of the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company, mentioned at annual meetings of the Company during the last few years, of disposing of old and comparatively obsolete tonnage when favourable opportunity occurs, and replacing it with vessels more efficient and more suited to the calls of modern shipping competition.

Shanghai Chinese interests have also acquired two vessels which have for many years been very popular with travellers between Hongkong and Australia—the str. *Changsha* and *Taiquan*, owned by Messrs. Yuill & Co., of Sydney. These vessels are being replaced by two ships now under construction at Hongkong—the str. *Change* (launched on April) and *Taiiping* (launched in June), the builders being the Hongkong and Whampoa Dock Company.

The *Change* is expected to take over the Australian run of the *Changsha* during the next few weeks, when the *Changsha* will be handed over to her new owners. The *Taiquan* will not be replaced by the *Taiiping* till some time in December, when the *Taiquan* will also come into possession of her Chinese purchasers. As in the case of the Indo-China vessels, the purchase price has not been divulged.

The *Taiquan* and *Changsha* are steel screw steamers of 2,269 tons each, built by Scotts of Greenock in 1886, and are practically sister ships.

The third deal concerns a British India Steam Navigation Co's vessel, the str. *Hymettus*. This is the largest ship of those which have been disposed of, being of 4,606 tons gross, and having a length of 400 feet, a breadth of 52 feet and a draft of 25 feet. She was built at Newcastle by Palmers in 1900 and for many years was reckoned one of the most efficient cargo vessels in the B. I. fleet. The purchase price has not been made public.

We understand that a Norwegian ship which has been operating in China waters for some years has been disposed of to Chinese interests.

In South China, the *Honam*, which has been on the Hongkong-Canton run for over 50 years, has been sold, through Mr. Ming Kee, of On Lan Street, to Mr. Yeung Yuk-shue, of Messrs. Kung Wo, blackwood furniture manufacturers, of Hollywood Road, for \$20,000.

It is stated that the Hongkong, Canton and Macao Steamboat Company, Ltd., the owners of the *Honam*, have decided to place the str. *Lungshan* on the run instead of the *Honam*.

As a condition of the sale, the *Honam* will be broken up and sold as scrap iron by the purchaser.

The Robert Dollar Company transferred its upper Yangtze River interests to Butterfield and Swire and withdrew from the river above Hankow. The sale involved the transfer of the river steamer, *Alice Dollar*, together with landing places, dock space and warehouse facilities at Ichang and Chungking.

An unfortunate incident which cannot be left unrecorded was the grounding of the *Loongwo* below Kiu-kiang on July 10. The position of the vessel was precarious. The *Kiangshun* was passing and the *Loongwo's* master asked the *Kiangshun* shore. The *Kiangshun* was passing and the *Loongwo's* master asked the *Kiangshun* to take off the passengers and to land them at their destination, Kiu-kiang. The foreign master of the *Kiangshun* was willing to do this, but the crew of the ship, supported by a number of uniformed soldiers on the ship, refused to permit him to follow the golden rule of the sea. The *Loongwo* and its passengers were left in this dangerous position.

Hongkong-Canton 1925.

The effect of the strike and anti-British boycott on shipping is given in the report of the Hongkong General Chamber of Commerce, 1925:—

The serious effect this has had upon shipping interests may be estimated from the fact that some steamers normally carry cargoes in the following proportion:—For Canton, 50 per cent.; for Swatow 30 per cent.; for Hongkong 20 per cent. The 20 per cent. is all the trade that has remained to them for the last eight months. The number of British steamers entered into the Harbour of Canton during the period from August to December, 1924, varied between 240 and 160 each month. During the corresponding period of 1925 the numbers varied between 27 and 2, practically all of these being the vessels of one British Company which maintained one steamer on the run at a loss, being prevented by pickets from handling any cargo. Prior to the boycott the carrying trade between various ports on the China Coast and Canton and Swatow was largely in the hands of British Steamship Companies, but it is now entirely in non-British hands, principally Chinese, Japanese and Norwegian; the latter mostly under charter to Chinese merchants. From July to December, 1924, 681 British steamers entered the Port of Swatow, as compared with 78 in the corresponding period of 1925, and even these 78 were prevented by boycott pickets from loading and unloading cargo.

The trade from Canton to Ports overseas was practically at a standstill from the beginning of July until the end of August. From September onwards non-British ocean lines decided to accept the boycott pickets' terms and send ships to Canton without touching at Hongkong or Macao, and this shipping gradually increased from October, 1925, to January, 1926. It is understood that in many cases heavy fees have been demanded by the boycott pickets as a condition of allowing these ships to trade. This is particularly noticeable at Swatow where a fee of \$2,700 per steamer is charged by pickets for emigrant ships clearing for the British Port of Singapore.

Unprecedented and onerous conditions of trade by devious routes now hamper commerce. For example, goods in godown in Hongkong, after all marks on the cases which would associate them with Hongkong have been defaced, are conveyed 800 miles northward to Shanghai and then shipped South again to Canton. In order to reach the Native City a few hundred yards distant, goods at Shameen in Canton have been conveyed by river steamer to Hongkong, from Hongkong to Shanghai by coaster and from Shanghai south again to Canton Native City. The poorer classes in Canton are subjected to heavy increases in the cost of everything imported, owing to the extra charges which these roundabout methods involve, and the bribes demanded by the boycott pickets as a condition of allowing trade to continue at all, even under these restrictions. Canton merchants also suffer

heavily from the restrictions imposed upon the export trade, for which Hongkong is the national transhipment Port. At present, goods for Europe via Suez are conveyed to Shanghai and thence forward; or to Keelung, on the island of Formosa, where they are picked up by Japanese ocean carriers. Because the loading at Canton or Swatow is arranged by non-British firms who are working in conjunction with non-British ocean carriers, it often follows that the on-carrying steamer will also be non-British, so that the boycott policy has widespread effects upon British trade. The enormously valuable Canton silk trade has been diverted from Hongkong to Shanghai or has been carried on in direct shipments in non-British ocean vessels from Canton. This trade affords an illustration of the risk of damage involved by devious methods of handling. Silk, which is the most important trade of Canton, used to be shipped, after inspection on the Shameen, direct from Canton to Hongkong in British steamers provided with special stowage and transhipped at Hongkong into first-class mail steamers with special accommodation, so that no time should be lost in transit and risks of damage or pilferage minimised. Under present circumstances, silk is frequently shipped from Canton, in highly unsuitable native craft, which have to pay illicit taxation or bribes to boycott pickets; it is then loaded at Whampoa sometimes into old and unsatisfactory tramp steamers, which carry it to Shanghai, Keelung or Japan where it is again transhipped to the ocean steamer bound for Europe or America. Numerous and very heavy claims have been received for damage to cargo shipped under these conditions and there is grave risk of some trades, especially silk, being entirely lost to South China on account of the dissatisfaction created by present unsuitable methods.

The annual report of the Harbour Department for the year 1925, signed by the Harbour-Master of Hongkong (Lieut.-Comdr. G. F. Hole), which was presented to the Legislative Council on May 27, shows that the total shipping entering and clearing at ports in the Colony during the year amounted to 379,177 vessels of 41,469,584 tons, which compared with the figures of 1924 show a decrease of 384,315 vessels and a decrease of 15,261,493 tons. Of the above, 41,336 vessels of 32,179,053 tons were engaged in foreign trade as compared with 57,765 vessels of 38,770,499 tons in 1924. The returns reveal a decrease in British ocean going shipping of 1,381 ships or 26.1 per cent. and a decrease of 1,977,932 tons or 16.1 per cent. Foreign ocean-going vessels have decreased by 1,911 ships and by 2,243,124 tons or 22.3 per cent. in numbers and 13.1 per cent. in tonnage. British river steamers have decreased by 3,062 ships with a decrease in tonnage of 1,069,546 tons or 43.0 per cent. in numbers and 16.3 per cent. in tonnage. Foreign river steamers show a decrease of 1,052 ships with a decrease in tonnage of 387,469 tons or 45.4 per cent. in numbers and 46.1 per cent. in tonnage. In steamships not exceeding 60 tons employed in foreign trade there is a decrease of 2,445 ships with a decrease in tonnage of 66,336 tons or 31.2 per cent. in numbers and 28.7 per cent. in tonnage. Junks in foreign trade show a decrease of 6,578 vessels, and a decrease of 847,039 tons or 23.9 per cent. in numbers and 25.6 per cent. in tonnage. In local trade (i.e. between places within the waters of the Colony) there is a decrease in steam launches of 367,826 and a decrease in tonnage of 8,571,867 tons or 54.2 per cent. in numbers and 51.5 per cent. in tonnage. Junks in local trade show a decrease of 1,060 vessels and a decrease of 98,180 tons or 3.8 per cent. in numbers and 7.4 per cent. in tonnage. The decreases are attributed to the strike and boycott. Of vessels of European construction 4,776 ocean steamers, 3,085 river steamers and 2,695 steamships not exceeding 60 tons entered during the year, giving a daily average of 28.9 ships as compared with 41.2 ships in 1924 and 34.7 ships in 1923. The average tonnage of individual ocean vessels entering the port has increased from 2,129.8 to 2,472.9 tons, British ships from 2,234.3 to 2,529.4 tons, and foreign ships from 2,057.6 to 2,434.2 tons.

The average tonnage of individual river steamers entering during the year has remained the same at 659.8 tons, British river steamers have increased from 819.5

to 848.4 tons and foreign river teamers have decreased from 340.3 to 332.9 tons. The actual number of individual ocean-going vessels of European construction during the year 1925 was 1,015 of which 371 were British and 644 foreign. In 1924 the corresponding figures were 1,123, 416 British and 707 foreign. These 1,015 ships measured 3,171,253 tons. They entered 4,776 times and gave a collective tonnage of 11,810,938 tons. Thus 108 less ships entered 1,708 less times and gave a collective tonnage less by 1,999,036 tons an average of 1,170.4 tons per entry.

The Soviet Commission at Canton arranged for a regular passenger and freight service between Canton and Vladivostok, four vessels being employed in this connection.

The actual shipping business in Canton has improved, as some vessels, which had formerly docked at Hongkong, now dock in Canton. The following is a list of the present normal shipping of Canton (during Strike period):—

| Nationality. | No. of Vessels. | Plying Between. | Total. |
|----------------------|-----------------|--|--------|
| Chinese | 6 | Canton & Shanghai | 17 |
| | 6 | Canton & Siam | |
| | 1 | Canton, Newchwang, & Dairen | |
| | 1 | Canton, Swatow, & Haikow | |
| | 1 | Canton & Pakhoi | |
| German | 2 | Canton & Saigon | 17 |
| | 14 | Canton, Shanghai, & Newchwang | |
| | 2 | Canton, Singapore, & Penang | |
| | 1 | Canton & Europe | |
| | 4 | Canton, Shanghai, & Vladivostok | |
| Soviet-Russian | 1 | Canton, Singapore, & Penang | 45 |
| | 3 | Canton & North America | |
| American | 1 | Canton & Shanghai | |
| | 2 | Canton, North America, & South America | |
| Dutch | | | |
| Grand total | | | 45 |

| 1924. | | 1925. | | Increase. | | Decrease. | |
|---|---------|------------|----------|------------|----------|------------|----------|
| Class of Vessels. | | No. | Tonnage. | No. | Tonnage. | No. | Tonnage. |
| British Ocean-going | 5,297 | 11,844,752 | 3,916 | 9,866,820 | 1,381 | 1,977,932 | |
| Foreign Ocean-going | 7,674 | 16,030,078 | 5,763 | 13,786,954 | 1,911 | 2,243,124 | |
| British River Steamers | 7,120 | 6,524,661 | 4,058 | 5,455,115 | 3,062 | 1,069,546 | |
| Foreign River Steamers | 2,318 | 840,347 | 1,266 | 452,878 | 1,052 | 387,469 | |
| Steamships under 60 tons (Foreign Trade) | 7,831 | 231,883 | 5,386 | 165,497 | 2,445 | 66,386 | |
| Junks, Foreign Trade | 27,525 | 3,298,828 | 20,947 | 2,451,789 | 6,578 | 847,039 | |
| Total Foreign Trade | 57,765 | 38,770,499 | 41,336 | 32,179,053 | 16,429 | 6,591,496 | |
| Steam Launches plying in Waters of the Colony | 678,750 | 16,622,806 | 625,848 | 16,101,878 | 52,902 | 120,928 | |
| Junks, Local Trade | 27,977 | 1,337,772 | 11,027 | 545,932 | 16,950 | 791,840 | |
| Grand Total | 764,492 | 56,731,077 | 678,211 | 48,826,863 | 86,281 | 7,504,264 | |
| Nett | | | | | 172,562 | 15,008,501 | |

Hongkong Shipping in 1924 and 1925. (Vessels entered and cleared.)

Piracy and Military Interference.

The Chungking Customs Returns for 1924 give the following:—
 With an ever increasing number of junkmen thrown out of work by the introduction of steam traffic on the Upper Yangtze, the enmity of the junkmen grew more and more bitter, culminating in a deplorable affair at Wanhsien on the 18th June, when Mr. Hawley, an American citizen and representative of Messrs. Arnhold & Co., was murdered by junkmen while she lay at anchor for the night at s.s. *Wanlu*. The Chinese s.s. *Tzesui* while she lay at anchor for the night at Kaokiachen some 150 miles below Chungking, was boarded by supposed bandits, who, after murdering Captain Brandt, the master, and the comrade and two shroffs, looted ship and passengers. It is said that the main object of their "visit" was to kill the captain, who had incurred their displeasure, and that the looting, involving the other murders, naturally followed. During the year vessels of all nationalities were constantly fired on both by bandits from the shore and by soldiers moving from place to place in sampans or junks. When the latter occurs the blame is invariably laid on the bandits. Claims against shipping companies for compensation for junks sunk by the wash of their steamers have been very frequent and though undoubtedly there have been cases of carelessness in this respect on the part of masters and pilots, the main cause of these accidents is to be found in the fact that junks are almost invariably overloaded and with insufficient freeboard for safety.

The year has been very bad for pirates and military interference with the movement of vessels. During much of the year, civil war was taking place on the principal rivers of the country, which had the effect of reducing the number of ships flying the Chinese flag. During wars, Chinese shippers often take their ships off the runs to avoid being forced to carry troops on a basis which makes payment very uncertain.

Piracies affected shipping throughout the country for most of the year. The Taihu Lake region was particularly affected by pirates, who come from villages in the vicinity of the lake.

In southern waters, the pirates were particularly active.

Arising out of the appointment by the Hongkong Government of a Committee to consider "certain further proposals" with regard to Piracy in neighbouring waters a "Minority Report" was presented, at the end of 1924, by the representatives on the Committee of this and the Chinese Chamber, and of the combined Coast Officers' Guilds.

The "Minority Report" condemned the existing Piracy Prevention Regulations for the internal protection of ships on the ground that they throw the responsibility for defence against pirates upon the Mercantile Marine instead of upon the Navy, to which it properly belongs. It pointed out that the grilles, with which the ships are required to be provided, are in conflict with Board of Trade Regulations and are a grave source of danger. It condemned the Indian guards, of whom some 900 are employed at a cost to the shipping companies of about \$270,000 per annum, as "undisciplined and inefficient" and said that, being under the orders of the police they derogate from the authority of the master of the ship. Briefly, the Report urged that if the guards are withdrawn, grilles removed (except those around the engine-room and bridge) an adequate fleet of patrol craft provided, and police supervision, both ashore and in the harbour, materially reinforced, there should be little to fear from the possibility of piratical attacks in the future.

The Hongkong Government was informed that the Report had the Chamber's wholehearted support, and, in acknowledging this communication, wrote on February 11, 1925, that the "Minority Report" had been forwarded to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The letter added that while adhering to the view, which was shared by the Commander-in-Chief, that armed protection on board ship was essential, the Government had urged that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty

should, in the interests of British trade and prestige, so strengthen the naval forces here as to provide for the establishment of a system of patrols which would be adequate to safeguard ships from external attack, and when coupled with reasonable measures of self-protection on board, to make attempts at piracy from within too hazardous to be attractive.

It transpired in April, 1925, that, some months before the Hongkong Piracy Committee held its meetings, the question of Piracy in waters adjacent to the Colony of Hongkong was considered in London by an Inter-Departmental Conference. The Secretary of State for the Colonies notified that, on the information before him, and after carefully considering the "Minority Report," he saw no grounds for modifying the conclusions of the Inter-Departmental Conference. Whilst in no way modifying the views it expressed with regard to the "Minority Report," the Chamber reprints the report of the Conference in full as the latest official word on the subject:—

Report of an Inter-Departmental Conference on Piracy in Waters Adjacent to the Colony of Hongkong.

MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE.

- Sir Gilbert E. A. Grindle, K.C.M.G., C.B., (Chairman) Colonial Office.
- Mr. S. P. Waterlow, C.B.E. Foreign Office.
- Captain W. Tomkinson, C.B., M.V.O., R.N. Admiralty.
- Commander E. R. Carson, R.N. Admiralty.
- Mr. A. G. M. Fletcher, C.M.G., C.B.E. Assistant Colonial Secretary, Hongkong.

To the Right Honourable,
 L. S. Amery, M.P.

Sir,—We were requested by your Predecessor to enquire into certain representations which had been made by The China Coast Officers Guild and the Marine Engineers Guild of China in regard to the measures adopted by the Governor of Hongkong for dealing with piracy in waters adjacent to the Colony.

2. These representations were the outcome of a series of piratical attacks which had been made on ships sailing between Hongkong and neighbouring Chinese ports.

3. The views of the Guilds were summarised in a series of resolutions passed at a combined meeting of members of the two Guilds held on the 3rd of February, 1924, and communicated to the Colonial Secretary, Hongkong, in a letter dated the 4th of February, 1924. The resolutions were:—

- (1) That, in so far as piracy prevention is concerned, the Police Department be relieved from all duties in regard to sea-going and river steamers whilst outside the waters of the Colony and concentrate its attention to detecting and preventing the embarkation of unlawful persons and/or firearms whilst these vessels are in Hongkong Harbour, unless some better method is devised.
- (2) That all arms and armed guards required by the Piracy Regulations be removed from every vessel and the absolute command thereof restored to the Master as laid down in the Merchant Shipping Acts, unless some better method is devised.
- (3) There shall be at once inaugurated a proper system of patrol in the Danger Zone.
- (4) That all vessels subject to Piracy Regulations shall have wireless telegraphy installed and under the control of a competent operator signed on the Articles.

- (5) That Insurance be automatically effected for every Master, Officer and Engineer whose duty takes him into the Danger Zone, the Premium for such Insurance to be paid with the money at present paid as wages to the guards, in the event of them being removed from the vessels.
- (6) That every case of piracy shall be the subject of enquiry at the Harbour Office (as soon as possible after the outrage) with the Harbour Master as President of the Court, which should consist of *active* Mercantile Marine Officers of both departments, with the addition of one *active* Naval Officer.
- (7) That a substantial reward be offered for information which leads to the arrest of any person implicated in any piratical attack.
- (8) That a reward should be paid in all cases of seizure of arms and/or ammunition.

4. We have held two meetings. At our first meeting held on the 17th of June, 1924, there were also present, besides the members of the Committee, Sir J. Jamieson (His Majesty's Consul-General, Canton) and representatives of the Treasury, the War Office and the India Office. At our second meeting, held on the 10th of July, 1924, we had the advantage of a personal discussion with Mr. T. W. Moore, C.B.E., F.R.C.S. (Secretary, The Imperial Merchant Service Guild) Mr. D. Bramah, C.B.E., (General Secretary, The Marine Engineers Association), and Mr. J. Watson (Secretary, The Marine Engineers Guild of China). Representatives of the Mercantile Marine Department Board of Trade were also present at this meeting.

5. After considering reports on the cases of piracy which had occurred and on the general conditions existing in South China it was agreed that the present state of affairs was directly due to the civil war in the Kwangtung Province which had completely disrupted the policing by the Chinese Authorities of the Canton Delta and neighbouring waters. In the circumstances the only measure which could be effective would be the destruction of the pirate lairs, the whereabouts of the more important of which were apparently well known. In regard to this we were informed that the landing on Chinese territory of British military and naval forces for such a purpose is out of the question but that arrangements had been made to lend such friendly support to the local Chinese authorities as was feasible; and we were informed of the successful issue of an expedition undertaken by local Chinese forces, in accordance with these arrangements. We are very sensible of the value of these arrangements for co-operation with the local Chinese authorities; and we consider that whenever opportunities of such co-operation occur, they should be utilised to the fullest extent possible subject to the necessary limitation imposed by the political situation in China.

6. We are however sensible that in existing circumstances it would be vain to expect anything approaching the complete suppression of the bands of pirates which infest these waters. It is therefore very necessary that in the Danger Zone there should be as effective a system of precautionary measures as can be devised and maintained with such resources as are available.

7. The system in force at the time of our enquiry may briefly be described as follows:—

At the beginning of the year there were four of His Majesty's Gun-boats engaged in patrolling the danger zone, and later on a reserve gun-boat was put into commission with a crew lent by one of His Majesty's ships on the station. In addition four armed launches were fitted out by the Hongkong Government, with civilian crews and commanded by Naval Officers with Naval gun crews. (Later arrangements were made for the complete manning of these launches by naval crews).

In addition to the maintenance by these patrols the "Piracy Regulations" issued by the Hongkong Government require *inter alia* that all certificated officers shall be armed at all times while the ship is in the "Danger Zone", that the ship must be provided with bullet proof dodgers, screens, girdles and barbed wire entangle-

ments to the satisfaction of the Harbour Master in order to render the vital parts of the ships defensible. A scheme of defence for each ship is drawn up by a Committee consisting of the Assistant Harbour Master, the Captain Superintendent of Police, the master, and (if the owner so desires) a representative appointed by the owner. The Regulations prescribe the number of rockets, Very lights, arms and rounds of ammunition to be carried; and the carrying of specified numbers of armed guards. The Regulations also provide for the control and search of ships, passengers and goods before sailing, and for other matters incidental to the carrying out of the Regulations.

8. As we understand them the view of the Guilds (so far as the first three of the Resolutions quoted in paragraph 3 of this report are concerned) was that the defensive measures at present laid down in the Piracy Regulations should be replaced completely by a system of effective Naval patrols throughout the Danger Zone.

9. In regard to this proposal we were informed by the representatives of the Admiralty that it would be a matter of extreme difficulty to organise such an extensive system of Naval patrols that river steamers would always be safe from piratical attacks; and that such a system of patrols would in any case necessitate a very great expansion of the Naval Forces in Hongkong waters. We were further informed that, Naval establishments having been drastically cut down since the War, there are no longer available any vessels of the special type which would be required to operate in the winding creeks of the Delta, that they could only be provided at great cost, and that the building of the necessary vessels and the provision of crews would take a considerable time.

10. We are satisfied that the situation is not so serious as to justify our recommending any such expansion of the Naval forces in these waters.

11. It was suggested to us that the problem might be solved by the adoption of a convoy system, and we were informed that such a system had been brought into operation on certain runs. We agree that in circumstances a system of this kind may be useful and desirable. We feel however that the general adoption of such a system could not fail to have a serious effect as a hindrance to trade, and that it could not remain in force for any considerable length of time without creating widespread dissatisfaction.

12. In the light of the foregoing consideration we are satisfied that in addition to co-operation with the local Chinese authorities and the maintenance of as efficient a system of patrols as is possible with the resources available to the Naval authorities, defensive measures on board the ships themselves are vitally necessary. We have accordingly given our careful consideration to such evidence as has been placed before us in regard to the efficacy of the measures prescribed in the Piracy Regulations in the light of the criticisms of these Regulations which have been formulated by the Guilds concerned.

13. Briefly the contentions of the Guilds were that the Captain Superintendent of Police is not a suitable person to exercise supervision of the anti-piracy arrangements, which duty should be taken over by the Naval authorities; that the Indian guards which ships are required to carry are not amenable to the authority of the masters of the ships and are useless for defence purposes; that the carrying of arms which may easily fall into the hands of the pirates is an added danger even if the desire to obtain them is not direct incentive to piratical attacks; that the structural requirements prescribed by the Regulations are a hindrance to the working of the ships; that generally the chances of successfully resisting a surprise attack are so slight that if (as they are required to do by the regulations) the master and other certificated officer "Resist to the uttermost," they are faced by almost certain death; and that in view of the absence of adequate provision for their dependents, it is unreasonable not to allow them to exercise their discretion as to the degree of resistance which should be offered.

14. We understand that in every case in which a piratical attack has been successful, it has been found that the Piracy Regulations, have, in some essential

respects, been disregarded. We have also had cited to us instances of attacks which have failed.

15. In the light of these reports we are satisfied that if the grilles required by the regulations are properly constructed and kept closed, the guards properly posted and disciplined, the passengers restricted to their proper quarters and the ships officers properly armed, there is very little chance of their being taken by surprise and every chance of their being able to resist successfully any attacks which might be made. We are moreover convinced that the knowledge that all ships are in an efficient state of preparedness would act as a real deterrent to piratical attacks. This view is borne out by the fact (as we were informed) that the ships of the more reputable lines, by which the regulations are observed and good discipline enforced, have been immune from attack.

16. We therefore do not consider that a case has been made out for any radical revision of the existing regulations. We understand that, particularly in the case of old ships, full compliance with the structural requirements of the Regulations would entail considerable expense to the owners and that accordingly the Hongkong Government has in the past allowed some latitude in cases where a strict enforcement of the regulations would appear to entail special hardship. We were informed however that the policy of the Government for some time past has been directed towards the more stringent enforcement of the regulations. We consider that this is the proper course to follow, and we recommend that the Hongkong Government should be invited to consider the desirability of announcing that full and strict compliance with the Regulations will universally be required after a certain definite period of time.

17. The guards employed are Indians, and we are informed that when it was decided to place guards in the ships, there was at first considerable difficulty in finding suitable men. The number of Indians in Hongkong is not large and the Government had to take such material as it could find.

The men were inexperienced in their new duties and it is hardly surprising that the conduct of some of them was open to criticism. The guards, many of whom are old soldiers, have now been formed into an organized unit under the control of the Captain Superintendent of Police, and an officer taken from the Indian Army has been detailed to superintend their training and discipline. We do not consider that the regulations regarding the carrying of these guards should be relaxed.

18. We consider however that there is force in the contention of the Guilds that it is not reasonable that the ships officers should not in any circumstances be allowed to exercise their discretion as to the degree of resistance to be offered. It seems quite possible for example, to envisage circumstances in which the obligation to resist "to the uttermost" might entail their certain death without securing the ship against the attack. We are assured by the gentlemen who were present at our second meeting that ships officers would not contest that it is in general their duty to defend their ship. We accordingly recommend that the words "to the uttermost" should be deleted from Regulation No. 1. We were informed that this would meet the objections of the Guilds, on this head.

19. Regulation No. 3 requires that each certificated officer, whether on or off duty, shall carry on his person a revolver and 25 rounds of ammunition. It was urged upon us that it is unreasonable to insist on the application of this regulation to engineer officers when actually engaged in the heat and cramped space of the engine rooms. The representative of the Admiralty concurred in this view. We accordingly recommend that this regulation should be modified in such a way as to relieve the engineer officers of this obligation when actively engaged on their duties in the engine room.

20. We were much impressed by the statement made by the Naval Intelligence Officer before the Coroner in connection with the *Tai Lee* Piracy. We consider that this statement has such a direct bearing on what we regard as the crux of the whole matter viz., the maintenance of a proper state of discipline on

ships playing in the Danger Zone, that we are justified in making the following quotations from it:—

"The conditions under which officers were called upon to serve in these ships are such that the ordinary cleanliness discipline and efficiency of a British ship cannot be maintained by them. The fact that they are on a 24 hours agreement makes their position so insecure that many do not take any trouble to exercise command over their ships which are entirely in the hands of pilot, boatswain, and compradores.

"It is impossible to expect the conditions outlined above to attract men capable of carrying out the regulations, or by their personal influence of rendering their ships unpopular with pirates. At present the owners regard British Officers as a necessary evil which must be made to cost as little as possible, and they will not hesitate to dismiss a good man who does not fall in with their ideas, and put in place any one from the water front who will privately agree to take less wages than the Guild rate.

"Unless pay conditions and compensation are made attractive good officers cannot be expected to stay in river steamers. Unless you have good officers in river steamers you will never get regulations carried out."

21. In commenting on this statement the Governor of Hongkong has written as follows:—

"It should be understood that these remarks do not apply to the well run European-controlled ships, whose immunity from attack by pirates is probably due to the knowledge that the regulations are properly complied with, but to the Chinese owned vessels which carry British Officers merely in order to comply with the conditions requisite to obtain registration in Hongkong."

22. We consider that if the Guilds concerned could contrive, by negotiation with the ship owners concerned, to improve the status of the officers in these badly managed ships, so that they would be in a position to enforce and maintain proper discipline, the risk of piracy would be greatly lessened.

23. The fourth resolution was to the effect that all vessels subject to Piracy Regulations would have wireless telegraph apparatus installed, under the control of a competent operator signed on the Articles.

We not only agree that the chances of dealing successfully with any piratical attack would be greatly increased but we consider that the mere knowledge that ships were fitted with wireless apparatus and could summon help, would act as a very great deterrent to such attacks. We therefore gave this suggestion our very careful sympathetic consideration.

24. We understand that its immediate adoption presents several difficulties. In the first place, we are informed, many of the river steamers (and in fact one of the gunboats operating in these waters) are so cramped that it is difficult to find room on board for any wireless apparatus of greater power than (possibly) a small portable set. We understand that the range of such a set might vary between 20 and 100 miles according to the atmospheric conditions. Even such a set would however probably be sufficient for the purpose in view.

25. A greater difficulty lies in the cost of maintaining and providing accommodation for the necessary personnel. At present some of the gunboats carry only one wireless operator, whereas, if the suggestion were adopted, each river steamer would require to carry two, (and the gunboats four) wireless telegraph operators, in order to make possible a proper system of reliefs.

26. It was suggested to us that these difficulties would be greatly reduced if a semi-automatic form of apparatus capable of being operated by one of the ships officer could be installed. If semi-automatic transmitting and receiving apparatus were carried, it would probably be sufficient for one skilled operator only to be

carried since it would not be necessary for him to keep continuous watch. We consider however that the mere emission of a distress signal unaccompanied by an indication of the position of the ship would not be sufficient. The objection that an automatic distress signal does not give a ship's position may be met by the reply that the approximate position of a ship on a regular run at any given time is readily ascertainable, but we consider it to be advisable that ships should be able to get into communication with each other.

27. We were informed by the representative of the Mercantile Marine Department, Board of Trade, that experiments with automatic wireless apparatus had given good results in this country, but that, at the time of our enquiry, it was not certain whether the apparatus would be successful under tropical conditions. In order to test this, a ship fitted with such apparatus was on its way to India and it was hoped that at no distant date, it would be known whether the apparatus could be regarded as sufficiently effective to be licensed by the Board of Trade.

28. We recommend therefore that the fitting of some form of wireless apparatus, and the carrying of trained operators should be made obligatory on all ships subject to the Piracy Regulations; and that as a corollary the Admiralty should be asked to consider that steps should be taken to render the Naval vessels patrolling the Danger Zone continuously able to receive distress calls from river steamers.

29. In view, however, of the information given to us as to the experiments with automatic wireless apparatus which were being conducted, we consider that the question of the type of apparatus to be prescribed should be deferred.

30. The fifth resolution refers to the lack of adequate provision for the dependents of officers who may be injured or lose their lives by reason of their resistance to piratical attacks. We recognize that this matter cannot fail to have an effect on the mind of an officer confronted with the necessity of deciding the degree of resistance to offer when attacked, and we are in entire sympathy with the views of the Guilds that proper provision should be made.

31. We were informed that the Hongkong Government had announced on the 25th of April, 1924, that in the event of the death or disablement of an officer on a ship on the Hongkong register, by reason of piratical attacks, grants would be made by Government to the officer or his estate provided the Piracy Regulations have been properly observed. Our attention was however drawn to the following paragraph in the Gazette Notification in which this scheme was announced:—

"This undertaking on the part of Government is not intended to relieve Shipping Companies of their responsibilities in the matter of the insurance of their officers but is intended to supplement such arrangements as may be made by the Companies."

We are in complete agreement with the principle underlying this announcement. In our view the responsibility for making provision for the dependents of their officers should rest with the owners, and not with the Government. In the first instance, therefore, we consider that the Guilds should make every endeavour to induce the Companies to institute a system of insurance voluntarily. If, however, the ship owners are obdurate, we consider that the Hongkong Government should consider the question of making it obligatory on them either to insure their officers adequately or to defray the cost of an adequate Government scheme of insurance.—
We have, etc.,

A. G. FLETCHER,
E. R. CARSON,
S. P. WATERLOW,
G. GRINDLE,
W. TOMKINSON,
J. PASKIN (Secretary).

Attack on the "Mei Ren."

After having been subjected to a severe rifle fire during most of the time on November 7 and 8, 1925 the American guard on the s.s. *Mei Ren*, operating between Ichang and Chungking, opened fire with their machine gun and killed one Chinese soldier and wounded 15 or 16. As is customary with American ships navigating this dangerous district, the *Mei Ren*, owned by the American West China Steamship Company, Messrs. Cox & Co., agents, carried an ample guard of experienced men, an officer and six other ranks. According to the meagre information which has reached Shanghai the ship left Ichang without any trouble, and it was not until the swifter reaches of the river were arrived at that anything serious broke out. Here they met several junk loads of soldiers which, it is believed, were being sent by Gen. Yang Sen to his superior, Wu Pei-fu, in Hupeh. Without provocation the rabble opened fire on the harmless steamer as they passed. As the next junks neared they also used their fire arms, endangering the lives of all on the *Mei Ren*. Those who were not on active duty were ordered to points of safety while the captain and his pilot, secure behind the steel plating, built entirely round the bridge, ordered all steam on. Maintaining their posts the officers brought their vessel through the attack. It got so bad, however, on November 8, at a point more than 300 miles up-river from Ichang, that the guard could no longer desist. Subjected to a continual rifle fire of terrific intensity, which threatened the lives of passengers and crew, the guard—they had their clips full throughout the passage—operated their machine gun, killing the one and wounding more. That put an end to the Chinese attack. The battle over, the firing was promiscuous all along the route, the ship continued to Chungking, with the wounded also. These were placed in Messrs. Cox & Co.'s offices there, and Mr. W. E. Drake, in charge, had to find other quarters. From a rather official source, although not in Shanghai, it has been learned that of the attacking parties, several ordered the *Mei Ren* to stop and take them aboard and with the answering refusal, opened their murderous attack. Bent on loot, as this informant puts it, the soldiers, enragined to see their prize slipping from them, determined on the most radical measures to stop the ship, but were foiled through the determination of the captain in the first instance, and the ready succour of the armed guards. The *Mei Ren* was surrounded upon her arrival in Chungking by a regiment of Chinese infantry. Posts were placed aboard, and she was prohibited from leaving the berth. The American Consul, it is reported, communicated with the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs and demanded the removal of the military. At the time writing no word had been received as to the ship's status in Chinese eyes, the protests of the American officials notwithstanding. It is understood that, in view of this outrage and the one against the *Chi Chuen* some time ago, foreign official patience has nearly reached the straining point and that Consular action, perhaps combined, is being contemplated. The entire river situation is of such a jumbled character, that no one knows where to start, without presenting a definite ultimatum. American shipping interests are, it is understood, demanding that their consular representatives take an immediate initiative and bring the matter to a head without delay. In this connection it is interesting to note that recently while the *Chi Nan*, another of Messrs. Cox & Co.'s ships, was travelling on the upper reaches, soldiers fired on her and wounded the comrade.

The Piracy of the "Tungchow."

The climax of piracies was the events on the *Tungchow* which are described as follows:

Hongkong, December 22, 1925.*
The China Navigation Company's s. *Tungchow* while on its way from Shanghai to Tientsin was pirated by Chinese travelling as passengers at 6.30 p.m.

* From *Shipping and Engineering*.

on December 18, about two hundred miles south of Weihaiwei. The pirates shot and wounded the Captain in the groin and held up all the other officers and passengers. They put the ship about, first stating that they were making for Shanghai, then Swatow and, finally, Bias Bay, which proved to be their destination. The ship was navigated by the chief and second officers under the watch of armed pirates, who had seized all the ship's arms. The engineers also worked under pistol threats. The pirates made their headquarters in the first-class saloon, but they did not interfere with the passengers, who had their meals and occupied their cabins as usual. The pirates stated, however, that in the event of any interference they would shoot everyone on board. They insisted upon a course far out from land and evinced murderous intentions every time another steamer hove in sight. The captain's wound was dressed and he was nursed by Mrs. Emmott, a missionary, the male passengers taking watches in his cabin during the night. There were several anxious moments, notably at the end of the trip, when another steamer of the same company passed by, almost in sight of the pirates' lair. This, however, was reached safely at 1.25 to-day. The foreign passengers, on the advice of the officers, remained within their cabins, while boats came out from the shore to take off the loot, which included a considerable quantity of specie, some cargo and all the portable baggage of the Chinese passengers. The foreigners were not molested. The steamer weighed anchor at 2.10 and sailed for Hongkong. The captain's condition is hopeful. No one else was injured, although all are suffering severely from the strain. The passengers were: Mesdames Melchers, Murch and Walsh; Mr. and Mrs. Emmott and Mr. and Mrs. Pampignan; Messrs. Webster (of Singapore), Gamble (of the British Legation staff), McAfee (of the American-Oriental Bank), Woodhead (Editor of THE CHINA YEAR BOOK, and of the Peking and Tientsin Times) and Sharp (of the British-American Tobacco Company), and the Rev. Mr. Ford and the Rev. Mr. Lefaki. All the passengers testify to the courage and resource displayed by the Chief Officer, Mr. Nisbet, and the other members of the ship's staff.

The officers of the *Tungchow* are as follows:—

| | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|
| Master | Captain W. McIntosh |
| Chief officer | Mr. J. R. Nisbet |
| Second officer | Mr. G. S. Scott |
| Chief engineer | Mr. John Johnston |
| Second engineer | Mr. Alex Knowles |
| Third engineer | Mr. C. A. Bickford |

Several of the pirates were eventually caught and sentenced to death by the French Mixed Court in Shanghai.

The "Jade" Piracy.*

The following are details of the piracy of the s.s. *Jade*.

With the arrival in Hongkong on February 11, 1926, of the French vessel s.s. *Jade*, from Kwangchowwan, a piracy outrage, which occurred on board after the ship had been about eight hours at sea, was reported to the local Police authorities, the loss sustained being \$80,000 worth of bullion. As with most other piracies, the desperadoes seem to have had knowledge of the shipment of bullion, and this theory is substantiated by the fact that none of the passengers was either molested

or even robbed, the pirates leaving the ship after transferring the bullion to sampans without touching the personal effects of those on board. The *Jade* left Kwangchowwan at 6 a.m. on February 8 with 17 passengers on board. After steaming eight hours from the French possession, seven of the passengers suddenly produced firearms, at the same time discharging two shots as a warning to the remainder of the passengers. They at once took charge of the ship, four men going to the bridge, while the other three descended to the engine room. The master was forced to steer the vessel around Hongkong to a place called Sha Mei, in Bias Bay. On arrival the ship was stopped about a mile from shore, and sampans were summoned alongside. Without interfering with the passengers, the pirates unloaded a quantity of bullion, which was placed in the sampans, and after they had left the *Jade* they made for the shore. The *Jade* was then brought back to Hongkong. The pirates were not slow in making their identity known to their victims, and openly boasted of having pirated various other steamers, including the *Ling Chow* and the *Fung Wah*. The *Jade*, they said, was their sixth victim, and up to the present they had carried out one outrage every year.

Some interesting facts concerning the manner in which the pirates from Bias Bay seized and controlled the French steamer *Jade* on her last trip from Kwangchowwan are made available in an interview which a *Hongkong Telegraph* representative had with the Captain. Captain Maternati stated that the attack which resulted in the pirates obtaining control of the ship occurred at 2 p.m. on February 8. The pirates worked together in groups of two or three, and appeared to be led by a chief whose age the Captain speculates to be somewhere about 45 years. He was dressed in the same shabby way as his subordinates, but his manner was characterised by great assurance. This was demonstrated in a remark made to Captain Maternati, when the latter, on arrival at Bias Bay, expressed his fear that there would not be sufficient draught for the vessel, the reply being:—"Have no fear on that account, Captain. You may not know it, but I have led ships in here before, and I shall know what I am doing." The pirate chief's remark is cryptically phrased, but it is of interest when taken in conjunction with his other statements to the Captain, to the effect that he had led many other similar piracies, an average of one in each year. The exact locality in Bias Bay into which the *Jade* was headed is known as Fau Lo Kong.

The "Kwanglee" Piracy.

On July 13, 1926, the China Merchants' Steamer *Kwanglee*, bound from Shanghai to Canton, was seized by 36 pirates, who had bribed two of the ship's Quartermasters to open the grille defending the Bridge. Captain Tollefsen and the other European officers and passengers, who were absolutely helpless, were locked up in the officers' cabins, and the vessel, which had been seized within sight of Repulse Bay, was then steered for Wang Mun, near Macao. She went aground three or four miles off the Ki An Light. The pirates then looted the vessel, taking everything of value they could find, including the personal effects of the passengers and officers, and made off for the shore in two lifeboats, carrying away with them twelve of the wealthier Chinese passengers, for ransom.

The *Kwanglee* was eventually refloated, and reached Canton on July 15.

Shipbuilding in China.*

The large new dry dock of the Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works, which had been under construction for sixteen months, was officially opened for service last month.

* *Far Eastern Review*, May 1925.

The new dock has been placed parallel to the old dock, leaving a space of about 150-ft. dividing the two docks, on which the pump houses for both docks are situated, also power house and other buildings for the use of the vessels using the docks.

The first vessel to enter the new dock was the *Liberator*, 11,713 tons displacement, 428-ft. long and 56-ft. beam. The operation of placing this large vessel in the dock was accomplished in a very short space of time, as two electrically driven capstans placed on each side of the dock, quickly warped the vessel into a central position.

The steel caisson closing the entrance to the dock was floated into position and in a few minutes after being placed was rapidly sunk into the recess for its reception and the order was given to start the dock pumps.

It was soon evident that the pumping plant was of large capacity as the water in the dock was falling at a very rapid rate, and within a few minutes the *Liberator* was resting on the blocks and about sixteen wood shores were wedged up to keep the vessel upright as the water receded and left the vessel dry.

The dimensions of the new dock are 502-ft. long, 60-ft. wide and 26-ft. 6-in. deep. The pumping plant consists of one 30-in., one 20-in. and one 10-in. electrically driven centrifugal pumps. All running together, the dock can be pumped dry without any vessel in the dock in about two hours.

In the docking of the 11,700-ton *Liberator*, the 30-in. pump was not required, the two smaller pumps being sufficiently powerful to deal with the water to be discharged.

The general construction of the dock is of timber, imported from Canada and the Philippine Islands. The only concrete work visible is at the bottom of the pier heads behind the large steel caisson, which most effectively shuts out the river, with practically no leakage.

The whole structure of the dock is heavy and substantial looking and gives the impression at once as being imposing and a great engineering achievement, reflecting the very highest credit on the designer, Mr. R. B. Mauchan, the general manager of the Kiangnan Works.

The Kiangnan Works is now in a most enviable position, having two dry docks, and probably the best equipped plant in this part of the world, at the disposal of their many clients.

The dimensions of the docks are: Old dock, 545-ft. on blocks, 60-ft. wide, 20-ft. draught; new dock, 502-ft. on blocks, 60-ft. wide, 23-ft. draught.

Upper River Steamers.

A new departure in shipbuilding for the Upper Yangtze River service has been inaugurated by the Roscoe L. Hambleton, Inc., an American company in Shanghai, who recently launched their first vessel, the s.s. *Foo Chuan* which is equipped with two full Diesel engines especially designed and constructed for the upper river traffic. These engines were supplied by the Atlas Imperial Engine Company of Oakland, California.

The s.s. *Foo Chuan* is the first of a fleet of modern shallow draft vessels which the firm of Roscoe L. Hambleton, Inc. expect to put upon the Yangtze Gorges route. It marks the first entrance of full Diesel engines upon this upper river waterway.

The final British trials were successfully concluded at Southampton in September of the *Fushun*, shallow-draft twin-screw cargo and passenger boat, designed

and built by John I. Thornycroft & Co., Ltd., to the order of Mr. Fung Kan-yu of Hongkong, for service on the upper Yangtze River of China. The writer, as British correspondent of the *Far Eastern Review*, was among those who accepted the courteous invitation of Messrs Thornycroft to attend the trials. High speed, shallow draught and extreme handiness are essential features, while definite limits of length are set by reason of the sharpness of some of the bends. In addition to the problems imposed on builders by the physical characteristics of the river, there is the equally important question of providing a sufficient deadweight carrying capacity to enable the vessel to trade profitably.

The principal dimensions of the *Fushun* are as follow:—

| | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Length overall | 147' 8" |
| Breadth Moulded | 28' 0" |
| Depth Moulded | 8' 6" |
| Draft, mean F. W. | 6' 0" |
| Deadweight on 5' draft | 103 tons. |
| Deadweight on 6' draft | 201 " |
| Measurement of space about | 23,000 cubic feet. |
| Complement | 43 officers and crew, 136 passengers. |
| Speed oil load-d | Designed. Actual. |
| Speed coal loaded | 13.5 k. 13.9 |
| | 13.5 k. 13.9 |

New Coasting Vessel.

The following are the details of the s.s. *Taisihan*, the new twin-screw steamer for the Hongkong, Canton and Macao Steamboat Co., Ltd., for their Hongkong-Canton service, which was launched by the Taikoo Dockyard & Engineering Co. of Hongkong, Ltd. on June 10, 1925.

| | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|
| Length overall | 300-ft. |
| Length between perpendiculars | 290-ft. |
| Breadth extreme | 56-ft. 2-in. |
| Breadth moulded | 54-ft. |
| Depth moulded to saloon deck | 22-ft. |
| Depth moulded to main deck | 13-ft. |

The vessel has a double bottom fitted all fore and aft, two large cargo holds and a smaller hold specially fitted up for the carriage of silk. There are three decks, accommodation being provided on the saloon and boat decks for 49 first class passengers and 24 second class. Intermediate passengers are berthed aft on the saloon deck in a large deckhouse while the third class are carried on the main deck.

The captain, officers, engineers, wireless room and navigating quarters have been placed on a deck somewhat higher than the passenger deck forming a citadel, which meets all the special requirements of the Anti-Piracy Committee.

The foremen and engine room staff are housed conveniently to the engine room and "grilled off" from the main deck, so that they cannot be interfered with in the event of piracy. Electric light is fitted throughout the vessel and numerous fans provided; hot and cold water service is laid on to all wash basins throughout the vessel.

The propelling machinery consists of two sets of inverted, direct-acting surface-condensing four cylinder triple-expansion engines working on four cranks which are balanced so as to, as far as possible, eliminate vibration. The diameters of the cylinders of each set of engines are 19-in., 30-in., 35-in., 35-in., with a stroke of 27-in. and they are designed to give the vessel a speed of 15 knots when developing collectively 3,500 i.h.p. and running at about 180 revolutions per minute but are capable of developing 4,000 i.h.p. at 200 revolutions so as to increase the speed if desired.

Steam is provided by four cylindrical, multitubular marine boilers each 15-ft. 6-in. diameter by 11-ft. 7-in. long having three "Morison" corrugated furnaces 3-ft.

10 in. internal diameter and they have been constructed in accordance with Board of Trade rules, under Hongkong Government supervision for a working pressure of 200 lbs. per sq. in. They are arranged for burning coal with provision for changing over to oil burning at a future date if desired and work under Howden's system of forced draught.

REGULAR LINES, CARGO AND/OR PASSENGER.

Ocean Steam Ship Co., Ltd. & China Mutual S. N. Co., Ltd. (Blue Funnel Line).
 Canadian Pacific Ocean Services.
 "Glen" and "Shire" Lines.
 Ellerman & Bucknall S. S. Co., Ltd
 "Ben" Line of Steamers Ltd.
 "Prince" Line
 Lloyd Triestino.
 Holland-Oost Azte Lijn.
 Hamburg-Amerika Linie.
 East Asiatic Co., Ltd. of Copenhagen.
 Swedish East Asiatic Co. of Gothenburg.
 Dodwell Line (James Chambers & Co.)
 Struthers and Barry.
 Tampa Inter-Ocean S. S. Co.
 Pacific Mail Steamship Co.
 Norddeutscher Lloyd, Bremen.
 Messageries Maritimes.
 P. & O., B. I. E. & A. Lines
 N. Y. K. Line.*
 Oregon Oriental Line
 Dollar Steamship Line.
 American Oriental Mail Line.
 O. S. K.
 Soviet Merchantile Fleet.
 Wilh. Wilhelmsen Line of Norway.

COAST AND RIVER STEAMERS.

| Steamer. | Built. | Gross Register Tonnage. |
|--|--------|-------------------------|
| ASIATIC PETROLEUM Co. (NORTH-CHINA) LTD. (British) | | |
| Asiatica | 1909 | 318 |
| Ah Kwang | 1913 | 612 |
| Chin Kwang | 1926 | 537.65 |
| Fu-Kwang | 1922 | 1402 |
| Hai Kwang | 1926 | 898.62 |
| Shu Kwang | 1924 | 731.54 |
| Tien Kwang | 1925 | 730.93 |
| Yang Peh | 1916 | 311 |
| CANTON NAVIGATION COMPANY, LTD. (British) | | |
| Wuchow | 1909 | 436 |
| CHIU ON S. S. Co., LTD. (British) | | |
| Hydrangea | 1916 | 1131 |
| Chiu On | 1904 | 20 |
| CHINA IMPORT & EXPORT LUMBER Co., LTD. (British) | | |
| Tsang Tah | 1915 | 769 |
| Hsin Tseanglah | 1918 | 986 |

*Combined with the T. K. K. Line.

Gross Register Tonnage.

| Steamer. | Built. | Gross Register Tonnage. |
|---|------------|-------------------------|
| CHINA MERCHANTS' STEAM NAVIGATION Co. (Chinese) | | |
| Feiching | 1883 | 1539 |
| Hae-ai | 1873 | 1344 |
| Hsin Chang | 1905 | 2000 |
| Hsin Chi | 1892 | 1846 |
| Hsin Fung | 1891 | 1846 |
| Hsin Kong | 1906 | 2146 |
| Hsin Ming | 1907 | 2133 |
| Hsin Kiangteen | 1921 | 3659 |
| Hsin Wah | 1921 | 1940 |
| Irene | 1890 | 1343 |
| Ka Ho | 1891 | 1680 |
| Kiang An | 1921 | 3141 |
| Kiangching | 1900 | 1682 |
| Kiang Hsin | 1905 | 3372 |
| Kiang Shun | 1921 | 3141 |
| Kianglah | 1900 | 1682 |
| Kiangteen | 1870 | 2012 |
| Kiang Wah | 1912 | 3692 |
| Kiangyu | 1883 | 3098 |
| Kiangyung | 1876 | 1451 |
| Kuling | 1885 | 498 |
| Kung Ping | 1894 | 2705 |
| Kwang Chi | 1887 | 505 |
| Kwang Lee | 1883 | 2159 |
| Kwang Tah | 1883 | 2474 |
| Kwei Lee | 1893 | — |
| Taishun | 1896 | 1962 |
| Tao Nan | 1881 | 1537 |
| Tung Wah | 1906 | 1176 |
| Yu Shun | 1900 | 1696 |
| CHINA NAVIGATION COMPANY, LTD. (British) | | |
| Anhui | 1925 | 3494 |
| Anking | 1925 | 3494 |
| Antung | (Building) | — |
| Changchow | 1901 | 1948 |
| CHINA NAVIGATION Co., LD.—(Continued). | | |
| Changlo | 1917 | 248 |
| Changning | 1921 | 251 |
| Chang Sha | 1922 | 2493 |
| Changteh | 1914 | 244 |
| Chekian | 1914 | 2171 |
| Chenan | 1903 | 2209 |
| Chengling | 1915 | 141 |
| Chengpu | 1924 | 28 |
| Chengtu | 1914 | 2218 |
| Chihli | 1895 | 1862 |
| Chinhua | 1903 | 2207 |
| Chinkiang | 1898 | 1986 |
| Chinkong | 1917 | 250 |
| Chuchow | 1925 | 30 |
| Chungking | 1914 | 2171 |
| Chunsan | 1921 | 158 |

| Steamer. | Built. | Gross Register Tonnage. |
|---|--------|-------------------------|
| China Navigation Co., Ltd.—(Continued). | | |
| Chusan | 1914 | 2218 |
| Chuling | 1920 | 207 |
| Fatshan | 1887 | 2616 |
| Fengtien | 1905 | 1765 |
| Foochow | 1895 | 1994 |
| Hangang | 1901 | 1956 |
| Hsin Peking | 1905 | 2866 |
| Huichow | 1905 | 2001 |
| Hupei | 1901 | 1951 |
| Ichang | 1898 | 1984 |
| Kalgun | 1921 | 2655 |
| Kanchow | 1905 | 2001 |
| Kansu | 1895 | 1862 |
| Kangling | 1926 | 423 |
| Kashing | 1895 | 1862 |
| Kaying | 1922 | 2626 |
| Kian | 1907 | 1195 |
| Kiangsu | 1921 | 2661 |
| Kiating | 1925 | 423 |
| Kingjuan | 1921 | 2653 |
| Kinlang | 1926 | 423 |
| Kiuikiang | 1898 | 1985 |
| Kiungchow | 1921 | 2653 |
| Koh Kham | 1922 | 144 |
| Kueichow | 1905 | 2001 |
| Kwangchow | 1921 | 2626 |
| Kwangse | 1898 | 1985 |
| Kwangtung | 1921 | 2626 |
| Kweiyang | 1921 | 2644 |
| Liangchow | 1905 | 1999 |
| Linan | 1903 | 2211 |
| Luchow | 1905 | 2000 |
| Nanchang | 1922 | 2485 |
| Nanning | 1922 | 2485 |
| Neuchuang | 1922 | 2485 |
| Neankin | 1883 | 2732 |
| Ninghai | 1925 | 2484 |
| Ningpo | 1898 | 1985 |
| Pakhoi | 1895 | 1992 |
| Patung | 1923 | 48 |
| Pootung | 1919 | 86 |
| Poyang | 1891 | 2551 |
| Shantung | 1915 | 2549 |
| Shansi | 1898 | 1984 |
| Shasi | 1910 | 1327 |
| Shengking | 1895 | 1650 |
| Shuntien | 1904 | 1758 |
| Shutung and Flal | 1909 | 271 in all |
| Siangtan | 1905 | 1195 |
| Sinkiang | 1915 | 2646 |
| Siu-han | 1926 | 296 |
| Soochow | 1921 | 2604 |
| Suiting | 1926 | 296 |
| Suitung | 1917 | 2590 |

CHINA NAVIGATION Co., Ltd.—(Continued).

| Steamer. | Built. | Gross Register Tonnage. | Flag. |
|--|--------|-------------------------|-----------|
| Sanning | 1916 | 2555 | |
| Szechuen | 1920 | 2604 | |
| Taikoo | 1917 | 83 | |
| Taikoo Hang | 1924 | 32 | |
| Taming | 1903 | 2209 | |
| Tatung | 1891 | 2548 | |
| Tean | 1904 | 2202 | |
| Tientsin | 1895 | 1992 | |
| Tungting | 1900 | 2036 | |
| Tungchow | 1914 | 2104 | |
| Wanhsten | 1921 | 867 | |
| Wanlu | 1920 | 1111 | |
| Wantung | 1921 | 1114 | |
| Wenchow | 1923 | 3112 | |
| Wangpu | 1921 | 3204 | |
| Wosung | 1918 | 3426 | |
| Wuchang | 1914 | 3204 | |
| Wuhu | 1895 | 1922 | |
| Yingchow | 1905 | 2000 | |
| Yungling | 1923 | 81 | |
| Yunnan | 1901 | 1953 | |
| CHINESE ENGINEERING AND MINING Co., LTD.* | | | |
| Kaiping | 1905 | 2563 | British |
| Tonjer | 1920 | 3268 | Norwegian |
| Skymer | 1921 | 1984 | Norwegian |
| Unita | 1906 | 3586 | Norwegian |
| Patriot | 1887 | 2545 | British |
| Huach Wu | 1898 | 4249 | Chinese |
| Elida Clausen | 1920 | 2471 | Norwegian |
| Fei Ha | 1905 | 1734 | Chinese |
| Corona | 1920 | 3264 | Norwegian |
| Damplo | 1921 | 2515 | Norwegian |
| Amur | 1897 | 2272 | Norwegian |
| Shinsei Maru I | 1901 | 4354 | Japanese |
| Haukefjell | 1921 | 2521 | Norwegian |
| Raunefjell | 1921 | 2475 | Norwegian |
| CHINESE GOVERNMENT STEAMSHIP ADMINISTRATION. (Chinese) | | | |
| Huach Jah | 1900 | 6026 | |
| Huach Lee | 1900 | 1682 | |
| Huach Ta | 1900 | 1682 | |
| Huach Yih | 1899 | 5174 | |
| CHING KEE S. N. Co., Ltd. (Chinese) | | | |
| An Lee | 1906 | 1643 | |
| Chenglee | 1916 | 1200 | |
| Chun Lee | 1919 | 1203 | |
| Englee | 1901 | 1383 | |
| Feng Lee | 1902 | 1632 | |
| Foo Lee | 1900 | 1376 | |
| Heng Ta | 1902 | 1529 | |
| Kia Lee | 1908 | 4176 | |

* The fleet of Steamers of this Company is constantly changing as vessels go off charter and are replaced by others. The normal fleet is 100,000 tons D/W.

| Steamer. | Built. | Gross Register Tonnage. |
|---|--------|-------------------------|
| HOONG ON S. N. Co., LTD. | | |
| Chang On | 1890 | 1661 |
| Teh Hsing | 1889 | 1642 |
| INDO-CHINA STEAM NAVIGATION Co., LTD. (British) | | |
| Chak Sang | 1917 | 2358 |
| Chang Wo | 1891 | 1065 |
| Cheong Shing | 1905 | 1989 |
| Chit Shing | 1906 | 1984 |
| Fausang | 1921 | 2256 |
| Foo Shing | 1903 | 2284 |
| Fook Sang | 1905 | 3100 |
| Fuh Wo | 1922 | 953 |
| Han Wo | 1919 | 248 |
| Hang Sang | 1901 | 2143 |
| Hin Sang | 1905 | 2929 |
| Hop Sang | 1901 | 2149 |
| Hosang | 1922 | 5698 |
| Kia Wo | 1925 | 953 |
| Kiang Wo | 1901 | 2209 |
| King Wo | 1923 | 617 |
| Kum Sang | 1920 | 5415 |
| Kung Wo | 1921 | 4636 |
| Kutsang | 1922 | 5847 |
| Kut Wo | 1895 | 2665 |
| Kwai Sang | 1917 | 2320 |
| Kwong Sang | 1902 | 2283 |
| Laisang | 1901 | 3460 |
| Lee Sang | 1907 | 1655 |
| Lien Shing | 1924 | 2416 |
| Loongwo | 1906 | 3923 |
| Luenho | 1905 | 2868 |
| Mausang | 1920 | 3372 |
| Ming Sang | 1907 | 1650 |
| Min Wo | 1925 | 287 |
| Nam Sang | 1902 | 4035 |
| Ping Wo | 1922 | |
| Shun Wo | 1917 | 220 |
| Siang Wo | 1926 | 2671 |
| Sui Sang | 1923 | 3229 |
| Sui Wo | 1896 | 2672 |
| Tingsang | 1922 | 2256 |
| Tuck Wo | 1904 | 3770 |
| Tung Wo | 1914 | 1337 |
| Wai-Shing | 1903 | 1865 |
| Yat Shing | 1904 | 2284 |
| Yu Sang | 1912 | 1844 |
| Yuen Sang | 1923 | 3229 |
| JAVA-CHINA-JAPAN LIJN. (Dutch) | | |
| Tjibesar | 1922 | 10,836 |
| Tjibodas | 1906 | 4660 |
| Tjikandi | 1921 | 7979 |
| Tjikarang | 1922 | 9505 |
| Tjikembang | 1914 | 8013 |
| Tjikini | 1907 | 4597 |

| Steamer. | Built. | Gross Register Tonnage. |
|--|--------|-------------------------|
| CHING KEE S. N. Co., LTD. (Chinese).—(Continued). | | |
| Hsin Lee | 1916 | 1198 |
| Hung Lee | 1901 | 771 |
| Kung Lee | 1914 | 549 |
| Kwang Lee | 1897 | 1033 |
| Mao Lee | 1911 | 1962 |
| Sang Lee | 1914 | 632 |
| Shanglee | 1891 | 924 |
| Tai Lee | 1919 | 1829 |
| Tong Lee | 1916 | 612 |
| Tsenglee | 1902 | 1408 |
| Yiu Lee | 1918 | 967 |
| Yung Lee | 1913 | 494 |
| Shun Lee | 1906 | 628 |
| Shun Lee | 1902 | 1529 |
| CHEONG YUE STEAMSHIP Co., LTD. (Chinese) | | |
| Phranang | 1888 | 1643 |
| Deuawongse | 1890 | 1604 |
| Yue Ying Wa | 1876 | 1351 |
| DAI DAH S. S. Co. (Chinese) | | |
| Ta Chi | 1904 | 221 |
| Ta Ning | 1903 | 134 |
| Ta Shun | 1905 | 277 |
| DAIREN KAISEN KABUSHIKI KAISHA. (Japanese) | | |
| Benten Maru | 1907 | 197 |
| Chohei Maru | 1920 | 1793 |
| Chojun Maru | 1918 | 2213 |
| Ekishen Maru | 1918 | 993 |
| Hakushin Maru | 1914 | 1482 |
| Isshin Maru | 1914 | 1440 |
| Kaishu Maru | 1913 | 172 |
| Kojuu Maru | 1917 | 2178 |
| Manshu Maru | 1921 | 5267 |
| Ryohai Maru | 1910 | 742 |
| Ryusho Maru | 1897 | 2880 |
| Satsuu Maru | 1911 | 1037 |
| Taisho Maru | 1896 | 2579 |
| Tencho Maru | 1812 | 1261 |
| Yekishin Maru | 1918 | 993 |
| DOUGLAS STEAMSHIP Co., LTD. (British) | | |
| Haiching | 1899 | 2080 |
| Hai-Hong | 1898 | 2067 |
| Haiyang | 1908 | 2289 |
| Hai Ning | 1924 | 2017 |
| HAN YEH PING IRON & COAL Co. (Chinese) | | |
| Han Ping | 1908 | 952 |
| HENG AN STEAMSHIP Co. (Chinese) | | |
| Heng An | 1888 | 1646 |
| Heng Chong | 1904 | 1795 |
| Ta Chung | 1896 | 1825 |
| Hua Ming | 1903 | 1613 |
| HONGKONG, CANTON & MACAO STEAMBOAT Co., LTD. (British) | | |
| Kinshan | 1903 | 2773 |
| Lungshan | 1923 | 3068 |
| Sui-An | 1899 | 1682 |
| Sui-Tai | 1899 | 1265 |
| Taishan | 1925 | 3173 |

| Steamer. | Built. | Gross Register Tonnage. |
|--|--------|-------------------------|
| JAVA-CHINA-JAPAN IJIN. (Dutch).—(Continued). | | |
| Tjileboet | 1918 | 5760 |
| Tjiliuwong | 1905 | 4809 |
| Tjimanoké | 1911 | 5620 |
| Tjipanas | 1903 | 3815 |
| Tjisaalok | 1917 | 5787 |
| Tjisondari | 1915 | 8039 |
| Tjitaroem | 1910 | 5775 |
| Tjisaroera | 1925 | 7089 |
| LUEN S. S. CO., LTD. (British) | | |
| Luen Ho | 1905 | 2868 |
| Luen Yi | 1905 | 2868 |
| MAN WING S. S. CO., LTD. | | |
| Haitan | 1887 | 1856 |
| MOLLER & CO. | | |
| Loong-Hwa | 1918 | 2499 |
| Hat-Yen | 1903 | 1449 |
| Yang-Ning | 1894 | 2615 |
| Kwong-Foh | 1896 | 2255 |
| King-Sing | 1900 | 4204 |
| Henli | 1903 | 1199 |
| H. M. H. NEMAZEE & CO. (Persian) | | |
| Arabestan | 1896 | 6689 |
| Armanestan | 1903 | 5029 |
| Dashtestan | 1889 | 3271 |
| Engleslan | 1899 | 7077 |
| Gorjistan | 1895 | 4435 |
| Lorestan | 1897 | 2242 |
| Namestan | 1892 | 4478 |
| Sarwistan | 1899 | 7740 |
| Seistan | 1890 | 2539 |
| Tangistan | 1901 | 4159 |
| Sealda | 1902 | 5431 |
| NINGPO SHAO SHING S. N. CO., LTD. (Chinese) | | |
| Hsin Ningshao | 1914 | 2551 |
| Ning Shao | 1905 | 1920 |
| Yangshin | 1885 | 999 |
| NISSHIN KISEN 'KABUSHIKI KAISHA. (Japanese) | | |
| Feng Yang Maru | 1915 | 3977.13 |
| I Yang Maru | 1921 | 943.46 |
| Kashitwa Maru | 1924 | 222.32 |
| Lusnan Maru | 1920 | 2531.05 |
| Matsu Maru | 1923 | 217.91 |
| Momo Maru | 1911 | 34.26 |
| Nan Yang Maru | 1907 | 3310.29 |
| Paling Maru | 1907 | 2422.68 |

| Steamer | Built. | Gross Register Tonnage. |
|---|--------|-------------------------|
| NISSHIN KISEN 'KABUSHIKI KAISHA. (Japanese).—(Continued). | | |
| Siang Kiang Maru | 1903 | 935.42 |
| Siang Yang Maru | 1907 | 3302.47 |
| Sui Yang Maru | 1917 | 3078.08 |
| Sungshan Maru | 1921 | 2529.69 |
| Tachang Maru | 1901 | 2421.45 |
| Tachi Maru | 1901 | 1891.95 |
| Tahung Maru | 1905 | 1643.49 |
| Tajoo Maru | 1900 | 2555.21 |
| Talee Maru | 1900 | 2005.34 |
| Tayuen Maru | 1899 | 1694.67 |
| Ume Maru | 1904 | 118.85 |
| Wooling Maru | 1906 | 1458.56 |
| Yohyang Maru | 1906 | 3298.01 |
| Yuen Kiang Maru | 1903 | 875.32 |
| Yang Yang Maru | 1922 | 1037.98 |
| Huashan Maru | 1926 | 2089.96 |
| Tangshan Maru | 1926 | 2089.96 |
| RUSSIAN VOLUNTEER FLEET.* (Soviet Mercantile Fleet.) | | |
| SAN PEH STEAM NAV. CO., LTD. (Chinese) | | |
| Fengpu | 1907 | 1819 |
| Fulang | 1907 | 1819 |
| Ningshin | 1913 | 2897 |
| Shinon | 1893 | 1753 |
| Shin'oo | 1884 | 2291 |
| Shin Ping | 1903 | 1895 |
| Wan-Hsiang | 1903 | 2096.00 |
| Tai-Shan | 1907 | 1752.98 |
| Fet-Hu | 1906 | 1734.84 |
| Ming-Hao | 1906 | 1734.84 |
| Shin-Shih | 1898 | 1966.55 |
| SHAWHSING S. S. CO., LTD. (Chinese) | | |
| Hohsing | 1900 | 2030 |
| Shawhsing | 1895 | 1276 |
| Tong An | 1891 | 1141 |
| Tonguen | 1901 | 573 |
| Yunghsing | 1915 | 832 |
| Yu-hsing | 1891 | 1559 |
| Lienhsing | 1891 | 1559 |
| SOUTH CHINA S. S. CO. (Chinese) | | |
| Hwah Wu | 1893 | 4249 |
| Hwah Cheng | 1894 | 2600 |
| SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY CO. (Japanese) | | |
| Boto Maru | 1908 | 225 |
| Ento Maru | 1908 | 223 |
| Dairen Maru | 1921 | 400 |
| Holen Maru | 1921 | 400 |
| Nanto Maru | 1910 | 152 |
| Soya Maru | 1907 | 107 |
| Taisan Maru | 1912 | 419 |
| Tetto Maru | 1909 | 102 |

* No data furnished.

Steamer. Built. Gross Register Tonnage.
SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY Co. (Japanese).—(Continued).

| Steamer. | Built. | Gross Register Tonnage. |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|
| <i>Tugs.</i> | | |
| Heito Maru | 1910 | 569 |
| Nanzan Maru | 1910 | 462 |
| Dairen Maru | 1921 | 437 |
| Holen Maru | 1921 | 427 |
| Taisan Maru | 1912 | 419 |
| Sanzan Maru | 1910 | 416 |
| Ryusan Maru | 1910 | 416 |
| Boto Maru | 1908 | 224 |
| Yento Maru | 1908 | 223 |
| Nanto Maru | 1910 | 152 |
| Hokusan Maru | 1920 | 109 |
| Soqa Maru | 1907 | 107 |
| Tetto Maru | 1909 | 102 |
| Kinto Maru | 1914 | 83 |
| Tsinlau Maru | 1912 | 76 |
| Shinto Maru | 1914 | 73 |
| Kaiyo Maru | 1905 | 69 |
| Choto Maru | 1912 | 61 |
| Hokuto Maru | 1910 | 57 |
| Myoho Maru | 1904 | 41 |
| Tokiusa Maru | 1899 | 34 |
| Meiji Maru | 1908 | 31 |
| Boshin Maru | 1908 | 31 |
| Mizuho Maru | 1911 | 24 |
| STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK. | | |
| (American) | | |
| Mei An | 1901 | 934 |
| Mei Chuen | 1923 | 975 |
| Mei Foo | 1912 | 912 |
| Mei Nan | 1918 | 364 |
| Mei Hsia | (Under Construction) | |
| Mei Ming | 1912 | 240 |
| Mei Hung | 1912 | 240 |
| Mei Shan | 1915 | 274 |
| Mei Yun | 1915 | 274 |

INLAND WATERS STEAM NAVIGATION: VESSELS REGISTERED, 1920 TO 1924.

| PORT. | ON REGISTER AT END OF YEAR. | | | | WITH-DRAWALS. | NEW REGISTRY. | 1924. | | TOTAL. |
|----------------|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------|
| | 1920. | 1921. | 1922. | 1923. | | | Foreign Flag. | Chinese Flag. | |
| | No. | No. | No. | No. | | | | | |
| ANTUNG..... | 7 | 10 | 16 | 19 | 9 | 1 | 18 | 9 | 27 |
| DAIREN..... | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 12 | 2 | 6 | 9 | 15 |
| NEWCHANG..... | 1 | 8 | 13 | 28 | 20 | 28 | 4 | 16 | 20 |
| TIENTSIN..... | 22 | 27 | 41 | 52 | 7 | 11 | 10 | 38 | 48 |
| LUNGKOW..... | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | — | 1 | 1 |
| CHEFOO..... | 5 | 16 | 24 | 16 | 15 | 5 | 1 | 25 | 26 |
| KIAOCHOW..... | 1 | 4 | 14 | 9 | 11 | 11 | 3 | 6 | 9 |
| CHUNGKING..... | 4 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 19 | 18 | 7 | 1 | 8 |
| SHASI..... | 11 | 11 | 12 | 16 | 3 | — | 4 | 15 | 19 |
| CHANGSHA..... | 86 | 94 | 103 | 109 | 17 | 6 | 35 | 85 | 120 |
| HANKOW..... | 238 | 279 | 324 | 330 | 26 | 9 | 87 | 260 | 347 |
| KIUKIANG..... | 45 | 45 | 50 | 53 | 6 | 2 | 11 | 46 | 57 |
| WUHU..... | 46 | 48 | 49 | 46 | 25 | 25 | 21 | 25 | 46 |
| NANKING..... | 20 | 22 | 24 | 27 | 5 | 2 | 8 | 22 | 30 |
| CHINKIANG..... | 31 | 35 | 37 | 39 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 31 | 40 |
| SHANGHAI..... | 374 | 359 | 397 | 420 | 89 | 68 | 126 | 315 | 441 |
| SOOCHOW..... | 13 | 16 | 15 | 10 | — | — | 8 | 2 | 10 |
| NINGPO..... | 21 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 1 | 1 | — | 22 | 22 |
| WENCHOW..... | 6 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 3 | — | — | 7 | 7 |
| SANTUAO..... | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FOOCHOW..... | 32 | 32 | 38 | 39 | 7 | 4 | 12 | 30 | 42 |
| AMOY..... | 35 | 48 | 67 | 83 | 27 | 20 | 42 | 48 | 90 |
| SWATOW..... | 61 | 53 | 62 | 78 | 26 | 12 | 15 | 77 | 92 |
| CANTON..... | 542 | 600 | 640 | 708 | 214 | 167 | 276 | 479 | 755 |
| KONGMOON..... | 15 | 7 | 10 | 15 | 6 | 3 | 14 | 4 | 18 |
| SAMSHUI..... | 2 | 6 | 5 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 8 |
| WUCHOW..... | 30 | 31 | 34 | 39 | 17 | 3 | 28 | 25 | 53 |
| NANNING..... | 24 | 34 | 34 | 21 | 7 | 7 | 12 | 9 | 21 |
| KIUNGCHOW..... | — | 1 | — | — | 22 | 22 | — | 1 | 1 |
| PAKHOI..... | — | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | — |
| TOTAL..... | 1,678 | 1,820 | 2,045 | 2,205 | 599 | 431 | 763 | 1,610 | 2,373 |