

CHAPTER XV. SHIPPING.

1928

Certain phases of this subject are discussed in the Chapters on Commerce and Labour.

The general provisions with regard to extraterritoriality govern the relations between the law of China and oceanic shipping. In most countries, inland navigation is reserved to natives of the country. In China, however, the inland waterways are open to foreign navigation. The Inland Steam Navigation Regulations of 1898, provided that vessels engaged in inland navigation must register at Treaty Ports and that they must report their movements to Customs officials. No unregistered vessel may ply inland. Special regulations were issued in August 1898 by the Commissioner of Customs, governing Yangtze navigation. "The merchant vessels of the Treaty of Customs were authorized to trade at certain specified Treaty Ports and to land and ship goods in accordance with special regulations at certain enumerated non-treaty ports. Shipment or discharge of cargo at other points on the river was prohibited. However, it was provided that passengers and their baggage might be landed or shipped at any of the regular passenger stations—the baggage, however, upon pain of confiscation, not to contain articles subject to duty."^{*}

A revision of the Inland Navigation Rules followed the signing of the Sino-British Treaty of 1902. By these regulations, "British (and therefore other foreign) steamship owners are to have the right to lease warehouses and jetties on the banks of waterways for terms not exceeding twenty-five years, with option of renewal on terms to be mutually agreed upon. Such jetties, however are not to be erected in such position as to obstruct the inland waterway or interfere with navigation. The sanction of the nearest Commissioner of Customs is to be obtained, which sanction is not to be arbitrarily withheld.

"Foreign merchants are to pay taxes and contributions on these warehouses and jetties on the same footing as Chinese owners of similar properties.

"The main object of the British Government, it is declared, 'in desiring to see the inland waterways of China opened to steam navigation being to afford facilities for the rapid transport of both foreign and native merchandise, they undertake to offer no impediment to the transfer to a Chinese company and the Chinese flag of any British steamer which may now or hereafter be employed on the inland waters of China, should the owner be willing to make the transfer. In the event of a Chinese company registered under Chinese law being formed to run steamers on the inland waters of China, the fact of a British subject holding shares in such company shall not entitle the steamers to fly the British flag.'"

Registered steamers are forbidden to carry contraband.

In all ports, vessels are required to pay various dues to the Harbour Master, who is under the control of the Chinese Maritime Customs. Certain dues are also levied in connexion with conservancy work. A schedule of all dues is obtainable from the Chinese Maritime Customs.

For Cargo landing procedure at Shanghai and Hongkong see *China Year Book*, 1926, page 819.

* Quotations from Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*

TONNAGE OF VESSELS ENGAGED IN THE CARRYING TRADE FROM AND TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND BETWEEN OPEN PORTS. PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTED BY PRINCIPAL FLAGS 1916 AND 1925.

1916		1925	
Tons	Percentage	Tons	Percentage
British	35,840,573	Other Flags	5.00%
Japanese	24,233,835	Norwegian	1.89%
Chinese*	23,397,109	German	1.94%
Other	4,548,584	American	4.57%
Total	88,020,101	Chinese*	25.74%
1916		1925	
Other Flags	5.17%	British	40.72%
Chinese*	26.56%	Japanese	27.53%
Japanese	27.53%	Other	3.18%
Total	88,020,101	Total	128,202,625

Last year's report under this heading began, "1925 will probably go down in shipping history in China, as the worst year." 1926 showed some improvement but not sufficient to make up for the losses of the previous year.

In spite of the strikes in Shanghai, Hankow and other ports, business was not as bad as in 1925, because cargoes somehow had to move. The fact that practically all railways were occupied by the military and were inactive for commercial purposes, gave shipping additional business which somewhat compensated for losses in other directions. Foreign shipping companies benefitted by the elimination for long periods of important Chinese shipping companies, such as the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company.

In a port like Shanghai, the total tonnage over 1925 actually increased from 30,284,855 to 33,323,429 tons, but actual business was very bad owing to strikes, civil wars, the detention of ships by the military and other causes for the disturbance of trade. The increase in 1926, however, cannot be taken on its face value as 1925 saw a decrease of fully two million tons as compared with 1924.

Owing to the anti-British boycott and the fact that Chinese ships had been seized by the military men for the transportation of troops, Japanese shipping rose from 8,066,612 in 1925 to 9,382,846 tons in 1926. Danish shipping increased over 30,000 tons compared with 1925; French, about 20,000 tons—while Norwegian tonnage increased fully 100,000 tons over 1925. Russian tonnage continued to gain, rising 50,000 tons over 1925. Great Britain, nevertheless, maintained her predominant position in Coastwise and River Tonnage, controlling 37.98% as against 21.19% for Japan and 30.56% for Chinese shipping.

The "Investors' Review" in a study of the shipping situation in China, analyses the condition of the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company as an example of the effects of the general chaos in China on British shippings. Parts of the review are worth reproducing here:

"The company is managed by the great Eastern merchants, Jardine, Matheson & Company, and apart from the fluctuations inherent in such a business it attained a wonderful measure of success and established itself in what appeared to be an impregnable position. With a capital of only £496,000, half in 6% cumulative preferred, and half in deferred ordinary shares of £5 each, it has built up a fleet of 105,400 gross tons, valued at £2,111,000, and five years ago it had reserves amounting to nearly £1,800,000, against which there were gilt-edged investments for £1,360,000. Of course, it has encountered its full share of the vicissitudes inherent in an under-taking of this kind, and from 1909 to 1914 only two small dividends could be paid on the deferred shares. But for 1915 the latter got 16 per cent (including 13½ per cent. from exchange adjustments,) for each of the years 1918-20 56 per cent., and for 1921 50 per cent. At the end of the last-mentioned year the various reserves, including underwriting account, amounted to over £2,600,000, which sufficiently indicates the careful husbanding of resources of the company that has always distinguished its management. How useful these accumulations have proved in the recent lean years will be gathered from the following table:—

	1925	1924	1923	1922
	£	£	£	£
Loss on working	203,000	104,000	136,000	335,000
Depreciation	109,000	105,000	100,000	107,000
From reserves	335,000	209,000	245,000	425,000
Interest	—	12,000	17,000	45,000
Carried forward	700	1,000	1,200	2,200
Reserves	654,000	989,000	1,180,000	1,365,000
Creditors	435,000	259,000	242,000	279,000
Debtors	246,000	268,000	263,000	285,000
Investments	88,000	246,000	550,000	880,000
Steamships, &c.	2,111,000	2,070,000	1,963,000	1,890,000
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* Including Junks Entered and Cleared at the Maritime Customs.

It will be observed that in the period covered by this statement reserves have been reduced by over £700,000, and investments for nearly £800,000 have had to be unloaded in order to provide for the losses incurred. The causes of this unfortunate state of affairs are, of course, entirely beyond the company's control. Continued unrest, resulting from political strife and military operations, we are told, occasioned severe restraint of commerce throughout the principal trade centres of China. The difficulties and risks experienced by merchants in moving merchandise to and from the interior points made business unremunerative where it could be done at all. This was naturally reflected in the general carrying trade and in conjunction with competitive charter rates on nearly all lines, both north and south, earnings even during the first half of the year did not cover expenses.

North China.

Interference with shipping was not as effective in the North as in other parts of China during 1926. The Northern military men sought to close the entrance to Tientsin at Taku but were prevented by the Powers. (Full details of the Taku Bar incident will be found on Pages 1031-3 of the 1926 CHINA YEAR BOOK.) The united and definite stand of the Powers, with regard to this particular incident and the fact that the northern cities were generally free from active fighting, led to no further incidents there. The fact that almost during the entire year the Tientsin-Pukow line was closed to commercial traffic, gave an advantage to shipping between Shanghai and northern ports, British and Japanese shipping particularly benefiting. There was no boycott against either British or Japanese shipping in North China.

South China.

Shipping in South China during 1926 was entirely affected by the anti-British boycott, which was a continuation of events starting in Shanghai on May 30, 1925. Except for one daily boat between Canton and Hongkong, British shipping had altogether ceased. There was an increase in Norwegian, Danish, German and Russian shipping, but as the boycott rules forbade ships coming to Canton to stop at Hongkong, important ocean lines naturally omitted the port. During 1926, when Marshal Sun Chuan-fang was at war with the Canton forces, he seized as many of the steamers of the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company and the San Wei steamers as he found in his territory, reducing to a minimum traffic between Shanghai and the Southern ports.

The year commenced with a quarrel between Colonel Hayley Bell, Commissioner of Customs at Canton and the strike pickets over the question of strike picket activities against goods in the custody of the Customs. On February 21, he declared the ports of Canton and Whampoa closed pending a surrender and return to the Customs for proper examination and assessment of duty of cargo irregularly removed from the Customs by the Strike Committee. In consequence, no steamers left Canton for several days. The Consular Body unanimously endorsed the Commissioner's action. The unloading of cargoes and personnel was prohibited. The Strike Committees had not only interfered with the movement of ships, but detained goods which they alleged to be contraband, meaning British goods of whatsoever nature. An example of the methods employed may here be quoted as taken from the *Hongkong Telegraph*:

So much has been heard of the boycott movement as a so-called work of sacrifice inspired by patriotic motives that it is interesting to learn the opinions of a Chinese who has just visited Canton and had an opportunity of investigating conditions first-hand. He says that the picket corps is generally regarded as a nuisance and little other than a business concern to extort money in defiance of good law and order. It is all a matter of dollars and cents, he says.

When a steamer calls at Whampoa, two pickets go aboard and remain there as long as the vessel is at the port, living on board at the expense of the ship's company or comradore. On the steamer's departure for Canton, two more pickets are sent on board either to relieve the former pair or in addition, and during the round trip, cigarettes, sampan hire and other petty expenses are provided for the pickets by the ship. The treatment accorded the steamer is according to the treatment accorded to the pickets—in other words, the despatch of the steamer is facilitated if good treatment be given to the pickets, whilst all sorts of delays are meted out in case of ill-treatment to the pickets.

"That foreign ships should grant such privileges to the pickets," says the informant, "only encourages the pickets in the exercise of their illegal actions; and with such latitude granted the pickets to prevent persons and goods from coming and going to Canton, with judicial powers to sentence offenders, and the privilege of accompanying all steamers from port to port it is easily seen that a large amount of legitimate revenue is lost to the Government."

By February 28, the Canton Government issued a proclamation to the effect that the Chinese Maritime Customs is the only authority for the collection of duties for the Chinese Government. "The public is therefore to note that there is to be no interference with the import or export of cargo." The day before,

Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance of the Nationalist Government announced the terms for the reopening of the port to traffic:

(1) The Strike Committee shall surrender all confiscated cargoes to the Customs House.

(2) The Canton Government guarantees that the Strike Committee shall not interfere with cargoes to be imported into Canton in future until after the cargoes have passed the Customs House.

From this moment onward shipping troubles at Canton and other Southern ports lessened, although business had become so stagnated that it took much of the year to bring about anything resembling normal conditions. By April, it is reported that the picket boats had become less violent in their attempts to interfere with the Hongkong boats.

A general description of shipping conditions between Hongkong and Canton is here given:

The Hongkong Government Gazette (May, 1926) contains a harbour notification issued by the Harbour Master in Canton to the effect that owing to the increase of ocean going steamers calling at that port, every available berth in the Harbour is occupied and a number of vessels have to wait berthing space, anchoring below Macao fort until a berth is available. In order to avoid serious risks attending the bringing of steamers into Harbour without knowing that a berth is available and turning round to go out again, masters of ocean going steamers are cautioned not to attempt to enter the Harbour but will anchor below Macao fort until notified by the Berthing Officers that a berth is available in the Harbour.

The boycott against Hongkong is accountable for the presence of so many ocean going steamers in Canton Harbour. Heretofore, all big vessels with cargoes and passengers for Canton did not go there directly but came only to Hongkong where connexions were made. The reason is that Hongkong Harbour offers excellent facilities for big liners, and is one of the best in the world. After the boycott, the Canton Government made a declaration that no vessels can go to that port if they pass through Hongkong on the inward or outward voyage. Now all ships from Europe, America and other places carrying passengers and goods to Canton go there without calling at this port. The result is the slump in shipping business to local steamship companies. The Dollar Line, Lloyd Triestino, Hugo Stinnes-Linien, and other shipping

companies maintain regular service from Canton to Europe, America, Shanghai, Manila, and other ports. The Canton River is narrow. The arrival and departure of these steamers cause a congestion, rendering necessary the foregoing notice.

Labour troubles, the anti-British boycott and contentions between Chinese employed by British ships, who were called, "Running dogs of British Imperialism," by the pickets, led to constant irritation until finally on June 24, the British Senior Naval officer at Wuchow, Commander Fitzmaurice, ordered the port of Wuchow blockaded. The general circumstances of the blockade were as follows:

A British subject had been murdered in the West River country and Commander Fitzmaurice had been sent with the gunboats *Tarantula*, *Moorhen* and *Robin* to investigate. Upon their arrival, the Wuchow authorities practically declined to provide them with pilots, either by demanding exorbitant pay or by delays. After waiting nearly a fortnight, on June 24, Commander Fitzmaurice blockaded the port. Early on June 25, the Wuchow authorities furnished the pilots and the blockade was lifted and the gunboats proceeded upstream. It should be pointed out that the local authorities were apparently disobeying instructions from the Canton Government, according to a statement in the House of Commons by Sir Austen Chamberlain. A statement issued by the *Canton Bureau of Information* on this question is typical of the political issues, which confused trade and shipping during the year:

"The Canton Foreign Office has authorized the publication of the following cablegram which the Canton Acting Foreign Minister has despatched to Mr. Trevelyan, who lately questioned Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons on the subject of the British blockade of Wuchow port:—

"Referring to Sir Austen Chamberlain's reply to your question regarding the British blockade of Wuchow port I have to state that the Canton Government did not issue instructions that facilities should be provided because the British have no treaty right to insist on Chinese authorities providing pilotage for British warships in Chinese inland waters. The Canton Foreign Office, however, requested the Wuchow Chinese authorities to facilitate passage of the British gunboats which, the Acting British Consul had stated, were already en route to recover the body of a dead British subject. The Wuchow authorities accordingly extended facilities, including presents of food and, finally, pilots, whose pay was borne by the Chinese authorities.

As the Chinese pilots in Wuchow for more than a year have refused to serve on British trading ships their objection was naturally stronger to serving on British warships. But the Chinese authorities eventually induced them to agree to do so in view of the object of the British mission, the dead being especially sacred with our people. Because of the inevitable delay for the pilots going on board the British Senior Naval Officer showed himself "most capable in using his discretion" by blockading the Chinese port of Wuchow for ten hours and thus committing an overt act of war against the Canton Nationalist Government. The British Senior Naval Officer doubtless has British precedent for this "international brigandage." That it is action of this sort that is forcing Chinese Nationalists to realize the hollowness of British official declarations affirming friendship for China and respect for her independence and sovereignty.

On August 26, the Nationalist troops captured Foochow and the entire forces and all the resources of the Canton Government were thrown into the Yangtze Valley. In December, the Government moved first to Nanchang and then to Wuhan. As soon as the Government left Canton, conditions, as far as shipping is concerned, began to improve. On October 10, the anti-British boycott was officially declared ended and by the 16th, two British and two Chinese steamers began to operate between Hongkong and Canton. During September, British

marines had occupied the wharves of the Hongkong and Canton Steamboat Company at Canton, so that passengers were able to come to the wharves instead of disembarking amid-stream. On September 12, it was reported that 500 passengers had come to Hongkong from Canton on one steamer, the *Lungshan*. The Indo-China Steam Navigation Company dispatched the *Fooshing* from Hongkong to Canton—the first of its ships to make the trip since the boycott commenced. Thus, by October 10, the Government was faced with the *fait accompli* of a partial resumption of British shipping and the necessity of quiet in Canton, while the soldiers were being occupied on the Yangtze front. A description of conditions in Canton, as obtaining on October 18, is herewith given from a correspondent of the *North China Daily News*:

Two British and two Chinese steamers have resumed passenger and freight service between Canton and Hongkong, and fully as many people are travelling back and forth by these steamers as in the days before the strike and boycott. Most of the barbed wire entanglements and the sand bags that guarded Shameen, the foreign concession, have been removed, and Chinese having business on the island are free to come and go without the necessity of first procuring passes. Nor have any of the foreigners in the concession any difficulty in securing Chinese help, and many of the old employees have been taken back by their Shameen masters.

Over 10 policemen are sent daily to the steamer wharves, and there have been no disturbances of any kind. Considerable quantities of perishable goods are being taken aboard the Hongkong boats every day, though, for the most part, they are loaded from river boats. Many coolies still seem to be afraid to carry goods into or away from the docks. Most of the cargo consigned to Shameen is still, in fact, being carried there by launch from the Hongkong steamers.

In Canton there are few who feel that the boycott has been entirely settled. The Strike Committee has said most plainly that it is still a life issue, and if its word is to be taken at face value, it spells defiance of the Canton government which, by printed proclamation, declared the boycott to be at an end. But a few days ago, the local manager of a foreign shipping concern wrote to Strike Headquarters asking whether or not any objection will be raised to the shipment of goods to Hongkong for transhipment to other countries. The answer came back that the strikers have only consented to the opening up of passenger travel; that the Strike Committee has not given its consent to the shipment of goods to Hongkong, even though the ultimate destination of those goods may be some place other than Hongkong. The interesting statement was also made that the strike is not yet over but it has simply assumed a new form.

On October 31, however, the Canton Government announced that all ships entering the port should be subject to a new inspection bureau acting independently of the regular Customs service. This inspection came to nothing. By November, shipping between Hongkong and Canton had become normal, although trade was not yet good. A description of conditions on November 10, follows:

The British steamers of the Hongkong, Canton and Macao Steamboat Company are running, but with less passengers than before the boycott. At that time they were the only steamers plying between Hongkong and Canton. Now Chinese-owned steamers have resumed their service and compete seriously with those of the Steamboat Company. The str. *Taishan*, a new and palatial steamer of the Company, returned last night with no more than 60 passengers (mostly Europeans) and no cargo. Passengers prefer to travel on Chinese ships because they can land and embark in Canton free from interference by unemployed seamen and other agitators. Travellers are urged to patronize only Chinese vessels. Taking advantage of this situation, a Chinese

company has been formed in Canton and owns a river steamer flying the Chinese flag and commanded by a German captain. She will maintain regular service with this port.

The stevedores and cargo coolies in Canton have declared they will not load or unload ships flying the British flag. This includes those owned by Chinese but registered in Hongkong. The str. *Tung On* comes in this category, and her cargo could not be unloaded on her last trip to Canton. The coasting steamers, *Cheongshing*, *Fooshing*, and *Lushan Maru*, returned from Canton without freight.

The Chinese steamship companies most of which have their head offices here are advised that if their ships are to be loaded or unloaded in Canton they must be registered with the Chinese authorities and must fly not the five-colour flag, but the Kuomintang emblem of a white sun on a blue sky with red background.

The *Hongkong Daily Press* says: "There is no sign or suggestion that the Canton Government is supporting directly or indirectly the Cargo Coolies Guild in their boycott of British steamers. On the contrary, the Canton Foreign Office has again directed the Chief of Police to protect all persons having business with British steamers on the Bund. Certain labour elements have been in control for so long that it is difficult to dislodge them."

Perhaps this movement lends colour to the denial of the Canton Government that it has nothing to do with boycott activities. People in Canton allege that this new form of boycott is a popular and spontaneous movement arising out of a series of causes. Hongkong thus far has not challenged the veracity of this statement.

The end of the year saw the end of most of the trouble, although there were sporadic efforts to create disturbances. Conditions became increasingly normal under the local officials, until shipping became more dependent upon trade than politics. It should be noted that all southern ports reflected events in Canton.

THE YANGTZE.

Shipping in the Yangtze became increasingly difficult as the year progressed. Chinese shipping was seized by the various military commanders on the river, which gave foreign shipping increased cargo, but after the Nationalist advance toward Hankow and the commencement of the war in Kiangsi between them and Marshal Sun Chuan-lang, shipping risks were high because both armies fired upon foreign shipping—the nationalists, particularly on British. Japanese and other non-British foreign shipping increased as the Nationalists took over larger parts of the Yangtze, as there was a boycott of British shipping, which became more violent from Hankow westward after the Wanhsien Incident. Almost as soon as the Nationalist troops arrived in the Yangtze, trouble developed between themselves and the foreigners, because of the firing on foreign ships, which, apparently, the authorities could not prevent, as troops acted often on their own.

The Wanhsien Incident.

The general facts of the Wanhsien Incident are not disputed any longer, although at the time, there was a most unfortunate exaggeration of the events from both Chinese and foreign sources, which led to reprisals against foreigners in the Upper Yangtze. These exaggerations were with regard to the numbers killed and the effect of the British gunboats firing upon the city—the Communist agitators accepting an exaggerated and ill-considered foreign report as true, and circulating it among the Chinese. The actual facts may be taken from the note to the Waichiaopu, dated September 20, and signed by Sir Ronald Macleay, which appears below:

BRITISH MEMORANDUM.

His Majesty's Minister has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Waichiaopu's Memoranda of the 10th and 14th instant on the subject of the seizure of British merchant steamers at Wanhsien in which four complaints are made against British steamers in connection with the sinking of junks on the Upper Yangtze as follows:—

- (1) the S.S. *Tien Kuang* on 13th June in the district of Wanhsien;
- (2) the S.S. *Wanliu* on 8th July in the district of Feng Tu;
- (3) the S.S. *Chia Li* on 2nd August at Fou T'an;
- (4) the S.S. *Wanliu* on 29th August at Yun Yang.

Owing to the interruption of regular communications, due to civil war conditions on the Yangtze, and to the fact that His Majesty's Consul, Chungking, is at the present moment in Ichang, His Majesty's Minister has so far only been able to obtain telegraphic reports in regard to these cases; but His Majesty's Consul, Chungking, states that of the four cases alleged, the first was never reported to him, the second was completely refuted, the third was referred to the steamship company concerned for observations and, in regard to the fourth, His Majesty's Consul, the day after it occurred, telegraphed to General Yang Sen that any claim against the *Wanliu* should be brought through his Consulate, when it would be promptly and equitably dealt with; and, in view of General Yang's high-handed action in detaining two British ships which had no connection with the Yun Yang incident, he at once proceeded to Wanhsien to deal with the matter in person.

His Majesty's Minister has already discussed this last *Wanliu* case and the grave incidents which have arisen out of it at an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 13th instant, and he has now the honour to place on record the following outline of the facts, as they have so far reached him.

The British steamer *Wanliu*, belonging to Messrs. Butterfield and Swire, on 29th August was discharging passengers at Yun Yang when she was boarded by sixteen armed soldiers, seeking to commandeer accommodation for the transport of Chinese troops, in violation of the regulations prohibiting British vessels in the interests of strict neutrality in Chinese civil war from carrying armed Chinese forces, while at the same time sampans containing troops approached the ship. The *Wanliu* proceeded slowly in order to avoid the sampans. Fire was opened from both banks of the river, and the troops on board rushed the bridge and the engine room, but the ship's officers drove them off. Meanwhile, sampans containing about eight people tried to come alongside, but fouled, and another boat drifted astern, eventually sinking. The soldiers on board seized the *Wanliu's* comradore and threatened to kill the captain, but an armed watch was kept on board until the ship's arrival at Wanhsien where the soldiers were removed by H.M.S. *Cockchafer*.

On August 29th or August 30th General Yang Sen, apparently as a reprisal against this incident, seized Messrs. Butterfield and Swire's steamers *Wantung* and *Wanhsien* at the port of Wanhsien, putting at least 300 soldiers on the steamers and detaining the six British ships' officers on board. General Yang declined to discuss the matter with the commander of the British gunboat *Cockchafer*, whereupon His Majesty's Consul, Chungking, at once hurried to Wanhsien to take charge of the negotiations. General Yang refused, however, to listen to his representations, or to release the steamers and their officers, until the matter of the *Wanliu* had been settled. His Majesty's Consul, acting under the instructions of His Majesty's Minister, exhausted every possible conciliatory effort, including naturally an offer of a proper legal enquiry, but, without result. General Yang declined to agree to any terms which did not permit him to exact compensation from the Company without regard to the actual facts of the case and all efforts for an amicable settlement failed.

On 5th September the British gunboat *Widgeon* with, the steamer *Kiawo*, the latter manned by four naval officers and sixty men, proceeded to Wanhsien to assist H.M.S. *Cockchafer* to effect the release of the ships and their officers. As soon as

the S.S. *Kiaow* approached one of the detained merchant vessels a murderous rifle and machine-gun fire was opened upon her without warning by the Chinese soldiers, and the other British vessels were also subjected to heavy rifle and field-gun fire from the troops on shore. The gunboats found themselves in self-defence compelled to return this fire against the points, including the town of Wanhsien, from which they were being attacked, and ultimately withdrew down river, having effected the release of five of the six officers from the merchant ships. The sixth officer, however, the Chief Engineer of the *Wantung*, is reported to have been wounded, and is presumed to have been drowned.

The British naval casualties sustained in the course of this operation were three officers and four men killed, and two officers and thirteen men wounded.

Pending the receipt of instructions, His Majesty's Minister must reserve, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, all their rights in connection with this grave incident. He would, however, in the meantime draw the attention of the Wai Chiao Pu to the fact that its immediate cause was the high-handed action of a Chinese military officer, attempting to commandeer a British ship for the transport of troops, and that His Majesty's Government, in pursuance of their policy of strict neutrality in Chinese civil wars, have always consistently refused to allow British ships to be used for the transport of armed Chinese soldiers. If this military official or his superior officer, had a real or fancied cause of complaint against the British ship in question, their proper course was to have asked for an investigation through the competent British authority, namely His Majesty's Consul at Chungking, by whom the matter would have been promptly dealt with. It is obvious that these officers place themselves entirely in the wrong if they endeavour to exact reparation by such means as the forcible detention of British ships or officers not connected with the cause of complaint, and His Majesty's Government are, of course, quite unable to tolerate such action as that taken by General Yang against British ships and British mercantile officers at Wanhsien. General Yang Sen, as the Civil Governor of the province, recognized by the Central Government, must be aware of the correct procedure to follow in cases where he has a complaint against British subjects or ships, and his action in seizing British ships in Wanhsien and posting armed soldiers on board, who open fire on British gunboats, amounts to nothing less than piracy, and His Majesty's Minister is convinced that the Wai Chiao Pu will not attempt to defend it. The Wai Chiao Pu may rest assured that His Majesty's officers concerned will endeavour to arrange on the spot an amicable solution of the difficulties that have arisen in connection with this case, but as a preliminary to any discussion it is essential that the two British ships detained be handed over to the British authorities forthwith.

British Legation.

Peking.

September 20th, 1926.

CHINESE REPLY.

The Wai Chiao Pu to Sir J. W. Ronald Macleay

November 2nd, 1926.

Monsieur le Ministre :

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Memorandum of September 20th ultimo relating to the unlawful bombardment of the city of Wanhsien by certain British warships with appalling loss of Chinese life and property. The statement presented in your Memorandum of the circumstances under which it took place is quite at variance with the reports which the Chinese Government have received up to date and I wish therefore to place on record what they understand to have actually occurred.

On August 29th last, while the S.S. *Wanliu*, a British merchant ship of Messrs. Butterfield and Swire, was stopping at Yunyang on her voyage upward to

Wanhsien, three sampans containing a party of Chinese soldiers approached her for the purpose of seeking accommodation for the transportation of public funds under their custody. Without waiting for the Chinese party to board and without giving any warning, the ship, evidently bent upon refusing accommodation, started all of a sudden to move away rapidly, thereby causing the sampans at once to capsize. As a result, sixty-four lives were lost with \$85,000 worth of silver. On her arrival at Wanhsien, General Yang Sen, to whose command the party of soldiers belonged, sent an officer aboard the *Wanliu*, with his retinue to investigate the matter. Here the H.M.S. *Cockchafer*, then lying at the same port, suddenly intervened by despatching a body of marines aboard the ship, who disarmed the Chinese soldiers on their official duty of investigation, drove them off by force and sent away the *Wanliu* without making the proper amends. The same British war vessel fired at the soldiers, wounding two of them, and levelled a gun at the city of Wanhsien as if firing were about to be opened.

It was under these circumstances that General Yang Sen detained two other British steamers of the same Company then lying at the port, namely the *Wanhsien* * and the *Wantung*, not for the purpose of commandeering them to transport troops nor for compromising the safety of the six officers on board, but solely for that of hastening an equitable settlement of the case of the *Wanliu*. This act of detention therefore was not done without sufficient cause, and it can be more readily understood when it is remembered that in less than three months from June 13th to August 29th, three cases of sinking of Chinese sampans due to the negligence of British steamers had already occurred, resulting in the loss of more than forty lives and considerable amount of public funds, and that in none of these cases had there been given any redress or compensation for the destruction of life and property.

Negotiations were at once opened at Wanhsien between General Yang Sen and the British Consul from Chungking with a view to a settlement of the incident. On September 4th Your Excellency called at this Ministry about the matter, stated that you had telegraphed to the British Consul at Hankow to request Marshal Wu Pei-fu to order General Yang Sen to settle it amicably, and was assured by my predecessor, Admiral Tsai, that, fully sharing your desire for an amicable settlement, instructions to that effect would be wired to General Yang Sen. These were sent in the same afternoon. It is reasonable to presume that Your Excellency's effort to bring about an amicable settlement was fully known to the British Naval Commander on the Upper Yangtze. But apparently without waiting for the result, he precipitately resorted to the use of force.

For all of a sudden, on September 5th, an armoured merchant vessel called the *Kiaow* proceeded from Ichang to Wanhsien and, with the aid of H. M. S. *Cockchafer* and H. M. S. *Widgeon* already at the port, attempted to effect the release of the detained steamers by force. She opened volleys of rifle fire, to which more than one hundred Chinese gendarmes guarding the two merchant vessels succumbed. This was immediately followed by a murderous machine gun fire from the gunboats toward the city in the direction of Chengkiapah, Nantsingchich and General Yang Sen's military headquarters. The Chinese troops in self-defence had to return the fire, whereupon the British gunboats withdrew down the river. The fighting resulted in an appalling loss of the lives not only of the Chinese guards on the two vessels but of the innocent civilian population of Wanhsien, there being nearly one thousand killed and wounded. The destruction of property was equally serious. Over one thousand houses and buildings were destroyed by gunfire from the British warships, spreading ruin and desolation amidst the most prosperous part of the city of Wanhsien.

* The str. *Wanhsien* had, as a matter of fact been in the hands of Yang Sen's troops since Aug. 27, i.e. two days previous to the alleged incident at Yunyang, an attempt having been made to commandeer her for the transportation of Chinese troops up-river.—E.D.

In view of the actual circumstances, therefore, the Chinese Government cannot refrain from holding the said British gunboats and Messrs. Butterfield and Swire responsible for this deplorable incident.

Reference was made in your Excellency's Memorandum under reply to the observation of neutrality by British steamers navigating the Yangtze. The Waichiaopu does not recall having been informed of the contents of the British neutrality regulations purporting to be in force in Chinese territorial waters, nor is it aware of the uniform and consistent application of such regulations, if there be any, to all British steamers and all cases. The point raised seems hardly relevant to the present case, as there is no state of civil war in the province of Szechwan, nor can the application of a few soldiers for accommodation on an up-going steamer for the transportation of public funds be reasonably considered as evidence of intention to take part in fighting.

Even admitting this point for argument's sake, the Chinese Government are of the opinion that the captain of the *Wanliu* and, through him, the steamship company could not be held immune from liability for the loss of life and property involved in the capsizing of the Chinese sampans. For in suddenly starting his ship on the approach of these boats seeking accommodation and without giving any warning, he was, to say the least, guilty of gross negligence, since as a navigating officer he must have been aware of the dangerous rapids in that portion of the river and of several previous cases of capsizing of Chinese boats caused by steamers, and, above all, of the serious consequences of his own wanton action.

As regards the conduct of the British gunboats, it appears to be even more deplorable. The negotiations between General Yang Sen and the British Consul were under way and the Waichiaopu, desirous to effect an amicable arrangement, had readily complied with Your Excellency's request on September 4th to send instructions to General Yang Sen to that effect. There was no pressing necessity for the British navy to appeal to force. On the contrary, with a little patience and forbearance, the whole case of the *Wanliu* and the detention of the two steamers could have readily settled. Such patience and forbearance was the more to be expected from the responsible officers of the British naval vessels on the Yangtze, as it must have been known to them that there had occurred cases in the past year or two causing a great deal of misunderstanding between the people of our two countries, and that any precipitate action could have served no good purpose except to aggravate the situation. But instead it appears that the expedition of the *Kiawo* had been secretly and carefully planned at Ichang in such a manner as could only give good reason for the belief that there was a deliberate, premeditated intention on the part of the British naval commanders to resort to the use of force. Though the purpose of the expedition was stated to be to rescue the detained steamers and their officers, the British Navy, knowing that they were kept under armed guards, must have been aware of the certainty of resistance from the Chinese guards with consequences which they as naval officers had no difficulty in anticipating. The whole incident at Wanhsien appears to be the result of a deliberate act of provocation. Therefore, the question of which side first opened fire, though still to be ascertained, would seem immaterial in view of the preparation for the attack made by the British navy at Ichang.

Nor can the argument of self-defence be invoked in favour of the British navy. It is a well-established principle of international law that the necessity of self-defence should be instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. The detained officers in the present case were in no danger of life, the object of General Yang Sen in the detention of the ships being only to keep them as security for the speedy settlement of several outstanding cases of negligent sinking of Chinese boats by British steamers of the said Company, indeed, negotiation for their release, as indicated above, was already under way and there was good prospect of a settlement until abruptly terminated by the sudden unjustifiable bombardment of Wanhsien.

The hostile operation of the British gunboats in friendly territory was the more to be deplored since there was no previous warning given to the innocent people of Wanhsien, who therefore had no opportunity to withdraw to a place of safety. Moreover, as Wanhsien is merely a port of call and not a fortified town, naval bombardment, according to international law, is forbidden even in time of war. There having been no interruption of the peaceful and amicable relations between China and Great Britain, the Chinese Government are at a loss to understand the conduct of the British warships in precipitating an attack on Wanhsien and visiting ruthless and indiscriminate destruction on the harmless people of that city. They cannot deprecate too strongly such wanton disregard of life and property.

Furthermore, it is to be noted that the permission to British warships to visit inland waters, though granted by treaty, is in the nature of a special privilege, not allowed by most other Powers to foreign vessels of war without serious restrictions. If the continued enjoyment of this special privilege is to be tolerated on the ground of its being a treaty right, it ought to be exercised within the strict limits of the treaty stipulation and with consideration and prudence. The conduct of the British warships in proceeding to Wanhsien on a hostile expedition, however, not only betrays a want of prudence but is incompatible with the letter and spirit of treaty provisions.

The action of General Yang Sen in detaining the *Wanlung* and the *Wanhsien* was characterized in Your Excellency's Memorandum as "nothing less than piracy." Whatever objection there might be to this form of reprisal, it was, as pointed out above, motivated solely by a desire on his part to hasten the settlement of several outstanding cases of wanton destruction of life and property by the ships of Messrs. Butterfield and Swire, for which he had been unable to obtain any redress or reparation. The Chinese Government cannot but consider the unusual expression referred to above as an excess of language entirely uncalled for and therefore much to be deplored.

In view of the foregoing considerations I have the honour to communicate to Your Excellency the present Note in supplement to the Waichiaopu's Memorandum of September 10th ultimo relating to the case of the *Wanliu* at Yungyang; and to place on record a formal protest against the unlawful bombardment of Wanhsien by British gunboats, and reserve all the rights of the Chinese Government as regards the claims to be presented later for full reparation of the damage done to life and property in the city of Wanhsien and for other equitable measures of redress. I have likewise the honour to request Your Excellency to ascertain and inform me whether in bombarding Wanhsien the officers of the said gunboats acted under specific instructions of Your Excellency's Government, and to cause proper steps to be taken to prevent similar occurrence in the future.

I shall be obliged if Your Excellency will be good enough to convey the contents of this Note to His Majesty's Government for their consideration and action. I avail myself, etc.

(Signed) V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

The casualties on the British side were as follows:

Officers Killed.—Commander F. C. Darley, R.N., H.M.S. *Despatch*; Lieutenant A. R. Higgins, R.N., H.M.S. *Despatch*; Lieutenant C. F. Ridge, R.N., H.M.S. *Cockchafer*.

Officers Wounded.—Lieutenant-Commander L. S. Acheson, D.S.C., R.N., H.M.S. *Cockchafer*; Lieutenant O. Fogg-Elliott, R.N., H.M.S. *Manis*.

Men Killed.—Farmer, Norman James, A.B., H.M.S. *Despatch*; Farrow, Frederick Joseph, A.B., H.M.S. *Scarab*; Haslam, Herbert, leading seaman, H.M.S. *Scarab*; Marotte, William, A.B., H.M.S. *Scarab*.

Men Wounded.—Crabtree, Robert Henry Bismark, shipwright, 3rd class, H.M.S. *Despatch*; Dolan, George James, A.B., H.M.S. *Despatch*; Gritt, Alfred Charles, A.B., H.M.S. *Despatch*; Beese, Clifford, A.B., H.M.S. *Scarab*; Eastcourt, Arthur

Charles, Ldg. Seaman, H.M.S. *Cockchafer*; Goodier, Albert George, A.B., H.M.S. *Cockchafer*; Molyneux, William George Alexander, A.B., H.M.S. *Cockchafer*; Sladen, Harry Bone, A.B., H.M.S. *Cockchafer*; Westaway, Ernest Edward, A.B., H.M.S. *Cockchafer*; Image, Francis Herbert, A.B., H.M.S. *Mantis*; Longhurst, Albert, Sto., Ist, H.M.S. *Mantis*; Stedman, Walter George, A.B., H.M.S. *Mantis*; Lynn, Donovan Wellesley, A.B., H.M.S. *Scarab*.

The incident was closed by General Yang Sen returning the ships, but thenceforth, there was constant trouble for foreign shipping on the Yangtze and a boycott of British shipping and British goods in Szechwan. The temper of the Southern troops as they came into the Yangtze valley was such that all foreign vessels had to take measures to protect themselves against sniping from the shore. The following Reuter's account of the action of the *Pidgeon*, an American gunboat, is descriptive of events as they occurred everywhere on the Yangtze during the latter part of 1926:

"The American gunboat *Pidgeon*, which was fired on by Southern troops on September 14, was again fired on yesterday morning when passing Hanyang. Three sailors were wounded but none was seriously hurt.

Fire was directed at the vessel from both sides of the river with machine guns and rifles, Cantonese thought responsible in each instance.

The *Pidgeon*, which, it is estimated, was hit a hundred times by Chinese bullets, replied with machine guns.

The foreign naval forces on the Yangtze have been served by the Cantonese with a circular notification requesting them to take their gunboats some distance down river, "in the interests of safety and understanding." It is believed that the request, up to the present, has not been complied with.

This is not the place to list all the incidents between foreign merchant and naval vessels and Chinese troops along the Yangtze. During the last quarter of 1926, all foreign vessels at Chungking remained tied up in the harbour, by order of the Consuls concerned, so as not to fall into the hands of the contending factions. The year had been a difficult one, anyhow, eight of the ships on the Chungking-Ichang run, having been laid up by accidents, three of them becoming a total loss. Coolie labour was everywhere difficult to obtain because of the labour agitation along the Yangtze; cargo accumulated and freight rates rose to be almost prohibitive.

Hankow, particularly suffered from the political consequences of the occupation of that city by the southern forces on September 6, as thereafter the handling of cargo became almost impossible. Toward the end of September, there was a revival of trade, but politics again intervened, with the result that shipping for the remainder of the year was very bad indeed. Foreign vessels had to be convoyed often all the way from Shanghai to Hankow, while Chinese companies suspended operation until sometime in March, 1927.

1927.

Shipping along the Yangtze during the early months of 1927 operated under the most difficult conditions. After January 3, when a mob invaded the British Concession in Hankow, conditions became increasingly bad. An anti-British boycott again was organized and attempts were made to get Chinese employed on British ships to strike. The seizure of the British Concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang and the labour disorders in Shanghai, impeded and at times stopped all shipping. After the Nationalists established themselves at Nanking firing on foreign vessels became usual, and all foreign merchantmen had to be convoyed between Shanghai and Nanking and at times over the entire stretch between Shanghai and Hankow. Snipers on both sides of the Yangtze, belonging to both the Nationalist and Ankuochin (northern) armies, fired on ships without apparent reason. It was difficult for the naval convoys at times to locate the source of

the sniping which led to considerable misunderstanding, the Nationalists accusing the foreign ships of bombarding their villages.

An official Nationalist report on the subject, which may be considered typical is herewith appended:

On the 25th of April an American gunboat, U.S.S. *Penguin* fired more than 20 shells into the village, Chang Cha Koh, about 20 li from the city of Kiangyin, destroying a score of houses and seriously wounding a refugee farmer.

Exactly a week later, on May 2nd, a British Gunboat, alleged to be *Wanderer 74*, bombarded twice in the same afternoon the village, Lang Men-sha, 30 li above Kiangyin, destroying about a dozen houses, killing 5 and wounding 4.

On the next day, May 3rd, another British gunboat of unknown identity sailed farther up the river and bombarded the village, Shih-Er-Wei, 70 li above Kiangyin, destroying 4 houses, killing 16 and wounding 3.

The bombardment on the part of the above mentioned 3 gunboats was said to have been "provoked" by the firing of the Chinese soldiers on shore. The Chinese soldiers, however, did not actually shoot at the gunboats, the shots fired were blank and the volley was really a signal of warning.

For the city of Kiangyin was then under martial law and across the river General Li Ming-yang was still waging a severe battle with the northern forces. The Bureau of Foreign Affairs for Kiangyin had duly warned the foreign men-of-war of this fact, and requested them also to withdraw from the points between Shanghai and Nanking by a special communication sent to all Consuls-General in Shanghai on the 18th of April.

This communication, apparently, was not heeded by the foreign men-of-war.

The following is the complete text of the report of the bombardment issued by the Bureau of Foreign Affairs for Kiangsu.

REPORT OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF KIANGYIN BY FOREIGN GUNBOATS BY THE TWO OFFICIAL INVESTIGATORS FROM THE BUREAU OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

The city of Kiangyin is strategically situated on the southern bank of the Yangtze river in the province of Kiangsu, the surrounding villages such as Hsia-Kong, Chang-Chia-Kong, Lang-Men-Sha, and Shih-Er-Kong which have been bombarded are all important points on the bank. In this section of the River, the river bed is high, and the water is shallow, thus making navigation very difficult. But along the bank, the water is always about thirty feet deep; therefore all men-of-war and merchantmen must proceed close by the bank, often so close that it is possible to carry on conversation between those on board and those ashore. This explains why in the past when military operations were in progress, the ships passing close should always have aroused much suspicion and misunderstanding on the part of the military authorities.

For this reason, on the 18th of April, the Bureau of Foreign Affairs for Kiangsu sent a special communication to all Consuls-General in Shanghai requesting that all foreign men-of-war either doing patrol duty or stationed at points between Shanghai and Nanking be withdrawn in order to avoid all untoward incidents.

Furthermore, about that time, the vanguard of the Nationalist Forces under the command of General Li Ming Yang was just waging a severe battle with the northern forces across the river. All foreign ships navigating along this section of the River therefore were to be subject to investigation and search by the Nationalist military authorities. The various cases of firing on foreign ships and consequent bombardments as occurred at Lang-men-Sha, Chang-Chia-Kong, and Shih-Er-Wei were all brought about by the non-compliance of the foreign gunboats with the Nationalist regulations.

Chang-Cha-Kong Case.—Chang-Cha-Kong is about 20 li above the city of Kiangyin. During the month of April, the thirty-sixth independent Regiment under the command of Chang Jen-fu was stationed there. On the afternoon of April 25, about 5 o'clock, a merchantman, (reported to be the S.S. *Tungteh* of the Tungteh Company, a Chinese concern), was seen proceeding upriver under the convoy of a foreign gunboat, passing Chang-Cha-Kong. The Nationalist troops stationed there, being apprehensive of the possibility of the presence of enemies or contraband aboard the S.S. *Tungteh* signalled to the gunboat to stop. But the gunboat ignored the signal and sped on, whereupon the troops fired several empty shots into the air as a further warning for the gunboat to stop. The gunboat must have misunderstood the warning, for she fired at the shore in return. Under such circumstances, the Nationalist troops were forced to use their rifles, whereupon the gunboat opened its machine guns and cannons, firing at the village in rapid succession. Altogether twenty odd shells were fired, destroying more than twenty houses and wounding a refugee farmer, named Chen, in the arm. There was, however, no other serious damage done. At present, the villagers at Chang-Cha-Kong have all dug trenches in the ground outside of their houses in order to hide themselves from further shelling. As to the foreign gunboat involved in the case, according to the various reports as well as to the List of Daily Movements of Foreign Gunboats as kept by the Bureau of Foreign Affairs, it has been ascertained to be the U.S.S. *Penangin*. Two shells from the boat have been found in the village and are now kept in the Bureau for the purpose of identification.

Lang-Men-Sha Case.—The village of Lang-Men-Sha is situated on the Yangtze River about 30 li above the city of Kiangyin. During the first part of May, it was under the guard of the sixth Company of General Li Ming-Yang's troops. On the afternoon of May 2, about 4 o'clock, a foreign gunboat was seen proceeding upriver. When the guard ashore signalled to her to stop for search, it immediately opened fire with rifles and then with cannons. Then it sped close to the bank as if preparing to embark. The guard at once spread out along the dykes of the river to meet any emergency. The gunboat again fired at the village in rapid succession with rifles, machine guns, and cannons. Then it moved away slowly and anchored near the sandbank under the Long Hill. Observing that the guards had gone for a rest, the gunboat again rushed toward the village and fired at it terrifically.

As to the nationality of the gunboat involved in the case, the Kiangyin fort reported that they observed an English gunboat No. 74 painted grey passing by the village about 5 p.m. that day. Referring to the List of Daily Movements of Foreign Men-of-war as kept by the Bureau of Foreign Affairs, it is also noticed that an English destroyer, "Wanderer D. 74," departed upriver that day. As a further evidence, two cannon shells, each weighing about 45 pounds, have been picked up on the spot upon which the following inscriptions are noticed:

"R.N.A.F., 4 7 in., A.H. 124, Lot. F. & S."

The meaning of these initials are yet to be ascertained. The following is a list of the losses of lives and properties resulted from the bombardment.

(Lists here omitted)

By June 1, official and unofficial interference with shipping ceased.

PIRACY.

The pirate of South China is equivalent in the social organization with the bandit of North China. He naturally becomes most active when Governments are weak, and when economic conditions are so disordered that farmers prefer to take the risks of piracy and banditry because the produce of the farm is not likely to provide an adequate income. The Canton delta is a particularly lucrative place for pirates because of the large amount of shipping there. The details of piracies which will here be discussed must not be taken as providing a complete picture, for only such cases are reported as involve large important steamships or such cases as come before the courts of Hongkong. The pirates, however, have a well-organized system of levying on all Chinese boats which ply on the Canton Rivers. Operating from a centre in Bias Bay, they levy what is tantamount to a tax, on all Chinese shipping. The Chinese shippers are pleased to pay this assessment, because it gives them a protection which the Government cannot afford. The pirates rarely come in conflict with the authorities, except when they attempt to pirate a steamship to make a huge haul.

The principal piracies during 1926-7 were the following:

February 8, 1926	S.S. <i>Jade</i> (Reported CHINA YEAR BOOK 1926-7 p. 838)
March 6, ..	S.S. <i>Tai Yan</i>
March 25, ..	S.S. <i>Hsin Kong</i>
July 13, ..	S.S. <i>Kwang Lee</i> (Reported CHINA YEAR BOOK 1926-7 p. 839)
August 21, ..	S.S. <i>Sandwichen</i>
October 1, ..	S.S. <i>Hsin Fung</i>
November 11, ..	S.S. <i>Hanoi</i>
November 15, ..	S.S. <i>Sunning</i>
November 19, ..	S.S. <i>Wan Hoi</i>
December 22, ..	S.S. <i>Heng An</i>
January 5, 1927	S.S. <i>Wing Wo</i>
January 27, ..	S.S. <i>Seang Bee</i>
February 2, ..	S.S. <i>Yuan On</i>
March 21, ..	S.S. <i>Hop Sang</i>
July 20, ..	S.S. <i>Soloiten</i>
August 25, ..	S.S. <i>Hsin Chi</i>
September 1, ..	S.S. <i>Kochow</i>

In addition, 30 piracies were recorded in the Canton Delta during 1926 by pirates other than those of Bias Bay. Four such piracies were reported in January, 1927.

THE HSIN FUNG PIRACY.

(Oct. 1, 1926).

The vessel involved was the str. *Hsinlung*, under the Chinese flag, and a feature of the piracy is that neither the only European passenger nor the officers of the vessel, also European, were interfered with. The ship was captured without any bloodshed, and there are no outstanding incidents to record, other than the seizure of cargo, and the kidnapping of the comrade who, it is stated, is to be held for ransom.

The *Hsinlung* left Shanghai on October 1 for Tientsin and Chefoo, with 280 Chinese passengers and one European, a member of the Chinese Maritime Customs. On the same evening, when the vessel was north of Shaweishan light, the pirates, approximately 30 in number, took charge of the ship. They were all young and active men, and were armed with revolvers.

In accordance with a prearranged signal, they posted themselves at the various strategical points, and without firing a shot were soon in complete control.

During the next few days, the pirates mounted guard in turn over the bridge, passengers' cabins and engine-room. Other members of the piratical company ransacked the baggage and persons of the various travellers. When they had exhausted this source of revenue, they turned their attention to the cargo. This consisted of silk and other valuable commodities, the best of which was placed on one side for speedy removal when the landing place was reached.

Even when the ship was being steered into Bias Bay, a Customs launch which was hovering in the vicinity was ordered off by signal, the master being compelled to signal that everything was all right, at the point of the pistol.

Bias Bay was reached four days after the vessel had been captured, and steered 900 miles out of her course. The *Hsinfung* reached this point during the afternoon of October 4. Sampans immediately approached the ship and stood by to receive passengers and cargo.

When the cargo had been moved to waiting sampans, the boat people showed a desire to board the ship themselves and make a second plundering, but this the pirates, under the iron discipline of their leader, refused to permit. Eventually the shore boats pushed off, taking with them the pirates and their plunder and the number one comrade of the vessel, who it is understood, will be held for ransom. It is learned that there were no wealthy passengers, and the comrade, an old servant of the company, was considered to be the only person of consequence. The *Hsinfung*, after the departure of the freebooters, steered a course for Hongkong.

THE HANOI PIRACY.

(Nov. 11, 1926).

Captain Cruchot, who commands the *Hanoi*, in his report of the affair to the Hongkong police, stated that he left Haiphong for Hongkong on November 8. When off Nam Ping Island, 90 miles west of Gap Rock, a number of armed men suddenly appeared in various parts of the vessel, and quickly subdued the officers and guards. One Annamite guard who offered resistance was immediately shot and thrown overboard, and the pirates proceeded with the work of searching the passengers, officers and crew. Whether the pirates had previous information that a considerable sum of money was being transferred from the Customs to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, is, of course, not known, but it is significant that the cargo was untouched, whereas bullion totalling about \$50,000 being sent by the Maritime Customs at Pakhoi to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank here (packed in two cases) was taken and the passengers and crew relieved of belongings to the value of about \$20,000. The ship's armoury, comprising 11 rifles, 10 revolvers and several thousand rounds of ammunition, was also taken away, and, as mentioned above, the pirates set a course for Bias Bay, where they abandoned the vessel, which was then brought on to Hongkong and a report of the occurrence made. There were four Annamite guards on the ship, in charge of a corporal, and these were the first to be overthrown by the pirates. The guard who was killed had two wounds in the head and two in the stomach, and after being despatched he was immediately thrown overboard. Two members of the crew were wounded, one being shot through the top of the head and the other through the hip. During the course of the voyage, after the pirates had control of the vessel, a British destroyer was sighted, but the Captain of the *Hanoi* was warned that if he made any signal he would be shot.

When Bias Bay was reached the pirates transferred their haul into waiting sampans. As the boats, laden with the spoils, were about to pull for the shore, a large junk drew near, and the purport of this visit was made clear the next moment by a very startling occurrence which followed. It soon became apparent that the intrusion of the junk at this particular moment was resented by the pirates, who opened a fusillade on the stranger, which was obviously another pirate vessel, seeking a share in the plunder. This fire was returned but feebly by the junk, which then made for the *Hanoi* with the apparent object of securing what the first gang of

pirates had left untouched, but prior to this the leaders of the first party of pirates had warned Captain Cruchot to take his steamer as quickly as possible out of the locality. This advice was promptly acted upon by the skipper, with the result that the *Hanoi* got safely away without further interruption.

THE WANHOI PIRACY.*

(Nov. 19, 1926).

The Chinese steamer *Wanhoi* was pirated on November 19. The vessel was on its way from Kongmoon to Yeungkong and among the passengers were Father Fletcher, pastor of the Yeungkong Catholic Mission, and seven Canadian sisters of the Mary Knoll Mission.

Just after the ship left the Customs Station of Ngaimoon a dozen well-dressed Chinese passengers suddenly shot and killed the Chinese soldier-guards, the purser, the cashier and a clerk.

The missionaries were placed under guard in a narrow stateroom for more than sixty hours. The deck passengers were huddled into the ship's hold.

The pirates ordered the steamer to proceed to Chekpei, where it was beached. Later an additional thirty pirates boarded the *Wanhoi*, upon which they began looting the vessel. The passengers were ordered to give up their money and jewellery.

This terrifying experience continued all through the night, any sign of resistance being threatened with immediate death.

The following day the cargo, comprising five hundred cases of kerosene and a large shipment of food supplies, articles of furniture and the passengers' personal effects, was removed. The pirates tied the hands of the Chinese passengers and carried them off for ransom, excepting four mission servants.

The captives were deprived of their blankets and clothing and suffered greatly from the cold.

Next morning the ship was refloated but later went aground on the mud flats, when it was visited by several gangs of pirates in twenties and thirties armed with revolvers. Each gang in turn looted the vessel. The last lot, enraged at finding nothing valuable, took away the shoes from the feet of one of the sisters and a hat and coat from Father Fletcher.

The missionaries lost everything except the clothing they wore, and arrived in Hongkong in a very nervous condition.

THE SUNNING PIRACY

(Nov. 15, 1926).

The *Sunning* Piracy is regarded as the classical piracy of the year and the Commission which investigated the piracy brought out so much data, which explains the activities and methods of the Pirates that the report is here quoted in full.

On November 15, 1926, a gang of armed pirates who embarked as passengers gained control of the *Sunning* while she was approaching Hongkong from Amoy. Mr. Thomas Parke Beatty (Chief Officer) and Mr. Joseph William Hurst (the Second Officer) decided to make an attempt to recapture the ship. They managed to secure some arms which had been overlooked and they proposed to take unawares the pirates within the bridge gridded area and so regain possession of that defensible portion of the ship. This was done. Two pirates were knocked down with the deep-sea-lead and there ensued for some hours a sharp encounter with about sixteen pirates who endeavoured by a vigorous attack in force to retake the bridge. The pirates were evidently prepared to stick at nothing in order to regain control. They used the Chief Engineer (Mr. George Cornack) and Chinese passengers as screens against the bullets from the bridge. In consequence, the Chief Engineer was wounded but, being rescued by the holders of the bridge, he also took part in the fight. In an attempt to enforce surrender the pirates set fire to the ship, but the defenders

* Reuters

stood fast. Some of the pirates then embarked in one of the boats and left the ship in desperation; there were heavy seas running at the time and it is believed that all these pirates perished. As the flames got a stronger hold another boatload of pirates left, and were captured by H.M.S. *Bluebell*. The remaining pirates gave up the contest and mingled with the passengers, hoping to escape. Distress signals were then sent out and other ships came to the aid of the *Sunning*, the fire was extinguished in time to save the ship from destruction and she was towed into port.

Report of "Sunning" Piracy Commission.

We the members of the Commission appointed by His Excellency the Governor to inquire into the circumstances under which the *s. Sunning* was on November 15, 1926, seized by pirates while on the voyage from Shanghai to Hongkong; and in particular:

- (a) to inquire how it was possible for the pirates to get on board the ship with arms in their possession;
- (b) to inquire how it was possible for the pirates to seize the ship;
- (c) to consider the efficiency of the anti-piracy fittings in the ship and to make recommendations as to the alterations and additions, if any, that may be deemed necessary in the *s. Sunning* or other sea-going ships;
- (d) to consider the supply of armed guards, the number to be carried and their administration; and
- (e) to consider generally and to make recommendations as to the measures necessary for preventing piracy:—

have the honour to submit the following report and recommendations.

I.—The Commission.

The Commission as originally appointed by Proclamation on November 25, 1926, consisted of the following members:—
Honourable Mr. E. R. Hallifax, C.M.G., C.B.E., (Chairman), Honourable Mr. E. D. C. Wolfe, Lieut. Commander G. F. Hole, R.N. Commander F. N. Miles O.B.E., R.N. Mr. W. G. Goggin, Captain A. J. Holland.

The sittings of the Commission were delayed by the necessity for awaiting the criminal proceedings instituted against a number of the pirates who had been arrested. Meanwhile the Proclamation of December 2, 1926, added the name of Captain A. H. Stewart to the Commission and the last of the terms of reference (c) set out above.

The Proclamation of February 4, 1927, substituted Lieut.-Commander L. J. Pitcairn Jones, D.S.C., R.N., Mr. T. G. Weall and Captain A. W. Davison, R.N.R., for Commander F. N. Miles, O.B.E., R.N., Mr. W. G. Goggin and Captain A. J. Holland, who had resigned.

The Commission met for the first time on December 6, 1926, held thirteen meetings, and examined seventeen witnesses.

II.—The "Sunning" and the Piracy Incident.

The *Sunning* is a steel screw steamer of 2,555 tons. Official Number 139,560 owned by the China Navigation Co., Ltd. and constructed in 1916 by the Taikoo Dockyard and Engineering Co. of Hongkong Limited. She is engaged in the conveyance of cargo and passengers between Hongkong and China coast ports. On November 15, 1926, at 9.30 a.m., the *Sunning* left Amoy for Hongkong. At about 3.40 p.m. on the same day pirates, who had travelled disguised as passengers, launched a surprise attack, secured the officers, disarmed the Indian guards, and were soon in possession of the ship. The ship was retaken during the following night as the result of resourceful and daring action for which the Chief and Second Officers were primarily responsible.

The reply of the Commissioners, following the order of the terms of reference, follows:

III.—(a) To inquire how it was possible for the pirates to get on board the ship with arms in their possession.

1.—SEARCHING AT COAST PORTS.

The Hongkong Government at the request of the Commission addressed a letter to the authorities concerned at the ports of Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Swatow, Kwangchowwan, Pakhoi, Saigon, Haiphong, Bangkok, Singapore and to the Commissioner of Chinese Maritime Customs, Kowloon, enquiring as to the regulations in force and the actual practice regarding the searching, other than by ships' officers and guards, of passengers either on shore or on board ship, in order to prevent the smuggling on board of arms and ammunition. It is to be noted that enquiries were not limited to the area defined by the Piracy Prevention Regulations as the "Danger Zone," (which stretches from Amoy to Haiphong), as recent events have proved that the pirate organisation is capable of covering a much wider field. The value of the searching methods employed by the Hongkong authorities is considered under section VII paragraph I below, in which criticisms and suggestions locally made are dealt with separately. The replies to the Government's letter elicited the following facts:

At the ports of Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Swatow, Pakhoi, Hoihow and the riverine ports the searching is done by the Chinese Maritime Customs. The Chinese Maritime Customs service is a revenue collecting rather than a preventive service, and in consequence there is little searching of passengers and their baggage on outward bound steamers; in fact passengers' baggage is interfered with as little as possible. At the ports of Saigon and Haiphong the local French authorities are chiefly concerned with the prevention of the smuggling into Indo-China of arms and ammunition. At Singapore there is no searching except on information. The reply from Bangkok stated that outward bound deck passengers were thoroughly searched by the police. Similarly at Kwangchowwan, from which port, however, there are only three steamers, the *s. Hydrangea* (British) and the *s. Hanoi* and the *s. Song Bo* (French) engaged in the passenger trade. It is evident therefore that at any port (with the exception perhaps of Bangkok, and Kwangchowwan) on the coast between Shanghai and Singapore it is an easy matter, as far as shore searching is concerned, to smuggle on board arms and ammunition.

2.—SEARCHING BY SHIPS' PERSONNEL AND INDIAN GUARDS.

It remained to examine the value of such search as was possible by ships' personnel and the Indian guards, and the Commission was left in no doubt that, in the conditions of modern trade, effective searching on board the ship is practically impossible. In port all the ship's personnel is particularly busy; time is of value and the ship is a hive of humanity, stevedores, coolies, passengers, agents, messengers all jostling each other. The decks are a litter of cargo and cargo boats and sampans of all descriptions necessarily cluster thickly alongside.

The Indian guards are utilised, if at all, more as sentries on the gangway than as searchers, and the little they could do in the way of searching would be quite ineffective. A really effective search would entail such a large staff or so much delay, probably both, as to make it to all intents and purposes impossible.

3.—GUARANTEE FOR PASSENGERS.

One Company appears to demand from its Compradore some sort of guarantee for every passenger. The guarantee form, however, as submitted to the Commission contains no sanction; and in the circumstances of the passenger trade on the coast the guarantee appeared to the Commission to be of no value. Whether stricter conditions would make it of value, or whether the change would destroy the traffic, is a matter for each Company to decide for itself.

4.—CONCLUSION.

The Commissioners are therefore of opinion that, whilst it is impossible to state where and exactly by what means the pirates got on board the ship with their arms, it was an easy matter for them to have done so at any of the coast ports.

IV.—(b) *To inquire how it was possible for the pirates to seize the ship.*

The pirates depended for success on getting control of the ship by surprise; and the execution of their carefully prepared plan was facilitated by a disregard in certain respects, on the part of the owners and of the officers of the ship, of this spirit and the letter of the Piracy Prevention Regulations. The causes of this divergence and the responsibility for it are dealt with in a later paragraph. For the purpose of reply to the question under consideration it is sufficient to note that the control on board was lax in the following respects:

1.—The officers did not carry revolvers (Regulation 3).

2.—The main deck grilles were continuously open, and the starboard grille on the saloon deck was generally open.

3.—The guards' quarters were situated outside the grilled area, and no precautions were taken to secure a continuous watch at the times of changing guard. Indeed there was little if any control of the guards by the officers.

4.—Further the grilles were of a nature that made them sufficiently easy to scale, and it is probable that the pirates launched their main attack by passing through the open main deck grille doors, scaling the grilles at the fore-end of the centre castle to the boat deck, and so gaining access unnoticed to the bridge.

Generally, the impression was created that the Piracy Prevention Regulations were not taken very seriously among the officers, and that there was a false sense of security on board with a lack of piracy precautions. It should be noted that the *Sunning* at the time of the piracy had no authoritative "Scheme of Defence" as required by Regulation 21. The statement applied to many other ships at the time, and still applies. In view of the final recommendations of this Report, it is necessary to mention this fact only to draw attention to the lack of any plan of defence organised by owners and officers, such as might reasonably have been expected to exist pending the formulation of the "Scheme of Defence" required by the Regulations.

V.—(c) *To consider the efficiency of the anti-piracy fittings in the ship and to make recommendations as to the alterations and additions, if any, that may be*

deemed necessary in the s. Sunning or other sea-going ships.

1.—GRILLES AND ACCESS TO LIFEBOATS.

A certain number of minor criticisms of the grilles was received, but none of them were of a nature to affect the general question. One general objection only to the grilles principle was received by the Commission: that in times of panic they may be liable to interfere with life-saving, and that in particular they are not in harmony with the Board of Trade Instructions as to the Survey of Life Saving Appliances, 1926; paragraph 190 of which states:— "Proper provision must be made for access of passengers to the embarkation deck and for controlling and marshalling them and finally embarking them in the lifeboats in the shortest possible time . . ." It is possible that circumstances may arise in which certain grilles would prevent ready access to lifeboats; but the weak foundation on which the general criticism stands—and it is not supported in detail—is shown by the following quotation from the letter dated February 11, 1927, of the Hongkong General Chamber of Commerce, which appears in Appendix I:—

"At present the anomalous condition exists that shipping companies are compelled by the Piracy Prevention Regulations to take measures which the Board of Trade surveyor ought, strictly speaking, to refuse to sanction."

It appears therefore that the Board of Trade, in spite of the prominence given to the risks involved, has found it unnecessary to enter any protest against the grilles since their institution in 1914.

The absence of any other serious criticism, together with the consensus of opinion that the system has advantages as an anti-piracy measure, lead the Commission to the conclusion that the value of the grilles for this purpose may override the possible conflict with the Board of Trade Instructions. The risks involved by grilles may easily be exaggerated, for it is hardly conceivable that all the grille doors should be suddenly and simultaneously jammed or deserted and so become unopenable; moreover, lifeboats are commonly swung out and partially lowered before passengers are embarked. But it is necessary to enter the proviso that no standard plan of grilles can be devised to suit all ships alike; adaptation to each separate design is essential.

2.—FORTIFIED BRIDGE.

The events on the *Sunning* emphasised two points. Firstly, that if grilles are to be used, they must be unscalable, as in this case the pirates appear to have scaled the forward grille to gain access to the upper decks and the bridge. The Commission here finds signs of the over-dependence on the Government Regulations and of the lack of co-operation which is one of the weaknesses of the present system; for it should not be necessary to wait for examination by the "Scheme of Defence Committee" before making improvements, such as are obviously desirable. Additional strength could also have been given to the grille defence by the incorporation of steel plates and dodgers; an expedient which deserves more careful consideration than it at present appears to receive.

The second lesson, and one of outstanding importance, to be learnt from the experience of the *Sunning* is the value of a protected bridge.

The recovery of a ship already in complete charge of the pirates was effected entirely from a completely undefended bridge, very lightly manned. The centre castle grilles had been forced, and were of no further value to the defence, if indeed they ever had the whole value attributed to them. Grilles enclosing such a wide area have obvious weaknesses; doors have to be continually opened and shut, the guards are out of sight of the officer of the watch, and, even in the most favourable conditions of preparedness, the numbers normally available for defence are too small for efficient protection of such an extended line of defence against a determined attack. They may conceivably afford valuable assistance, they can for instance form a first line of defence for the officers' quarters and the 1st class cabins; but the principle of the fortified citadel formulated in the report of the Commissioners on the *Sui An* Piracy has now been put to the severest practical test, and while it has been justified has also been more closely defined. The undefended bridge of the *s. Sunning* proved itself impregnable; and failing control of only this part of the ship, the whole plan of the pirates was completely defeated. Given a fortified bridge, with guards at the entrances under the eye of the officer of the watch, a surprise is hardly possible; and it may be safely surmised that pirates, whose only object it is to get away with the booty, would even hesitate to plan an attack if they saw such a serious obstacle in the way of success. Even with control of the engine room it would be difficult for them to direct the ship to their lair; and if they could succeed in running aground (easily possible in the case of river steamers), they are still under fire from the bridge in attempting to escape. And meanwhile it has been possible for the officers on the bridge to continue sending out signals of distress in the hope of receiving assistance, at most within a few hours.

This principle of a fortified bridge is in fact the one adopted by the River Steamers; for it is almost necessitated by the design. Guards at the entrances are continuously under the eye of the officer of the watch and all the arms are within the grilled bridge. It was consistently maintained that the bridge so defended would not be surprised and could be held indefinitely even by two officers. And

it is from these steamers so protected that the Commission received evidence of satisfaction with the system in force. Generally speaking, confidence in the value of the grille system was shown by the officers of River Steamers—in striking contrast to the officers of coastal ships—and efforts in some cases were even made to elaborate it, as by a proper arrangement of the lights on the boat deck and the after grilles.

The officer on watch on a protected bridge will undoubtedly carry a very heavy responsibility, and may even at short notice be called upon to carry out without hesitation orders which should have been laid down in advance as part of a considered general plan, affecting the lives of all the Europeans on board excepting those on the bridge. The action taken must ultimately depend on individual character and determination. The recommendations of the Commissioners can go no further than the consideration of the best form of assistance that can be given to a determination to resist, which must be assumed; and they find that assistance in a closer definition of the citadel idea as developed from its origin in the report on the piracy of the *s. Sui An*, in the belief that a ship so defended will discourage the attention of pirates. Arson or wholesale murder would hardly be resorted to by pirates, except in revenge for want of success; and a probable, or even possible, want of success will form a powerful deterrent.

A purely Government scheme in such circumstances not unnaturally invites criticism and objection; and this the grille system has received. In spite of this, however, and in spite of a certain lack of interest displayed in it by owners and officers generally, the Commissioners accept the position that the grille system has positive value if it incorporates the lessons of experience and is adapted to design.

VI.—(d) to Consider the Supply of Armed Guards, the Number to be Carried and their Administration.

1.—THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

The opinions elicited from witnesses showed one fairly well marked division in the general view of the value of the guards. The majority of the officers of the coast seemed to have little confidence in them, while the river steamer officers had little or no fault to find. The cause of this divergence of opinion no doubt lies in the different conditions obtaining on the coast and on the river. The river runs are matters of hours only and intermittent, while the coast runs are continuous over periods of days and nights. The grilles of coastal steamers, at which the guards are stationed, are in most cases out of sight of the officer of the watch, while the concentration of the grille system on the bridge in river steamers keeps the guards continually under the closest supervision. Even with these advantages, however, there was no strong impression created by the officers of river steamers that *Indian* guards were indispensable, and the opinion seemed to hold that if a surprise could be prevented by reliable discipline, an alert watch, and an early alarm, the officers could hold the bridge. For watchmen of this nature the choice between *Indians* and Chinese, perhaps from other provinces than Kwang Tung, seemed to be a matter of personal feeling, with a leaning, (among officers of river steamers) towards *Indian* guards for their fighting qualities, in the event of it becoming possible to defend the whole area inside the outer grilles.

Officers from coastal steamers had little good to say for the guards. Their discipline was not satisfactory and their behaviour often open to complaint, as with only two deck officers besides the Captain, it was not possible to exercise continuous supervision over duties out of sight of the bridge. The lack of interest shown by the officers in the guards is no doubt partly responsible for this state of affairs, but there is reason for this mental attitude, and it is obvious that even in otherwise well disciplined ships, the control of the guards offers peculiar difficulties, sufficient to prevent the presence of *Indian* guards on board coastal ships being generally viewed with favour by the officers. But again something in the shape of alert watchmen is required, and again the choice of nationality becomes a personal matter, with some leaning in this case towards Northern Chinese as being more easily adaptable

to the life of a ship which contains practically only Chinese. The possibility of connivance with pirates and the smaller fighting power of Chinese as compared with *Indians* has still to be considered, and must not be overlooked. These disadvantages may, however, be well counter-balanced by the probability that Chinese would be quicker than *Indians* to see signs of danger, and the officers would thus receive earlier warning to enable them to take measures for defence.

No criticisms or suggestions as to the number of guards to be carried were received. But as in every case the officers seemed confident of being able to hold the bridge indefinitely if given sufficient warning, it would appear that the number of guards to be carried should be governed by the number of watchmen required for the grilles.

2.—THE SYSTEM RECOMMENDED.

In considering the general administration of the guards, difficulties in the way of the existing system ever becoming completely efficient at once appear. It is unpopular with owners and officers alike; and while this unpopularity may be due to the dislike of the whole Piracy Prevention Regulations as a Government measure (a matter of common knowledge), the position of the *Indian* guards is open to special attack. Of all the crew on board, these guards alone are not engaged by the ship and are not entirely subject to ship's discipline as are the others. They must be "requisitioned for to the Captain Superintendent of Police." (Regulation 37). The Captain Superintendent of Police trains and appoints them to each ship as required and has the power to remove any guard from any ship as he may think fit. The guards also receive their pay and their punishments at the hands of the shore authorities. There is under the Piracy Prevention Regulations no system for supplying to a Captain the previous records of men quartered on his ship, nor for informing him of the result of action taken by himself or his officers against any of the guards. However strictly the guards may be instructed that while on board they are as entirely subject to ships' discipline as are any other members of the crew, it is obvious that there must remain an important distinction. The Captain's power is vicarious only, and this interference with the traditions of the sea is naturally resented; while the guards are inclined to regard the shore authorities as their real masters. It is hardly to be expected that they should be averse from taking advantage of the opportunities this division of responsibility, apart from their special position on board the ship, provides.

The Commissioners do not deal with the internal details of administration such as the training of the guards. There was no reason to find fault, and even if defects should appear they would be matters of detail comparatively easily remedied. The principal weakness of the system is the divided responsibility, and the recommendations of the Commissioners are directed to this point. They are of opinion that the engagement of guards should (subject to one important proviso) be left entirely to owners—who would naturally be expected to co-operate in making their selection with their comrades, whose safes form one of the first objectives of all pirates;—but that if a desire is expressed to enlist Government assistance in securing recruits, the Captain Superintendent of Police should be directed to consult with the employer concerned, and to make such arrangements as may in each case be agreed upon. There remains the proviso. Men engaged as guards only are in a position distinct from that of ordinary members of a ship's crew, and their efficiency and desirability should be safeguarded by investing the Captain Superintendent of Police with a general power of supervision. One method of attaining this object would be the addition to Section 4 of the Arms Ordinance (No. 2 of 1900) of a sub-section, providing that guards so employed on any vessel should be subject to the approval of the Captain Superintendent of Police, and that this approval could at any time in his discretion be withdrawn.

VII.—(e) to Consider Generally and to Make Recommendation as to the Measures Necessary for Preventing Piracy

I.—REQUEST FOR SUGGESTION AND THE RESPONSE. WIRELESS AND SEARCHING IN HONGKONG.

The Commissioners addressed to the Hongkong General Chamber of Commerce, the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, the China Coast Officers' Guild, and the Marine Engineers' Guild of China, Messrs. Jardine, Matheson & Co., Ltd., Messrs. Butterfield and Swire, Messrs. Douglas Lapraik & Co., Ltd., the Hongkong, Canton and Macao Steam Boat Co., Ltd., and the Chinese shipowners in Hongkong, a letter in the following terms:

"I am directed by the Commissioners appointed by His Excellency the Governor on December 2, 1926, for the purpose of conducting an enquiry into anti-piracy measures, to request you to be good enough to furnish them with your views on the Piracy Prevention Ordinance Regulations at present in force."

"2.—Whilst inviting criticisms of these Regulations the Commissioners particularly desire to receive any suggestions which you may wish to put forward for the improvement of existing conditions, whether such suggestions are directly connected with the Regulations or not."

"3.—It would be convenient if in your reply you would be so good as to nominate a witness or witnesses who would elaborate it orally as may be required." The replies, which appear in Appendix I to this letter may be summarised as follows:

Unqualified support for what is known as the "Minority Report," (see Appendix III), was given by Messrs. Butterfield and Swire, the China Coast Officers, and Marine Engineers' Guilds, the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and the Chinese shipowners; and a qualified support, though in effect covering all the important points, by the Hongkong, Canton and Macao Steamboat Co., Ltd. The Hongkong General Chamber of Commerce forwards Mr. R. Sutherland's Searching scheme and various individual opinions of members of the shipping sub-committee. It makes particular reference in the covering letter to the possible conflict between the Piracy Prevention Regulations and the Board of Trade Regulations, and it draws attention to the value of Wireless.

The question of wireless and other signalling is dealt with exhaustively in Lt.-Comdr. Hole's memorandum (Appendix II). The suggestions made therein clearly deserve careful consideration by owners, so long as the installation of wireless telegraphy remains optional. The part of the Government should be to encourage such installation in every possible manner, not the least important being the reduction of charges for anti-piracy messages. But the Commissioners wish to go further and to recommend for the favourable consideration of the Government that the carrying of wireless telegraphy be made compulsory on the lines of the enactments in force in the United Kingdom. They are of opinion that compulsory installations will quickly develop into a powerful and general anti-piracy measure, and the recommendation is the more readily made as it appears only to carry to its logical conclusion the suggestion contained in the letter from the Chamber of Commerce. The Minority Report is dealt with exhaustively in the memorandum by Lieut.-Commander Pitcairn Jones, D.S.C., R.N., which forms Appendix III, and the Commissioners wish to record their concurrence with the criticisms and conclusions of that memorandum. The question of the possible conflict between the Piracy Prevention Regulations and the Board of Trade Regulations has been dealt with above under section V paragraph 1, and it remains to consider Mr. Sutherland's scheme and the opinions of individual members.

The Commissioners, whilst having a full appreciation of the care with which Mr. Sutherland's scheme has been elaborated, can but agree with the suggestion on page 35 of his memorandum (see Appendix I) that "the proposal as put forward possibly goes beyond the scope of your reference." The Commissioners are concerned with the scheme solely as an anti-piracy measure, and it is therefore only the improved searching facilities suggested that they have to consider. They note in the first place that the blessing given to the scheme by the Chamber is only a qualified one.—"The Chamber would welcome the practical development of such

a scheme, with due regard to general conditions affecting shipping" (letter dated March 10, 1924, from the Chamber of Commerce to the Government)—"if it can be made to dovetail into existing shipping organisations without injuring economic working, the proposal has much to commend it." (the Chairman of the Chamber at the Annual Meeting on March 24, 1924).—"This Chamber, on March 10, 1924, informed the Colonial Government that it approved this proposal in principle and would welcome its practical development, with due regard to general conditions affecting shipping." (letter dated February 11, 1927 from the Chamber to the Commission). The qualification is apparently due to the inconvenience and extra expense that may be caused to shipping by the necessity for steamers to move from wharf to wharf, if the proposal as to searching is to be carried out, since it is difficult to conceive how the provision of extra wharves and godown facilities, with which the remainder of the report is concerned, could occasion such apprehension as appears in these three quotations. This deduction is not a good augury for the success of that part of the scheme dealing with searching, which calls for the fullest co-operation of all concerned; but indeed the Commissioners doubt whether the scheme, even if completely developed, would have any appreciable effect in the reduction of piracies.

The information in the hands of the Commission, and the description on pages 33 and 34 of Mr. Sutherland's memorandum of the methods of search employed by the Hongkong Police, shows that in this matter of searching Hongkong is at least as thorough as any port on the China coast, and is more thorough than the majority. Piracies out of Hongkong are comparatively rare, and there has been no case since January, 1924; while the Police search, aided by an efficient detective service ashore, has been definitely responsible for preventing more than one attempt. It would appear therefore that pirates already avoid Hongkong—the difficulties of operating from this centre are sufficiently great to drive them elsewhere where their road is easy, and as long as the Colony can hold this position in relation to other ports, further precautions in this direction may even lay themselves open to the charge of being unnecessarily stringent. What is required is a common level of search throughout the ports concerned, and such search to be completely effective must be backed by an efficient detective system ashore. Hongkong has set a standard in this matter, both ashore and afloat, high enough to drive the pirates to other centres. It remains for those other centres to take measures for driving them still further until they are finally driven off the face of the map of the China coast.

There is also put forward a plan for searching, which deserves further examination in the light of the recent *Ko Chow* incident. Briefly the plan is that all intending passengers should file past detectives, or should be paraded before them, so that the detectives should 'spot' undesirable. In the case of the *s. Ko Chow* a number of concealed revolvers was found under conditions which made it highly probable that a gang of pirates was actually on board. A close examination by the Police of all the passengers resulted in the detention of a number of suspects. Suspicion, however, was only based on the fact that the detained men spoke the same dialect as the man who had charge of the revolvers, and that they came from the same district at about the same time. Details of this nature could not be elicited in an ordinary parade, nor would they form ground for action unsupported by some good reason such as the previous discovery of the revolvers. This discovery, it should be noted, was directly due to alertness on the part of the ship's personnel.

Most of the views on points of detail of individual members of the Shipping Sub-committee of the Chamber of Commerce are dealt with in their appropriate paragraphs. The remainder consists of suggestions for small additions to the defensive equipment of the ship, such as should lie well within the competence of the Captain to provide without reference to the Piracy Prevention Regulations.

The Commissioners note with some disappointment that the letter from the Chamber of Commerce contains no suggestion that action on the part of the owners or of the officers by way of precaution against attack is called for. Destructive criticism rather than constructive suggestion is foreshadowed in the following extract from a member's opinion included in the letter :

"When the report of the Commissioners of the *Sunning Piracy* is complete at will no doubt show to what extent the Regulations were carried out, and whether it was found impossible to put certain Regulations into practice. The shipping sub-committee will be in a better position to offer suggestions for the improvement of existing conditions after the Report is presented."

The Regulations indeed ever since their institution appear to have provided an opening for destructive criticism which has been seized to the detriment of constructive and independent action; and the Commissioners have been influenced by this view in making their final recommendations.

2.—THE ROOT OF PIRACY.

It is a common-place to repeat that the elimination of piracy on the China coast must await improvement in the condition of the country as a whole, and that while no effort is made to deal with pirates in their lairs ashore by their own Government, and while the efforts of those with power throughout the land end only in the encouragement of disorder and destruction, so long will piracy flourish and increase. Given the will, it would be a simple matter for any Chinese authority to smoke out such a notorious nest as Bias Bay, and to keep it under control; but until the Chinese can be induced to take action themselves, or to allow action to be taken in the common interest, the risk of piracy in Chinese waters will remain. We say this much on the point not because we have any doubt that the Hongkong Government is making every possible effort in the direction of eliminating pirates ashore, but because a reference that calls for "recommendations as to the measures necessary for preventing piracy" cannot otherwise be answered. Wholly to prevent piracy involves a destruction of the conditions which breed pirates, the common duty of every civilised Government.

The attitude of the Nationalist Government to the question appears in the following extract from a telegram received by the Governor of Hongkong from Mr. E. Teichman, C.I.E., in Hankow :—

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs [Mr. Eugene Chen] yesterday [March 19, 1927] gave me his reply about Bias Bay in the sense that his Government considered that punitive measures against the villages on shore would be worse than useless, as they would not stop piracy on the high seas and would only provoke the pirates to reprisal; and that the best means of dealing with the evil was for us to station a man-of-war in the neighbourhood of Bias Bay for the purpose of intercepting pirated vessels, coupled with wireless precautions and increased vigilance especially over the crews at the ports of embarkation, where, (rather than in the Bias Bay villages) pirates were planned and pirate organizations were based."

The evil is thus admitted as is also the fact that its roots lie ashore; but no hint is given of any attempt to deal with it. Advice is tendered; but the patrol suggestion is open to the obvious reply that if called for at all it should be a matter for the Government claiming control of the district, and to the criticism that such a patrol aloft can hope at the best to deal only with a few pirates after their piracies have been completed. There is no suggestion of any co-operation at the ports of embarkation where, (rather than in the Bias Bay villages), pirates are planned and the organisation based. In China to-day men of all grades of life have taken to piracy, and the conditions are such that no action against them can hope for final success unless it is strongly supported by detective and executive action ashore. No charge of neglect in this connection can lie against the British Government, but the Nationalist Government, which claims control over essential parts of the "ports of embarkation," stands condemned by the words of its own

Foreign Minister. So far from exhibiting a desire to shoulder an obvious responsibility, the quotation reveals an anxiety to divert attention from the Bias Bay area, where suspicions may be justified, but where proof has still to be provided by the Chinese authorities themselves, who voice the suspicion. The first sentence of the quotation given cannot but excite astonishment if it is to be taken at its face value. The more charitable view probably is that it is a matter of propaganda only. Chinese Governments have often complained that the foreign controlled areas of the country are responsible for all the ills of China, and have avoided responsibilities thereby. The same course still offers the same advantages but in addition the propaganda habit has become so strong among the Nationalists that even this opportunity, unreasonable as it is, cannot be resisted.

This augurs ill for the immediate possibility of co-operation, and the Commissioners feel that the maintenance of this attitude with the continued absence of any attempt by the Chinese to carry out an elementary international duty in their own territory justify a recommendation for independent action. Very strong reasons are required for such action, but Bias Bay at least supplies them in its direct connection with seventeen piracies in the last five years, nine having occurred in the last two years and in the absence of a sustained or even serious attempt by any local authority to deal with an evil which has for too long made the name notorious.*

*This was written before the Bias Bay raid on March 23, 1927, but is allowed to stand as a general recommendation: Bias Bay merely affording a conspicuous example.

3.—THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMBATING PIRACIES.

While the roots remain, piracy will recur: and pending the necessary drastic action ashore, the Commission has therefore to consider the best means of mitigating the scourge, by way of preventing the operating of pirates on ships being successfully completed.

(a) Piracies from without.

The question naturally falls into two parts, piracies from without and piracies from within. The latter, at one time practically unknown, seem to have replaced the former, once a standing menace to commerce throughout the seven seas. Among the steps taken to deal with piracy from without, the course of history shows that action by the British Navy was always the most important factor; but in connection with the "Minority Report" it is interesting to quote the following from the "Encyclopedia of the Laws of England," volume 11, page 139.

"Not resisting Pirates is an offence by a statute of the reign of Charles II. (22 and 23 Car. II. c. 11) whereby the master of any vessel of a burden not less than two hundred tons, and furnished with sixteen guns is forbidden to yield his cargo to pirates or any force without resistance, on pain of being rendered incapable to take charge of any English vessel afterwards; and if the ship be released, and anything given by the pirates to the master, such gift and his share of the ship are to go to the owners of the goods. And any ship of less burden or force than before-mentioned is forbidden to yield to a Turkish pirate, not having double her number of guns, without fighting: "an extraordinary instance of the courage and skill," observes Abbott, "which the legislature of those times attributed to English seamen, and which the exploits of succeeding generations have so often and so gloriously exemplified."

Section 6 of the same statute provided that if the mariners or inferior officers of any English ship, laden with goods and merchandise as aforesaid, shall decline or refuse to fight and defend the ship when they shall be thereunto commanded by the master or commander thereof, or shall utter any words to discourage the other mariners from defending the ship, every mariner who shall be found guilty of declining or refusing as aforesaid, shall lose all his wages due to him, together

with such goods as he hath in his ship and suffer imprisonment not exceeding the space of six months, and shall during such time be kept to hard labour for his or their maintenance.

The principle underlying this law still holds good, though the circumstances have altered. No reasonably possible action by the Navy can prevail unless it is supported by full precaution and determined action on the part of all those who may be open to attack. Service on the China coast must in these troublous times be held to include the risk of piracy, and to presuppose a determination to resist. That this assumption is no mere pious hope is shown by an extract from the record of a meeting held at the Colonial Office to consider piracy on the China coast on July 10, 1924. At that meeting there were present besides representatives of the Colonial Office, Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the Board of Trade, and the Hongkong Government, the following:—

Mr. T. W. Moore, C.B.E., F.R.G.S., Secretary, The Imperial Merchants Service Guild.

Mr. D. Bramah, C.B.E., General Secretary, The Marine Engineers' Association.

Mr. J. Watson, Secretary, The Marine Engineers' Guild of China. (Representing also the China Coast Officers' Guild.)

The relevant section of the minutes reads:—

"As a preliminary to the consideration of this suggestion, there was some discussion as to whether the Guilds had any objection in principle to the defence of a ship from within. The representatives of the Guilds made it clear that they had no such objection in principle and indeed accepted as axiomatic the duty of the master and officers to defend their ship."

The same spirit is shown in the letter from the Secretary (China Coast Officers' Guild) to the Secretary *Sui An* Piracy Commission, dated December 13, 1922, which contains this sentence, "That every vessel should have 'Action Stations' for repelling attack by pirates, and exercise therein at regular intervals, such practice being recorded in Log Book..."; and of the letter from the Marine Engineers' Guild of the same date, which covers very detailed advice on the best use of possible defensive measures, such as grilles, steam pipes and hot water hose, and the Commissioners have no reason to think that the views of the two Guilds have been altered by more recent events.

It is reassuring to note that the officers of the *Sunning* have proved that the compliment conveyed to the Mercantile Marine in the quotation given from Abbott is still justified, and that officers are still prepared to elect for service on the China coast with all its risks and added responsibilities.

The memorandum criticising the Minority Report, (Appendix III) deals very fully with this question of piracy from without.

The Commissioners identify themselves with that memorandum, and hold the view that patrols by the Navy over the whole of the actual danger zone are impossible to an extent justifying any reduction of the internal precautions on board ships, which they merely complement; but that it is necessary to press for the extension of assistance from the Navy, which already guards the rivers, in the direction of establishing patrols off the seaward approaches to known pirate strongholds, and in the last resort, failing the co-operation of the Chinese authorities, of destroying those strongholds by independent action.

(b) *Piracies from within.*

Before considering in detail the question of piracy from within, it is pertinent to ask what action a British man-of-war could take if it found a ship already in control of pirates. The difficulties confronting the commander, and the extra risks to which all on board the pirated ship would be exposed are so obvious that they need no further elaboration. But the point emphasises again the supreme necessity for all possible action to prevent pirates gaining control, if only for long enough to send out signals to summon assistance.

The Commissioners base their recommendation principally on a consideration of the proper incidence of responsibility for defensive action within any ship. The possibility of making an impregnable citadel of the bridge, with the probability that pirates will not attack a ship, where the conditions leave any doubt as to their chances of getting clear with the booty, has been discussed under section V.

The whole of the existing Hongkong Piracy Prevention Regulations forms an extraordinary and unusual piece of legislation; it is indeed probably unique. Locally made regulations are imposed upon ships which are bound by bond to observe them far outside the limits of the Colony's jurisdiction. It is by no means clear that the Regulations cannot conflict with Board of Trade Regulations common to the whole British Mercantile Marine. In any event other authorities presumably have equal power to impose regulations of their own making, so that the value of the Hongkong bond may quite easily depend on something beyond the control of the bondsman. Further, the choice given to a captain, outside Hongkong waters, between observing the conditions of his bond or of ignoring them in favour of the commonly held view that they conflict with the Board of Trade Regulations, often ends in the defeat of the bond. The choice is the more readily made in that some at least of the conditions of the bond tend to hamper the easy working of a ship and the Regulations therefore start with the handicap of being unpopular. One such opening for attack weakens the whole fabric, which is already none too strong with the difficulty concerning the discipline of the guards, and the doubts concerning the dangers of carrying revolvers near a compass. Very conflicting evidence on this last point was received, and the Commission can only conclude that it is possible that in certain circumstances the danger may be a real one.

But this criticism takes second place in importance to the consideration that the Regulations cause a misplaced incidence of responsibility. The Government assumes through them some responsibility for the internal defence of a ship, and the whole responsibility for any possible conflict with the Board of Trade Regulations in emergency.

The value of the scheme of defence, the satisfactory design and construction of the grilles, the reliability of the Indian guards and their supply (or want of supply, as it has at times been necessary to detain ships for which no guards were immediately available)—these matters lie with the Government and they eat so deep into internal management, that those concerned are encouraged to go further and to consider that the whole anti-piracy question is a matter for Government alone. The fact, of course, is that at sea discipline and determination alone will count; without them the best made "scheme of defence" will be worthless, and where they exist the scheme is best left to those who have to depend on it perhaps for their lives. Advice and assistance can be freely given; but the responsibility should be directly on owners and officers. The companies at present pay all expenses for certain fittings and guards ordered or provided by the Government. They have little faith in their value, and in few cases do much to co-operate. The Government does nothing, beyond insisting that precautions are taken, that the companies could not do at least equally well themselves. The responsibility is, however, shifted to the Government. With that responsibility definitely put back on to the companies, it is to be hoped that self-interest or public opinion will lead to precautions being taken with a better will, and therefore with more chance of being thorough. Whatever it was decided to do would in any event be more quickly done than now, when it appears that the "Scheme of Defence Committee" has six months' whole time work before it to bring all the ships concerned into line with the Regulations; with little expectation that any organised "plan of defence" will be separately arranged before the regulation "scheme of defence" is set out by the Committee.

This misplaced incidence seems to have occasioned a misapprehension that appears in the Minority Report. That report, which hardly recognises sufficiently the important distinction between piracies from within and piracies from without, carries the Government acceptance of a responsibility, which it was forced by circumstances to assume but which it cannot fully discharge, to the furthest possible limits, and lays the whole burden on the Navy, apparently absolving owners, officers and crew from doing anything at all in their own interests.

Government action was required to force a beginning. The last thirteen years have provided ideas, and considerable constructional work, which should not now be in danger of losing their momentum, and experience which is not likely to be ignored. There is now more probability that the experience gathered will be put to practical use without, rather than with, Government "interference."

VIII.—Recommendations and Conclusions.

The main conclusion to which the Commission has been driven is that the conditions demand precautions and an organisation to resist pirates on board every vessel exposed to the risk of piracy; but that no system is worth the cost of installation or the trouble of organising, unless it is backed by a determination to resist on the part of owners and officers alike, who must necessarily co-operate to this end. The Government hand in the organisation on board is openly unpopular, and, in lacking the essential co-operation of owners and officers, even constitutes an obstacle to the institution and development of voluntary schemes. The Piracy Prevention Regulations and thirteen years' experience have given a valuable lead; and the Commission is unanimously of opinion that the responsibility for internal precautions and organisation should now be thrown back upon the owners, who, by seeking the co-operation of their officers and considering their views, will at least be able to ensure that confidence in the arrangements which is essential. Where the proper spirit exists, the Commissioners are convinced that arrangements can be made which will go far towards eliminating the risk of piracy, while if that spirit is lacking Government regulations will avail but little. This conclusion is no royal road to the elimination of piracy, but the Commissioners are satisfied that it goes to the heart of the matter, and that it must form the foundation of any attempt of whatever kind to mitigate the evils of piratical attacks.

It is by no means intended, however, that the Government should do nothing. It is the Government's part to press for all possible patrolling, and independent action if called for, by the Navy on the river and around spots such as Bias Bay, to encourage the installation of wireless, to consider the desirability of making it compulsory, and to facilitate its employment by such methods as the reduction to a minimum of transmission charges, to continue to make the Colony an unhealthy centre for pirates by search and detective operations afloat and ashore, and in addition to afford all such advice and assistance towards the making of satisfactory arrangements on board, as it may be possible to provide. In a purely voluntary scheme such as the Commission favours the provision of satisfactory guards for example may offer difficulties to private companies. In this matter Government could undoubtedly assist, and under section VI above the Commissioners have outlined a scheme which they anticipate would secure the necessary co-operation with the owners. There may be many details on which advice would be sought, (the details of a system of signals are an obvious one.) and the resources of the Harbour Office, and of others as may be necessary, should be made available. In their recommendations the Commissioners include in a general shape applicable to all vessels alike points, which the enquiry has shown to be most deserving of the consideration of owners in forming their own defence schemes. But opinion may be desired on the many possible modifications and these should be readily available.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

The unanimous recommendations of the Commissioners are summarized as follows:

1. The Government should endeavour to induce the authorities at the coast ports to make the searching at those ports more effective, and should continue to press for the co-operation of the Chinese authorities to deal with the evil ashore. Should effective co-operation continue to be withheld, the Commissioners consider that H.M.'s Government would be amply justified in taking independent action for the extermination of known pirate strongholds as a common international duty.

2. The necessity for all possible patrolling by the Navy on the rivers and on the coast, especially in the vicinity of such spots as Bias Bay, should continue to be emphasised.

3. The whole of the Piracy Prevention Regulations should be rescinded, and the following recommendations should be brought to the notice of owners as the outlines of a scheme sufficient to enable a few determined men to prevent a successful piracy, and so to make even the attempt at piracy unlikely:

(a) The bridge should be protected by grilles and dotgers, with guards stationed at the entrances.

(b) Subsidiary grilles should be provided, isolating the Officers and 1st class cabins as far as possible.

(c) Careful attention should be given to points of detail such as: the arrangement of lights to assist the defence, a system of alarm bells and a plan to concentrate all Europeans on alarm.

4. The compulsory installation of wireless telegraphy should be considered, but in any event the Government should encourage its use and development by such means as the reduction of charges for a system of anti-piracy messages.

5. The Government should establish a Board to be the repository of all data connected with piracy, which should meet at set, quarterly intervals to consider the question generally with a view to being in a position to supply information and advice when called upon. The idea of the Commissioners is to reduce formalities, and therefore delay, to a minimum. The opinion and advice of the members of the Board should be severally or jointly at the disposal of those concerned, and the available data should be equally at the disposal of each member, who would have discretion to advise with or without calling the remaining members to formal consultation. The responsibility for the collection and custody of the records would naturally fall to the lot of the Harbour Master, with the Harbour Office, as the most convenient repository; and the members to be associated with him should include the Captain Superintendent of Police, a Naval Officer, and a Coast Officer still serving. The necessary steps should from time to time be taken to bring the existence and nature of this Board and its personnel to the notice of those concerned, especially the Shipping Companies.

The report is signed by:—A. H. Stewart, W. Davison, T. G. Weall, L. Pitcairn Jones, G. F. Hole, E. D. C. Wolfe, E. R. Hallifax (Chairman).

New Hongkong Legislation.

In consequence of the measures decided upon in the report of the Sunning Piracy Commission, a Bill intitled an Ordinance to Amend the Law Relating to the Suppression of Piracy was introduced into the Legislative Council on Sept. 15, 1927.

In this Bill, a draft of which was published in the current Government Gazette, the abolition of grilles on ships for anti-piracy purposes and the complete repeal of the 1914 Piracy Prevention Ordinance and all the regulations in force under it is foreshadowed.

The Objects and Reasons state :

This Bill is one of the measures decided upon in consequence of the report of the *Sunning Piracy Commission*. It repeals the Piracy Prevention Ordinance, 1914, and all the regulations in force thereunder.

It inserts in the Suppression of Piracy Ordinance, 1868, power to make regulations for searches of vessels and persons, and any other regulations which may appear desirable for the purpose of preventing piracy. These regulations will all relate to things to be done or suffered within the territorial limits of the Colony, and the present scheme of bonds for the observance of various regulations outside the limits of the Colony will thus disappear.

A draft of the proposed regulations to be made under Ordinance No. 1 of 1868, will be published shortly. It will be seen that they contain nothing to require the provision of grilles or any other structural arrangement in any ship.

The recommendations of the *Sunning Piracy Commission* relating to guards are still under consideration.

Clause 3 of the Bill proposes to repeal four sections in the Suppression of Piracy Ordinance, 1868, which appear to be unnecessary. Section 7 is repealed because there is no reformatory in Hongkong. Section 8 is repealed because the possession of arms is sufficiently dealt with by the Arms and Ammunition Ordinance, 1900, Ordinance No. 2 of 1900, and stink pots are now obsolete. The regulations made under this section which were published in the *Gazette* of August 20th, 1870, ceased to be in force on April 12th, 1913, by virtue of the provisions of section 5 (2) of the Regulations Ordinance, 1915, Ordinance No. 7 of 1915, and of the Order made under section 5 (1) of that Ordinance which was gazetted on April 1st, 1915. No regulations have subsequently been made under section 8 of the Suppression of Piracy Ordinance, 1868. Section 9 of that Ordinance is repealed because it merely provides that all enactments, etc., inconsistent with Ordinance No. 1 of 1868 are to be of no effect. Section 10 is repealed because it merely provides that nothing in the Ordinance is to effect the jurisdiction previously exercised by the Supreme Court.

A number of the pirates engaged in the *Sunning* piracy were caught and tried before Mr. Justice J. R. Wood in the Hongkong Supreme Court and eight of them were found guilty and duly hanged.

THE HENG AN PIRACY.

(January 2, 1927)

A number of passengers, said to be about thirty, took passage by the *Heng An* from Swatow to Canton and en route carried out the usual pirates' plan of holding up the Captain and officers and proceeding to Bias Bay. There were several cases of tinfoil on board and these were apparently mistaken for silver. On arrival at Bias Bay, derricks were rigged and the whole of the tinfoil was discharged into junks. Prior to this, further up the coast, a boat containing the chief officer and some of the crew, was sent ashore, and on the way the boat struck a submerged rock and was smashed. Two of the boat's crew were drowned, but the remainder succeeded in swimming ashore. The value of the pirates' haul is not known, but is believed to be considerable. The *Heng An* is owned by the Great China Steamship Co., of Foochow, her master being Captain Hans Eriksen. She arrived at Swatow on December 18 from Shanghai and after loading and discharging cargo she took on 38 passengers for Canton. When the vessel was about six miles off Chilang Point, much commotion was heard on board. When the Captain rushed out, he was met by two armed men who ordered him up to the bridge, where the chief officer was on duty. The pirates then locked up the Captain and chief officer in the chart room,

where they were placed under armed guard, but later they were allowed to return to the bridge under cover of a number of armed pirates. The Captain was then ordered to steer the ship to Harlem Bay, Pinghoi, where the pirates forced the Captain to lower three of the lifeboats. In one of these were the chief officer and five of the ship's crew, accompanied by two pirates. When nearing the coast, the lifeboat overturned and all aboard began to swim ashore, but two of the crew lost their lives. The next morning, the chief officer and three of the crew returned to the ship in a sampan, whereupon the pirates ordered the steamer to leave for Bias Bay. Some hours later, the steamer anchored at Tsang Shan Tsi, and a boat was sent ashore with the boatswain, two seamen and a pirate to request sampans to come alongside. Then began the work of removing the cargo, the crew and *compradore* staff being forced to work the derricks, and in the afternoon the pirates left in two sampans, taking the Captain with them. Prior to this, all the money and much clothing had been taken from the passengers. An hour or so later, the Captain was allowed to return to the steamer, which later left for Canton, which was reached on Christmas Eve.

THE SEANG BEE PIRACY.

(January 27, 1927.)

The S.S. *Seang Bee* (reg. tonnage 3,784) was bringing mail from Singapore to Hongkong. There were over 700 passengers on board, and 12 European officers including engineers and three wireless operators, and a crew of 159. The pirates, as usual, boarded the vessel as passengers. On January 27 they surprised the officers while they were having breakfast. A few random shots were fired, and the bridge was rushed. Within a few minutes the vessel was completely in the hands of the gang, and under their instructions it was taken to Bias Bay. There the pirates left in the ship's boats, taking the Captain with them. He was held prisoner for several hours, and then released. Upon his return the vessel was permitted to proceed on its journey to Hongkong. Five passengers (Chinese) were taken for ransom, and the passengers' effects stolen were valued at \$100,000. Bias Bay was reached at 3 a.m. on January 31. The pirates on this occasion numbered about sixty. They made the usual threats to set fire to the ship and murder the officers in the event of any interference. The ship's general cargo was not touched, and she carried no bullion.

THE HOPSANG PIRACY.

(March 21, 1927)

The Indo-China S. N. Co.'s str. *Hopsang* was attacked between Swatow and Hongkong shortly before midnight on March 21. The attack occurred at a time when only one deck officer was on duty and the ship fell an easy prey, the officers being forced to steer the vessel to Bias Bay where the gang got clear away with booty valued at over \$10,000. A Dutch passenger named Kruger, awakened from his sleep in the saloon, made a show of resistance, throwing out the first two pirates who entered. A few minutes later he was attacked by half a dozen armed men, two shots being fired, one of which took effect in his leg. He was then struck over the head with the butt of a revolver and rendered *hors de combat*. The leader of the gang admitted in conversation with the officers that the pirates had organized an attack on the Douglas s. *Haining*. She failed to put into Swatow, and the pirates boarded the *Hopsang*, accepting her apparently as the next best thing.

The ship's officers were taken by surprise, made prisoners, and compelled to take the vessel to Bias Bay. Deck passengers and various officers and members of the crew were robbed of personal effects, and from the *Compradore* \$7,000 was stolen. The cargo was not interfered with. The pirates left the ship in sampans which came out from the shore on being summoned by revolver shots. At first the pirates suggested taking a European ashore as a hostage, but eventually

they abandoned this idea. The ship was detained in Bias Bay for three-quarters of an hour. There were about fourteen pirates on this occasion.

BIAS BAY PUNITIVE EXPEDITION. †

On March 23, 1927, British Naval Forces conducted a raid on Bias Bay. With aeroplanes observing overhead, a party 500 strong landed from the fleet, a slow busi-ness in the very shallow water of Fan Lo Kong inlet, and after giving the inhabitants an opportunity to remove their personal belongings, destroyed two groups of hamlets, comprising some 130 stone and matted shacks. They also destroyed about 40 junks and sampans, used in piracies and probably stolen. Clear explanations were given, with warnings of similar action in the future should piracies continue. Definite evidence was received from a villager. Unfortunately it was not possible to effect the rescue of the five passengers who were kidnapped from the s.s. *Seang Bee*, and who are captives in the same district. It was in consequence of the piracy of the s. *Hopsang* on March 21, that the naval operation was undertaken. It was carried out under the Command of Rear-Admiral Boyle, and the following ships took part:—H.M.S. *Frobisher*, H.M.S. *Hermes*, H.M.S. *Delhi*, H.M.S. *Marazion* and H.M.S. *Foxglove*. The expedition started at 6.30 p.m. on March 22 from Hongkong harbour and arrived in Bias Bay at about 1.30 a.m. on March 23. Naval forces entirely were employed with the exception of a detachment of police officers, interpreters and detectives under the charge of the Captain Superintendent of Police of Hongkong (the Hon. Mr. E. D. C. Wolfe), Mr. T. H. King (Head of the Criminal Investigation Department), and Captain H. F. Bloxham (A.S.P.). Four European detectives were also included in the party. It will be recalled that Captain Bloxham was one of the officers who accompanied the previous expedition in January, 1925. That was a joint undertaking organised by the Chinese authorities. Bias Bay is a bay of considerable size, and in one corner of it there is a long, narrow and very shallow inlet, Fan Lo Kong Inlet, sometimes called Fan Wo Kong. At the head of this inlet there are two groups of hamlets called Kwai Chau and Hai Chau, almost inaccessible because of the shallow water. Creeks run behind these villages and convert them into little islands. These hamlets were the objectives of the expedition. The police had definite information that the inhabitants of these villages had participated in at least three recent serious piracies. It was known that two of the pirates who took part in the *Seang Bee* affair were from Kwai Chau village and eight pirates were known to belong to Hai Chau village. Of these, five were concerned in the *Hong Hua* piracy of January, 1925, and two in the *Tungchow* piracy of December, 1925. One of the objects of the expedition, also, was to recover, if possible, the five Chinese passengers who had been seized for ransom from the *Seang Bee*, and from a statement made by the only Chinese questioned during the expedition it was apparent that these five were somewhere in the vicinity. There is an island in Bias Bay, in front of Fan Lo Kong inlet, where pirated ships are usually taken to anchor to let the pirates escape. The British cruisers anchored to the south of this island and preparations were made for the landing. The landing force was divided into three parties—one destined to proceed to the village of Kwa: Chau, and the other two parties for the group of three villages known as Hai Chau. The disembarkation of marines and naval ratings to the number of about 300, as well as police, by cutters and other boats, began at 2.30 a.m. When all was ready, the boats were towed in by the *Marazion* for a distance of about ten miles to the head of the inlet. In all, about 17 boats were employed on this operation, which required considerable seamanship and on which the Admiral later complimented those taking part. The boats then proceeded under oars or in tow of motor boats to the shore. Owing to the shallow water, the landing parties had to wade over distances which varied from 400 to 40 yards, the men often being

† *Shipping and Engineering.*

waist high in mud and water. The Kwai Chau party, having rather deeper water, were ashore first at 6.15 a.m. The object of the expedition was two-fold. In the first place, it was desired to destroy two villages which were known to be pirate haunts, and to destroy them without injury to life if possible. In the second place, it was desired to destroy junks and other craft found in the neighbourhood of these pirate haunts. The landing parties were under the command of Flag-Captain Calvert, R.N., of H.M.S. *Frobisher*. The slow progress up the inlet delayed the party and it was day-light when the landing was made. The villagers had seen them, and the element of surprise was absent. During the course of the operations, aeroplanes from the *Hermes* were overhead observing and reporting. On landing, covering parties had been sent to surround the villages to be dealt with. During the operations the neighbouring hillocks were crowded with Chinese watching what was going on. No opposition was offered. Of the force which proceeded to Kwai Chau, the first platoon immediately proceeded to the high ground west of the village and took up covering positions. The second platoon advanced on the village, which had been deserted by its inhabitants, who were congregated amongst some trees, about two or three hundred yards to the west of the village. The villagers were then collected and told that a period of grace was allowed to them during which they might collect and remove their personal effects from the houses which, after a short period, would be destroyed. They were also informed of the objects and reasons of the expedition, through interpreters. All houses in the village were then destroyed either by fire or by explosives. From fifteen to twenty junks and sampans on the northeast of the village were also destroyed. The number of houses destroyed amounted to about twenty of stone construction and a similar number of matcheds. The landing party for Hai Chau was divided into two sections. The first was intended to deal with the two hamlets near the beach, while the second was to proceed to the larger portion of the village which lay behind an adjoining hill. The force found all the houses deserted. The inhabitants had seen the boats approaching and had run away in the direction of the adjacent villages and townships of which there was a number within a radius of one to three miles. Their hasty departure was indicated by the fact that in many cases the morning meal had been left, either in the course of preparation or half-consumed. Details then proceeded to collect combustible materials which were piled in and around the houses and then set on fire. The more permanent structures were blown up. In the two hamlets already referred to, about thirty houses were destroyed by fire and seven or eight more by explosives. In the bigger village behind the hill fifty or sixty houses were destroyed by one or other methods, and it is noteworthy that in some cases explosions, obviously of ammunition, were heard coming from the burning structures. Here was found the only native who had remained to await the arrival of the forces. He came from his hiding place when the adjacent house was blown up. In answer to questions, he said that four or five pirates had absconded from the village when the force was landing. He said he knew nothing of the whereabouts of the five Chinese who had been kidnapped from the s. *Seang Bee* in January, 1927, but suggested that the elders of the adjacent village (Cheung Tai) might be able to produce them if they (the elders) were arrested by the force and held for examination. Instructions to the force had been to confine themselves to the two villages mentioned, and time not permitting, the villager's suggestion was not carried out, although the hope of the force had been to rescue these captives if possible. The villager was released, and commissioned to hand to his fellow villagers a number of copies of the Chinese notice explaining the reasons for the action taken.

This notice read as follows:

“This punishment is inflicted on this village on account of repeated piracies of British ships by inhabitants of this region.

If any further piracies are committed by the inhabitants of this region, the punishment will be repeated.”

These notices had been specially prepared and numbers of them were posted in and around the various villages destroyed. Copies were also given to the villagers who returned just as the force was leaving. Particular instructions had been given and particular care was taken that no damage whatever should be done to buildings of a religious character. This landing party also destroyed about twenty fishing junks and smaller craft that were found near the beach. While these landing operations were in progress a Naval party had been detailed to round up and destroy other junks in Fan Lo Kong inlet. Sampans were first requisitioned by this party and the occupants of the junks and other craft were disembarked. The junks, five and the number of about seven, were then burned or blown up. On one junk, five rifles were found and taken away. Just before the expedition reembarked at 10.30 a.m. a few of the villagers filtered back to the sentries. They were given copies of the explanatory notice by members of the Hongkong Police. There was no opposition, neither were there any casualties on either side. Re-embarkation began at 10.30 a.m. and the landing parties reached their ships shortly before 2 p.m. The expedition then returned to Hongkong, reaching the harbour about 6.30 p.m. The wind was from the sea to the shore and the smoke from the burning villages went up to the sky and must have conveyed its lesson for miles around.

THE HSIN CHI PIRACY.

(August 25, 1927).

The China Merchants' steamer *Hsin Chi* was pirated while en route to Foochow from Shanghai on August 25.

The pirates, who were travelling as passengers seized control of the vessel when she was one day's journey from Shanghai. They forced the crew to paint out the vessel's name and repaint her funnels. Thus disguised the *Hsin Chi* passed English and French gunboats and arrived at Bias Bay on August 27.

The pirates went ashore with six cases of treasure, one of silk and a quantity of other cargo.

The compradore and one Chinese passenger were taken as hostages.

The *Hsin Chi* left Bias Bay on the same evening and on entering the Min River was fired on from the forts as she was not recognized. After an explanation was given, however, she was allowed to proceed to Pagoda Anchorage.

There was one foreign lady passenger on board, Miss Ward, but she was not molested by the pirates.

THE YAT SHING PIRACY.

(August 30, 1927).

The Indo-China S.N. Co's steamer *Yat Shing*, bound from Swatow to Shanghai, was seized by pirates who had shipped as passengers when two hours out from the former port. The vessel was seized about 9 a.m. on August 30, the Second Officer, who was on watch on the bridge, being surrounded by eight pirates, while the remainder of the gang surprised the other officers. Orders were given to steer for Bias Bay, and signals were prepared stating that the vessel was returning to Hongkong with boiler trouble. The vessel was taken to Sam Chau (Tai Chau) Inlet, where loot to the value of several thousands of dollars was removed in the ship's boats, together with a large quantity of provisions from the Steward's stores. Eight Chinese passengers were kidnapped. The Captain, who was compelled to accompany the pirates ashore, was subsequently sent back to his ship, which left the pirates' lair at 11 a.m. on August 31 and reached Hongkong at 6 p.m. the same day. The pirates, when sending the Captain back, warned him to leave as quickly as possible, or he might be attacked by another gang.

BRITISH NAVAL RAID.

British Naval vessels made a second expedition to Bias Bay, the pirate retreat near Hongkong, on the morning of Sept., 1, following the receipt of information regarding the seizure of the s.s. *Yatshing* by pirates. Five men-o-war, the *Hermes*, *Danae*, *Foxglove*, *Sirdar*, and *Argus*, participated. Aeroplanes were in attendance.

The pirate-infested villages of Chung Pai and Fan Lo Kong were visited. Forty-five houses were destroyed in the former, and five in the latter. There were no casualties on either side. The landing party numbered 500.

The aim of the expedition on this occasion was to pick out definite pirate retreats and destroy them. Because the villagers at Chung Pai would not divulge these residences, they had to suffer more extensive damage to their property. As on the former occasion, notices were left behind warning the inhabitants that in the event of any further seizures of British ships the visits would be repeated.

The expedition left Hongkong at about four o'clock on the morning of Thursday, September 1, and steamed for four hours in the direction of Bias Bay. At 8 a.m. the large ships had to anchor owing to lack of water. The objectives were the known pirate-village of Chung Pai and Fan Lo Kong, and the intention was to destroy the houses of individual pirates, as bandits who had been engaged in recent piracies were known to be living in these villages.

The landing party comprised 500, and the first boat disembarked at 10.40 a.m., landing its force near the village of Hai Chau which was destroyed in the first raid. A walk of three-quarters of a mile brought the party to the village of Chung Pai, the first objective.

On passing through the village on the sea shore the landing force was met by the Elder of the place, who assured the officers in charge that it was not his village that was harbouring pirates. He offered to conduct them to Chung Pai, and his services were accepted. Upon approaching the latter village, the Elder collected the chiefs of Chung Pai together and handed the leaders of the expedition over to them!

There was a certain amount of parley between the Chinese and the leader of the landing party, Capt. Mackinnon, of H.M.S. *Danae*, Mr. Wolfe, the C.S.P., and others, and it soon became evident that these village heads would not disclose the residences of the pirates. Instructions were therefore given for the blowing up of some of the houses on the edge of the village. Then it was that the location of the pirate's haunts was divulged, and five were charged and destroyed. These happened to be amongst the best built and most ornately furnished in the village, and were empty at the time.

Chung Pai was entered at 11.20 a.m. and the first house house was fired at 11.25. The village was vacated at noon. There were no casualties on either side.

The landing party then marched to the second objective, the village of Fan Lo Kong, a scattered community of 10,000 souls. Here there was no hesitation on the part of what inhabitants there were left in pointing out the pirate houses, and five were destroyed. As in the first village, these residences were amongst the best in the place.

The first house was fired at 1.10 p.m., and the expedition commenced retiring at 2 p.m. Re-embarkation was started at 2.20, completed at 2.40 and the ships weighed from Bias Bay at 5.30 p.m., returning to local waters.

Such, in bald outline, is the story of the second naval raid on Bias Bay. Altogether, it appears, fifty houses were destroyed. Both villages were more or less deserted when the party arrived, which seems to show that the landing forces were expected. As a matter of fact, information was gleaned by some detectives from the villagers that, after the *Soloifen* piracy, a raid was expected.

and for some days the people camped on the hillside. This is what they were doing when the expedition made its appearance on Thursday.

Junks in the vicinity of the shore sailed rapidly away on the approach of the landing parties. Ten, however, were found anchored and these were destroyed. The demolition in Chung Pai, the first village attacked, was certainly more extensive than in the other. This, it is emphasized, was because the inhabitants refused to say which were pirate haunts. About 45 houses were destroyed in Chung Pai and the five definitely-known pirate retreats in Fan Lo Kong. In the latter village one house which was pointed out as a pirate residence was spared upon an officer going inside and discovering the owner, a pirate, dead in his coffin. It appears that he had been killed in a quarrel just before the landing party arrived.

Great care was taken by the landing forces to preserve joss houses and the property adjoining them. Animals were also removed from the scene of any firing operations.

The landing was an extremely difficult operation, and was handily carried out without incident. The expedition's activities were hampered by the flight of time, as all had to be done between tides. There was not sufficient time, therefore, to demolish all the pirates' houses that were discovered. Notices were left behind, as on the previous occasion, pointing out that should another British ship be pirated the landing forces would return.

The landing party was in command of Capt. Mackinnon, of H.M.S. *Danae*, who was accompanied by Messrs. Wolfe and King, Hongkong Police, and a party of 18 detectives. The actual expedition, at the outset, was in charge of Capt. Elliott, of H.M.S. *Hermes*. Whilst the raid was in operation, however, H.M.S. *Argus* which was on her way to Shanghai when recalled by the Commander-in-Chief, arrived, and Capt. Palmer, being the senior naval officer, took command. During the operations aeroplanes kept a surveillance over the spot but were not called upon to interfere.

As a result of the raid it has been ascertained that the s.s. *Yatshing* was not taken into Bias Bay when she was pirated the other day, but into Tai Chau inlet, which is on the south of the Bay. From this inlet there is a long and narrow creek up which small craft can get to within a few miles of the village of Fan Lo Kong, from whence it is certain the *Yatshing* pirates came. *China Mail*.

THE KOCHOW PIRACY.

(September 1, 1927).

The *Kochow* a steamer of 300 tons nett register left Hongkong for Wuchow on August 31, 1927 with approximately 100 passengers on board. In addition to a Chinese crew of 62 she carried a British Captain, Chief Officer, and Chief Engineer. The vessel reached Samshui next day, and there there was a change over of about fifty passengers. She sailed from Samshui at 4.30 p.m. on September 1, and was pirated about two and a half hours later. The Master and Chief Officer were seized in the Mess Room, where they were awaiting their dinner, the only Indian Guard on duty at the time having been overpowered, thus enabling the pirates to open the grilles. The six Guards were disarmed. The Chief Engineer, Mr. Black, endeavoured to seize his revolver, but was shot through the head, killed, and thrown overboard. The pirates stated that they had made several attempts to capture the *Kochow*, that they had spent ten thousand dollars in organizing the *Kochow* outrage. The Captain and Chief Officer were imprisoned in the hold and the *Kochow* was taken to Taipinghu, where it arrived about 9 p.m. on September 2. Here they dropped anchor, removing the loot, with the amount of which they were greatly disappointed, in sampans, and

one of the ship's boats. The compradore and his staff, and a number of passengers were kidnapped. The *Kochow* returned to Samshui, where the outrage was reported.

BRITISH NAVAL RAID.

Following the pirate outrage on the s.s. *Kochow*, the British naval authorities in Hongkong decided upon a punitive expedition in the West River area, and on September 4, the three gunboats, *Moth*, *Cicala*, and *Moorhen*, steamed to Taiping Hu, which has been involved in three piratical adventures within a year, and there set fire to all the houses on the water front, previously warning the inhabitants of their intention. There were no casualties.

The naval craft then proceeded to Shekki, which is on the opposite side of the river, and as the place stands back from the water's edge, 18 shells were fired into the village, the inhabitants being previously warned. Here, also, so far as can be ascertained, there were no casualties. There were certainly none on the British side.

Comdr. Fitzgerald, commanding the West River Flotilla, directed operations from aboard H.M.S. *Moth*, as his own ship, H.M.S. *Tarantula*, is in Hongkong refitting.

Taiping Hu (or Taiping market) is a small place on the right bank of the West River below the Ling Yang Gorges, where the *Kochow* was pirated. It may be remembered that the merchant vessel was brought down to Taiping Hu by the pirates, who then landed most of their 100 on the other bank, at Shekki. That is why these two villages were selected by the naval authorities for reprisal purposes. Shekki is just above Shamchau.

An official account of the operations is as follows:

"A British naval operation was carried out by the West River Flotilla on Saturday against the villages, of Tai Ping Hu and Shekki.

At Tai Ping Hu, the village from which the pirates came, the population were warned to evacuate and the waterfront of this village was set afire.

At Shekki, the village at which the loot was landed, the population were evacuated and eighteen shells were fired into the village.

There were no British casualties and, it is believed, no Chinese.

It is reported that Cantonese troops are also moving against the pirates."

THE SHING ON PIRACY.

The Hongkong steamer, *Shing On*, left that port for Samshui on October 10, 1927. Next day she took on board 83 Chinese passengers and sailed from Samshui at about 5.00 p.m. When an hour and a half out, in the vicinity of the *Kochow* piracy, her captain, Chan (Chinese), the purser and the pilot were overpowered and the vessel was steered for Fu Wan, which was reached at 8.30 p.m. Seventy of the passengers were carried off to be held for ransom, and the cargo of matches, sugar, flour, etc., was transferred to junks. The effects of the officers, crew and passengers were also stolen. The *Shing On* returned to Hongkong on October 13.

THE IRENE PIRACY.*

The China Merchants' steamer, *Irene*, 1343 tons, Captain Johnsen (Norwegian), sailing under the Chinese flag, was seized by pirates, masquerading as passengers, on the morning of October 19 while on a voyage from Shanghai to Amoy. The officers were overpowered, the steward was shot, and the passengers were robbed. The vessel was steered for Bias Bay, with orders not to enter before dark. When entering Bias Bay on the evening of the 20th, without lights, she was espied by the British Submarine L-4 and signalled to stop immediately. The signal was ignored and

* This description is summarized from Reuter's telegraphic report, received just as this Chapter was being printed, and before all details of the incident were available.—ED.

warning shots were fired across her bows. The pirates fired on the submarine, which eventually put a shell into the steamer, disabling her engines, and, it is believed, setting her on fire. The *L-4* rescued all European officers, and she and H.M.S. *Delhi*, which arrived on the scene later, picked up 234 out of the 258 persons believed to have been on board, including seven suspected pirates. The submarine took 228 of the survivors to Hongkong while H.M.S.S. *Delhi*, *Magnolia* and *Stormcloud* stood by to rescue any other survivors and to attempt to extinguish the flames. The *Irene*, however, was completely gutted and sank the following afternoon. Seven suspected pirates were among the survivors.

SHIPPING LABOUR DISPUTES.

(Reference with regard to this general subject will be found under Strikes, in the Chapter on "LABOUR.")

One of the most serious blows to the foreign employees of shipping companies in China, was the suspension on February 1 of the foreign staff of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company. On February 1, the Company announced that from that date, the services would temporarily be dispensed with of the staffs, foreign and Chinese, of the ships which were still in the Company's hands.

The rule as regards such ships was made general, the exception being on each ship the master and the chief engineer were retained, on half pay, and that three or four Chinese continued to be employed on each vessel to ensure their being kept in a fairly reasonable condition of cleanliness and efficiency.

How many Chinese, afloat and ashore, were affected, was not clear, but the number of foreigners whose services were temporarily dispensed with was stated to be between 60 and 70.

The difficulties of the China Merchant's Steam Navigation Company have been numerous throughout the period under discussion. Every military organization which required steamship transportation seized the ships of the Company and used them without payment, which meant that the Company was without revenue although there was the constant expense of operations. Then on October 16, a fire broke out on the *S.S. Kwang Yang* at Kiukiang. It is reported that the loss of life was large as a result of this fire, which started at daybreak, immediately after the arrival of the steamship at Kiukiang. The ship was carrying 1,000,000 rounds of munitions, both cartridges and shells, as well as 1,500 soldiers, of whom only 300 were rescued. The explosion of the munitions as much as the fire was responsible for the heavy loss of life.

Chinese labour seized upon this accident to demand that they should not be required to risk their lives on munition ships. Whenever a shipping strike was mooted, the suggested terms included a demand along these lines. After the occupation of Nanking and Shanghai by the Nationalists, the business of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company was taken under the supervision of a Commission appointed by the Nanking Government. The Managing Director of the Company, Mr. Fu Siao-en was forced to leave the country.

On October 10, 1926, the boycott and shipping strike at Canton was officially closed by order of the Canton Government, ending a strike situation which commenced on June 23, 1925.

THE FOREIGN OFFICERS' STRIKE.

The strike of the officers and engineers of the China Navigation Company, Ltd. is perhaps the first strike of European employees in China. The strike arose as a result of an announcement by the Company of a 10% reduction in salaries due to the poor business being done in shipping at the present time. The reduction was to take place as from April 1.

The China Coast Officer's Guild, and the Marine Engineers Guild combined to fight the reduction and in Shanghai, (on May 9) and Hongkong, the Guilds met and submitted to Messrs. Butterfield & Swire, agents for the Company, the following proposal:

- (a) Its consent to submit the dispute to an adjustment board in accordance with the terms of the agreement of May, 1916; or, alternatively,
- (b) To signify its decision to restore the salaries to the level prevailing previous to the reduction, as well as to refund to all ranks the salary percentage deducted since April 1st, 1927.

The history of the strike from the standpoint of both the Guilds and the Owners is contained in the following documents:*

The Guilds' Case

Although, at the express wish of Messrs. Butterfield and Swire, no information of any kind was given to the press at the time, it was an open secret that in the autumn of last year the China Navigation Company proposed to bring a ten per cent. reduction of the salaries of all officers in its employ into effect from January 1. The reason given for the proposed reduction at that time was that the Company, in consequence of the prolonged boycott of British shipping companies at Canton and Swatow, had incurred heavy losses on the shipping service which normally would have been serving those ports. The proposed reduction was strenuously opposed by both Guilds, and after protracted negotiations, and in view of the fact that towards the end of 1926 both Canton and Swatow were once more open to British shipping and that no other port or ports were closed, the Company, in a letter dated December 22 and addressed to both Guilds, withdrew the proposed reduction, but reserved the right again to consider the matter in three months' time. An interesting and irrefutable fact is that since the beginning of the year especially, and for some time before in perhaps a lesser degree, coasting vessels of the China Navigation Company have been running at full pressure, loaded to the limit generally, and with by no means sufficient ships to transport the cargo which was lying, available to the China Navigation Company, at various ports. During the same period, the freight rates charged by the China Navigation Company have been increased. These Guilds have information to the effect that at the time the reduction was first proposed, the wages of the Chinese staffs of the China Navigation Company, on the wharves and godowns were increased. It was not proposed that the reduction which was to apply to the foreign masters and officers should also be made applicable to any other department of the China Navigation Company. This in itself, apart from any economic consideration, the officers strongly considered was most inequitable. Officers on China Coast ships, whose rates of pay have already freely been given in the press of Shanghai (and no reasonable person can truthfully assert that any rank is in the least overpaid) have during the last few years been experiencing as difficult and anxious a time as anyone on the China Coast. The peril of piracy is ever-present and though the masters and officers of the ships have never complained of the risks they are continually running, as witness the long list of pirates accompanied by violence, there has been no single instance of any action taken in the face of danger which has not been dictated by the strongest consideration for the security of the Company's property and the safety of the company's passengers. The *Sunning* piracy is too fresh in memory to call for any reminder of the extent to which the China Coast ship's masters and officers are prepared to go in the performance of their duty to their owners and to the passengers of the ships; while the piracy of the *Hofsang*, reported so recently as to-day, is yet another unmistakable reminder of the ever-present danger to which the officers of coasting vessels in this part of the world are exposed. Since the inception of the civil war on the Yangtze, the Company's boats have been running continuously, and in no instance has there been any refusal or objection of officers to operate the ships in what is most decidedly a danger zone. The Company's vessels on the Yangtze run are not protected with

* *Shipping and Engineering.*

armour plate like the vessels of a competitor Company. As an instance of the dangers run by these lower river vessels, the case need only be mentioned of the *W'osung*, which arrived in Shanghai yesterday. On the way down, the vessel was fired on and a Chinese passenger was shot through the head while standing only two or three yards from the chief engineer's cabin. During the evacuation of foreigners from river ports, the officers of the China Navigation Company's vessels which were affected worked night and day looking after refugees and in practically every case gave up their own rooms and practically everything in the way of their own personal comfort, for the benefit of the unfortunate refugees. They never complained; they asked for no thanks; and got none apart from the refugees themselves, whose gratitude in most cases knew no bounds. During the strike of seamen at Shanghai in the summer of 1926 the officers of the company performed all sorts of tasks not coming within the normal sphere of their employment as ships' officers and engineers. As an instance of this, may be mentioned the fact that it was the officers who maintained communication between the Company's offices and the wharves. Otherwise the China Navigation Company's launches would have been as idle as the strikers intended them to be. At the present time, officers of the Company's ships lying at Pootung—and there are quite a number owing to the strike which commenced three days ago—are definitely confined to their ships after five o'clock at night; and in the interests of the safety of the Company's property, they all comply with an order which is not entirely unremissive of military law. The officers have been given only nine days' notice of the proposed reduction of ten per cent. in their salaries. By that very fact alone they are taken at a great disadvantage. It is interesting to note that the notices containing the decision regarding the reduction are dated March 22 and are all printed. This indicates that the Company knew of the reduction probably some days before the issue of the circulars. But not a suggestion of what was coming was made to those affected. But the most amazing fact of all is that the proposed reduction should have been sprung upon the men at such a time as the present. Is it a propitious time to do anything that might endanger, even in a slight degree, that necessity of pulling together and of fostering a spirit of mutual good will which is of so paramount importance to all foreigners in China at the moment, in face of a common danger? Is it fair to the officers themselves, to the travelling public, to the people who are directly interested in the continuity of coasting shipping, deliberately to bring about a situation that may result in polemics among two most important sections of the British community in China to-day—the shipowners and their national officers. The officers themselves are between the devil and the deep sea. It they decline to sign articles at the reduced rates and so bring about the possibility of a large and important section of British commercial shipping in the Far East being tied up indefinitely, they will promptly be branded as enemies to the struggling foreigners who already have enough to contend against without the added incubus of another shipping strike (the assumption is being made that the present strike of seamen will come to an end some time); while if they meekly accept the big reduction that the Company wants to make, they will be adding considerably to their already hard lot. A fact that many people are apt to lose sight of is that many of the masters and officers of ships are married, and that the increased cost of living, which is increasing and increasing and the greatly reduced purchasing power of the silver dollar as compared to the time when the present rates were brought into operation, affects the officers as much as anyone else, and that ships' officers, as much as anyone else, are struggling to make ends meet in very many cases. And they are faced with a ten per cent. reduction to take effect practically without notice. The officers' case, briefly, is that, in view of the remarkably brisk business that the China Navigation Company has been doing and would undoubtedly do again if the seamen's strike ended, the proposed reduction of the officers' salaries is utterly and completely unjustified.

and as ill-timed as inequitable. With the foregoing facts, they feel confident that the opinion of the great body of the general public will be with them; and they trust that the public will share their hope that money which it is proposed to take from the masters and officers is not earmarked for payment to the Chinese seamen now on strike, and who only last week submitted, through their own union, a demand for another increase.

The 'Owners' Reply.

Messrs. Butterfield and Swire, the local agents for the China Navigation Company, afterwards issued the following statement in reply to the public statement by Mr. J. Watson, Secretary of the Marine Engineers' Guild of China and acting secretary of the China Coast officers' Guild, in regard to the proposed reduction of the salaries of the officers of the C. N. Co. by ten per cent. from April 1.

In view of the statement which has been published by the secretary of the Marine Engineers' Guild and acting secretary of the China Coast Officers' Guild, it is desirable to explain the circumstances connected with the reduction in pay of the foreign staff of the China Navigation Company. Since July, 1925, the China Navigation Company's services have been seriously and constantly dislocated and curtailed by disturbed political conditions. At the present time, all C. N. Co. steamers above Hankow have ceased running; carryings to Swatow and Canton after complete stoppage for close on a year and a half were started again in October, 1926, but the steamers have been running with reduced cargo, and at Swatow there is still a boycott preventing resumption of chartering trades, which form an important part of the Company's regular services. Those conditions which have affected steamers based on Shanghai have also seriously affected the Company's southern fleet based on Hongkong. On September 15, 1926, the Company circulated the foreign staff as follows:—

The Company have now carried a full scale of pay for over a year in the face of unparalleled political disturbances and dislocation of their services. Owing to the continuance of these conditions and the prolonged boycott of British shipping at Canton and Swatow, the Company have decided with regret, and after most careful consideration, that the time has come when the reduction in pay advised in the enclosed circular must be made. It will apply to all members of the European staff of the Company, including those serving under Agreement at three months' notice of termination, which notice is hereby given. It is not, however, the intention that this notification shall affect their services with the Company except as regards the reduction in pay. The Company hope that all concerned will realize the necessity for this decision. It has been postponed for as long as possible in the hope that the political situation would improve, but the prospects continue so indefinite that further delay is not justified.

Prior to this, the Company arranged an interview with the Shanghai and Hongkong secretaries of the Marine Engineers' and China Coast Officers' Guilds. This was held in Shanghai on September 11, when the position was explained and the Guild secretaries were confidentially informed as to the heavy losses sustained by the Company; they were also informed that if before January 1, 1927, Canton and Swatow had been satisfactorily re-opened, and no other key ports such as Hankow or Shanghai had been closed, and normal trading by the Company's services had been resumed, the reduction in pay would not be put into effect on that date.

On December 22, 1926, the following circular letter was issued:—

With reference to our letter dated September 15, Canton and Swatow have since reopened to trade, and in view of the political situation being thereby modified, the Company have decided not to put into effect the reduction of pay notified in the circular dated September 15 on January 1.

The situation is, however, still very uncertain, and normal trading has not been resumed. It will therefore be necessary for the Company to reconsider the position in three months' time, that is on March 22.

In January, 1927, trade at Hankow was entirely held up on account of political disturbances involving all the middle, upper river and Huanan services. Certain steamers were placed under requisition for essential services such as evacuation and the remainder of the Yangtze fleet was laid up. A curtailed service was started on the lower river at the end of February, but with all lower river ports except Hankow closed trade is again seriously restricted and disturbed conditions still prevent resumption of the normal schedules. The middle, upper river and Huanan services are completely suspended. The Company throughout have been anxious to maintain the standard of pay and that object the reduction has been postponed for considerably longer than results have justified; it was only after the most careful and full consideration that the following circular letter was issued on March 22 (which was the date stated in the Company's circular of December 22, 1926):—

Referring to the Company's letter dated December 22 last we regret that present conditions make the reduction of 10 per cent. in pay necessary and this will be put into effect from April 1.

The necessity for this reduction was confirmed on March 19, the circulars were printed on March 21 and issued on March 22, on which date letters were also sent to the secretaries of the two Guilds. The coasting vessels of the Company have not been running at full pressure. Both inward and outward cargoes and the fleet as a whole have to be considered nor can the serious situation in the Yangtze area be ignored. In addition to the serious losses up to the end of last year, further heavy losses have since been incurred notwithstanding such increases in freight rates as have been made, but which cannot be effective when trade is suspended. Seven of the Company's coasters and six upper river steamers have been out of commission since June and October 1926, respectively. Others have been laid up for varying periods due to lack of employment. In view of the situation, the Company have disposed of three steamers for breaking up and two more are now being sold.

The Guilds refer to the fact that the wages of the Chinese staff of the C. N. Co. have been increased and that the Company have received further demands for increases. We would state that the Company give full consideration to the question of pay in all branches of the service, but different factors exist which have to be considered and dealt with according to circumstances. The bridges of the Company's vessels on the Yangtze run are protected with iron plates (in the case of the Upper Yangtze steamers with armour plate) and in addition areas available to passengers and ship's staff are also protected with iron plates.

The Company appreciate the difficult times now existing including the risks of piracy and indiscriminate firing on ships. They also appreciate the spirit in which these risks are met by the officers and engineers and regret the necessity for the reduction.

Guilds' Reply to Company's Statement.

The following letter was forwarded on March 30, 1927:

SIR,—With reference to the statement by the Agents of the China Navigation Company in reply to a communication by the Secretary of the Marine Engineers' Guild of China, it is necessary, in view of the critical position which has arisen in consequence of the Company's pronouncement to its floating staff of a 10 per cent. salary reduction on the 1st proximo, to place before the general public, firstly, a critique on one or two arguments advanced by the Company's Agents in the statement referred to, and secondly, the private attitude of the Company towards the floating staff as against certain protestations covered in the Company's statement:—

(1)—The Company's Agents state:—

"At the present time, all C. N. Co. steamers above Hankow have stopped running."

Reply.—The present scale of salaries was operative long before the Company placed its first vessel on the Upper Yangtze service.

(2)—"Six upper river steamers have been out of commission since June and October, 1926."

Reply.—

Same as reply (1).

(3)—"On September 15, 1926, the Company circulated the foreign staff....."

Reply.—The Company circulated the foreign floating staff. The (doubtless unintended) omission of the word "floating" would convey to the general public the belief that the salary reduction was applicable to all the foreign staff in the Companies controlled by Messrs. John Swire & Sons; this is emphatically incorrect, as the cut is to be borne *solely* by the floating staff ranks of the China Navigation Company.

It is not desired to emphasize the fact that Chinese employees of the Company have most recently received *increased* salaries, but the policy of obtaining the wherewithal to compensate the Chinese staff, from the pay of the foreign floating staff, is hardly a commendable one.

The penalize one section of the staff only and that section the one that gives the most in hours and service to the Company is a procedure contrary to all the principles of fair play and collective bargaining and an action fully deserving the resistance with which it will be met.

The Company has, to day, requested a deputation of its floating staff to attend at the Company's offices. Six officers were present individually "invited" by means of a personally addressed chit. At the interview these officers were "advised" by the Company's Agents that in the case of "men who decline to sign new Articles on the reduced scale of pay, the Company will consider them as having resigned the service." As two of the officers present at that interview had periods of service exceeding 20 years each with the Company, this attitude will not commend itself favourably to anyone imbued with the tenets of justice and fair play. Further, it is in distinct contrast to the Company's declaration of appreciation as covered in their statement with reference to piracy and extraordinary coastal risks.

Instructions have now been issued by the Guilds to all members of the Company's floating staff, to decline to sign new Articles of Agreement on April 1, on any scale of salaries below those now operative; and while we desire to express, on behalf of our members, sincere regret to the general public for any inconvenience which may be occasioned through the detention or non-delivery of cargo, we would also take this opportunity to tender an assurance that, in the event of sudden emergency consequent upon the present local political situation, the services of all ranks of our members will at all times be at the disposal of the Naval and/or Military Authorities should those services be required in any capacity, ashore or afloat—the announced salary reduction notwithstanding.

We are, etc.,

W. E. KIRBY,

Secretary, China Coast Officers' Guild.

J. WATSON,

Secretary, Marine Engineers' Guild of China.

An appeal from the British Consul General on grounds of "emergency" led to a postponement of the strike, which actually came into effect on June 30, 1927 and within a day, the Company's fleet of 75 yessels were idle. After midnight on June 29, the Masters and Officers declined to carry on with the operation of the ships in

Shanghai. Similarly ships were held up at Hongkong, Swatow, Amoy and Ningpo. The strike continued with few incidents, the most serious of which was as follows:

The most noteworthy incident of the strike was in connection with the s.s. *Sianglan* and *Poyang*. In the case of the former vessel, the master and chief engineer declined to lend their services to the removal of the ship from one part of the Whangpoo to another after the strike had commenced. The Company construed this refusal as tantamount to the resignation from the Company's service of the master and chief engineer concerned, who were informed in writing accordingly. The case of the master of the *Poyang* was practically similar, and he, too, received written intimation from the Company that his refusal had been construed as resignation from the Company's service. The reply of the Guilds to this action on the part of the Company was to state that unless the dismissed masters and chief engineer were reinstated in the Company's service without prejudice, the Guilds would withdraw all the officers from the Company's ships in Shanghai and Hongkong as from noon on July 4. The Company maintained its attitude in the matter, and accordingly the Guilds issued instructions for the officers to withdraw from the ships as stated. This took place without incident, all the masters and officers being withdrawn with the exception of about 14, mostly senior men, who remained on the ships at Lung-hwa.

Strike Settled.

The following statement appeared in the Shanghai papers on Sept. 9:

We are authoritatively informed that the dispute between the China Navigation Company, Ltd., and the China Coast Officers' Guild and the Marine Engineers' Guild of China, which has lasted for over two months, was finally settled to-day.

Through the kind offices of Mr. E. T. Byrne, to whom the Company and the Guilds express their appreciation and thanks for the time, patience and tact expended by him in bringing the parties together, meetings have been held during the past six weeks with Mr. Byrne in the Chair with the result that a settlement as been reached and a general reinstatement will take place immediately.

The Members of the Guilds have gone back to work and sailings have been resumed pending the drafting of terms of settlement and upon the understanding that both parties meet within a reasonable time and agree upon means for the settlement of future disputes that may be satisfactory to both the Company and the Guilds.

SHIPBUILDING.

Shanghai's position as an important shipbuilding and ship-repairing centre is due almost entirely to the existence of four concerns:—The Shanghai Dock and Engineering Co., Ltd.; the Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works; the New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works, Ltd.; and the Societe Franco-Chinoise de Constructions Metalliques et Mecaniques. The first and third are British concerns; the second is owned by the Chinese Government; and the fourth is a Franco-Chinese establishment. All engage in the construction and repair of ships on a large scale.

Since the settlement of the May 30 affairs it has taken some time for matters to re-adjust themselves but conditions have become more normal day by day and with the usual winter spurt for repairs the yards were all fairly well occupied at the end of the year. Towards the end of the year especially there were many important repair jobs in hand; and as the facilities at Shanghai for ship-repairing are second to none in the Far East, it may safely be assumed that whatever the prevailing economic conditions in these parts, the ship-repairing yards are certain to be kept fairly busy.

From Kowloon, the following report with regard to Shipbuilding is made by the Commissioner of Customs:

...The local shipbuilding industry lost a proportion of its skilled labour during the strike, but despite this fact there was considerable activity in the yards, the

Taikoo Dockyard turning out two steamers for the China Navigation Company and a new river steamer, the *Tai-shan*, which has replaced the old *Honam*, and the Hongkong and Whampoa Dock building two passenger and cargo vessels for the Australian and Oriental Line, while smaller craft in considerable numbers have been completed by these and other yards, and much repair work has been carried out.

The principal launchings during the Year were the following:

THE LAUNCH OF THE Hsin YANGTZE.*

There were many interested spectators at the Pootung Shipyard at the Shanghai Dock & Engineering Co., on December 21, 1926 to witness the launching of the Shanghai Pilot Boat Co.'s new s. *Hsin Yangtze*. In the course of the post-launching speeches, Mr. H. W. Lester, chairman of the Shanghai Dock & Engineering Co., spoke on behalf of that company. "The *Hsin Yangtze* so successfully launched," he said, "marks a further step in the progress of this port. Built under Lloyd's special survey for their highest classification, she is 190-ft. long overall and 34-ft. in breadth. She is to be fitted with modern triple expansion engines of over 1,200 horse-power and in addition to this no less than 15 sets of independent steam engines are fitted for the different auxiliary requirements. Many of you present can look back about 25 years when the pilot service was maintained here by sailing schooners, and when the first steam pilot boat came into service in 1902 and the second, the *Yangtze*, in 1906 it was felt that the last word was said. But Shanghai was just beginning to open out and now with the "*Hsin*, (or new,) *Yangtze*" I think that most of us agree that the present and near future is well provided for. During the construction of the vessel we have had a great many difficulties to contend with including the disastrous coal strike in Britain and civil wars and other troubles very near our own doors, but I hope our efforts to carry out this contract without undue delay will appeal to our friends, the Shanghai Pilot Boat Co. It is the first large vessel we have built for them and while they may not be in the market in the near future we trust the results will justify our hope that the next vessel will be built in the same berth as this one."

The *Hsin Yangtze*, which has been built to the order of the Shanghai Pilot Boat Co. (1923), Ltd., is an improved design on the *Ling Kong* built locally for the same owners two years ago, and has been specially constructed to meet the requirements of the Pilots for work at the approaches to Shanghai.

The principal dimensions of the vessel are as follows, viz:—

Length overall, 190-ft. 0-in.; length between perpendiculars, 180-ft. 0-in.; breadth moulded, 34-ft. 0-in.; depth moulded to main deck, 16-ft. 6-in.

The *Hsin Yangtze*, which has been constructed under Lloyd's special survey to Class 100 A.1. is built of steel with straight stem and elliptical stern, and the hull is divided longitudinally by five watertight bulkheads forming fore peak, fore hold, bunker space, engine and boiler space, after hold and after peak. There are four decks; lower, main, upper and boat decks. On the lower deck forward are four single berth state rooms forward and on the main deck fourteen single berth state rooms for the Pilots' accommodation, making twenty state rooms in all; and all fitted out in the most up to date and modern manner. On the deck there is a large and luxuriously fitted saloon forward and a well appointed smoke room aft also the wireless room and accommodation for the wireless operator. On the lower deck aft accommodation is arranged for the native crew, forward of which is a large cold storage compartment extending the full width of the ship, while on the main deck aft accommodation is arranged for the engineers, boys and stewards, also a fully equipped workshop and an additional small

* *Far Eastern Review*, February 1927.

service cold storage chamber. The propelling machinery consists of one set of triple expansion surface condensing engines, steam being generated in two large cylindrical multitubular boilers constructed to Lloyd's requirements for a working pressure of 180-lbs. per square inch. The auxiliary machinery includes a Drysdale's independent centrifugal circulating pump; Weir's Monotype air pump; Weir's direct acting feed pumps; Weir's direct contact feed water heater; feed water filter; Mumford's general service, bilge, ballast, sanitary and fresh water pumps; Clarke Chapman steam windlass; powerful steam capstan by Robert Rodger & Co.; Hastie's steam and hand steering gear; and also auxiliary condensing plant for use when vessel is at her station, and large refrigerating plant by Messrs. J. E. Hall of Dartford. Electric light is fitted throughout the vessel, current being generated by two duplicate dynamos coupled to Sissons enclosed compound steam engines, while a powerful searchlight is fitted arranged to operate from the wheelhouse. In addition to the usual lifeboats there are also two teakwood motor boarding boats of special design.

NEW FIRE FLOAT FOR HONGKONG.*

The Hongkong & Whampoa Dock Co., Ltd., built to the order of the Hongkong Government, during 1926 a firefloat which possesses many features of interest. The principal dimensions of this vessel are:—

Length overall	101 ft.
Length between perpendiculars	95 ft.
Breadth, moulded	23 ft.
Depth, moulded	9 ft. 6-in.

The hull is constructed of steel throughout, the principal scantlings being in accordance with the requirements for Lloyd's highest class for vessels of this type. As will be seen from the general arrangement drawings, the vessel has one steel deck sheathed fore and aft, over which for a length of 70-ft. is a wooden deck laid with 4-in. by 1½-in. teak on which are arranged the fire-fighting appliances about the funnel and the navigating bridge forward. The hull is divided into six compartments by means of five water-tight bulkheads, giving the fore-peak, chain locker and crew space forward, the machinery space which occupies the major portion of the space amidships, the captain's and engineer's cabin, and a store for the hose pipes etc., right aft. The vessel burns oil fuel under the boilers, this being carried in two tanks of 642 cub ft., or about 16 tons total capacity arranged in the wings of the boiler room forward, while two feed tanks are fitted in the boiler room wings aft, these having a total capacity of 575 cub ft., or about 14 tons. On the main deck below the navigating bridge there is the dining saloon, an additional cabin fitted with bath and w.c., while aft of the engine room casing is the galley and storeroom.

The vessel is propelled by a triple-expansion engine having cylinders 12-in., 20-in., and 33-in., diameter with a piston stroke of 21-in., receiving steam at a working pressure of 180-lb. per square inch. An independent air and circulating pump of Merryweather's make is installed, together with a bilge and general service pump and two Weir's direct-acting feed pumps. The vessel is lighted throughout by electricity, current at a pressure of 110 volts being supplied from a 5-kw. generator, which also serves to operate a powerful 18-in. searchlight containing a 2,000 candle-power gas-filled filament lamp and fitted with mirror and dispersion lens. Steam is supplied by two straight-tube express type water-tube boilers having a working pressure of 2000-lb. per sq. in. and burning oil fuel under the pressure system, the oil fuel apparatus, comprising pump, heaters

* *Far Eastern Review.*

and filters, being installed between the boilers as shown in the drawings. The boilers work under forced draught on Howden undergrate enclosed direct system, the fan, which is 60-in. diameter and is driven by an engine having a single cylinder 5½-in. diameter by 4-in. stroke, being installed on a platform above the firing flat of the boilers. The rudder is controlled from the bridge by hand-operated gear through rods and chains to the quadrant-tiller on the rudder stock. A steam-driven windlass, is, however, fitted forward for working the anchors and mooring cables.

Fire and Salvage Pumps.—The fire-fighting equipment comprises two of Merryweather's latest pattern double cylinder "Greenwich Gem" vertical fire and salvage pumps, which together are capable of delivering 4,000 gallons of water per minute at a pressure of 150-lb. per sq. in. These pumps, the cylinders of which are 12-in. diameter, are driven by engines having a cylinder 16-in. diameter by 8-in. piston stroke. The water is delivered through two gun-metal swivelling monitors fitted on the shade dock aft and one 5-in. monitor carried on a water tower built up of steel angle bars supporting a working platform 9-ft. above the deck level. In the interior of the delivery pipe to this monitor a telescopic steel tube is fitted operated by steel chains from the platform level, which when fully extended brings the delivery nozzle to a point 29-ft. above the upper deck. In addition, provision is made for connecting hose pipes from the deck to the wharf when the vessel is moored thus enabling an additional number of jets to be provided by the pumping equipment of the vessel.

During the course of the trials of the vessel, some 4,000-ft. of hose was laid out and an effective discharge of water to a height of about 150-ft. was made from the nozzles on shore. The speed trials showed that the vessel was capable of doing 10.31 knots while sufficient steam is available for operating the salvage pumps while the main engines are in operation.

THE LAUNCH OF THE MEI PING.*

The twin screw s. *Mei Ping* launched at the new Engineering & Shipbuilding Works, Ltd., on August 16, 1926 is being constructed to the order of the Standard Oil Co. of New York for the purpose of carrying oil in bulk up the Upper Yangtze River.

The vessel, which is being built to the classification of the American Bureau of Shipping, is 212 feet overall, 205-ft. 6-in. between perpendiculars with a beam of 32 feet and depth 10 feet 6-in., and is to carry 460 tons of bulk oil in three holds, at a draught of 8-ft. 8-in., and is also provided with a forward cargo hold and a spacious tween deck forward and aft for the carriage of packed oil or general cargo.

Accommodation of particularly ample dimensions is arranged for the foreign navigating and engineer officers in the forward deckhouse which is surmounted by the bullet proofed wheelhouse.

Aft of the engine and boiler casing the Chinese engineers are accommodated in comfortable cabins in the after deckhouse, while the sailors are housed in the fore deck. The fore and quarter decks are fitted with powerful steam warping capstans and sheaves. A feature of the vessel is the "open" cruiser stern which is the outcome of the long experience of the owners of vessels for this service, and has thoroughly justified itself in the *Mei Hsia* completed by the builders for the same owners last year.

* *Shipping and Engineering.*

Two balanced rudders are fitted hung on ball bearings and steam operated by Hastie's gear at the rudder heads and controlled by rod from the bridge. One cargo oil transfer pump deals with the bulk oil, and the vessel has a complete electrical installation and is fitted with a searchlight and a floodlight. A "Gardner" oil driven dynamo and compressor set as well as a steam driven dynamo set is fitted in order to save steam in harbour.

The main propelling machinery, which has been designed and constructed entirely at the builders' works consists of two sets of high speed, inverted, direct acting, surface condensing, four cylinder, triple expansion, reciprocating steam engines, capable of developing 3,000 Indicated Horse-power. The machinery is of extremely light design, having balanced cranks on the Yarrow Schlich Tweedy system for smooth running at high revolutions. The engine shafting is of high tensile steel and the three bladed propellers are of Stones' bronze carefully balanced and machined. The propeller thrust is taken by a Michell thrust block fitted direct to the main engine crank shaft, and the propeller shafts are arranged to run in cast iron bushes fitted with Vickers oil rings.

The auxiliary machinery which is entirely independent of the propelling engines is of the latest type and consists of:—a Uniflux main condenser, Radojet air pump and Turbine and electric driven condensate pumps in duplicate, centrifugal pumps in duplicate, centrifugal pump driven by high speed, enclosed steam engine, gravitation feed water filter, Paracoil surface feed heater, Weir's twin feed pumps, oil transfer pumps, fresh water pump, and Duplex pump for general service purposes. A two stage evaporating and distilling plant is installed for feed make up and culinary purposes. A powerful Drysdale vertical type electric ballast pump which can be used for salvage purposes is also fitted. Steam is supplied to the machinery by two Thornycroft water tube boilers constructed for a working pressure of 250 lbs. per sq. inch fitted for oil burning on the 'Ray' rotary system. The fuel oil burners are driven direct by steam turbines for normal working and smaller electric units are also installed for standing by and increase of boiler power when necessary. Each boiler is fitted with a Ranarex C.O. recording instrument for measuring analysis of the flue gases. A Kelvinator refrigerating plant in duplicate is installed and connected to a 'Bohn' syphon-sanitor ice chest of large capacity. The vessel is to maintain a service speed of 13½ knots at loaded draught.

TONNAGE DUES.

The Nanking Government, as from July 11, 1927, imposed a surtax amounting to half the existing Customs tonnage dues. These dues have hitherto amounted to 1.2 taels per ton annually on vessels of more than 150 tons, and have been collected by the Customs in accordance with the 29th Article of the Tientsin Treaty of 1858. The purpose of the tax originally was the financing of light-houses, buoys, and other aids to navigation on the coast and rivers of China. The revenue was approximately Taels, 2,500,000 and was ample for the purpose.

The consulates in Shanghai protested and during August, the principal shipping Consulates received authority from their Governments to accept tonnage dues at the old rates, as trustees for the Chinese Government, until such a time as this order was rescinded or new treaties on the subject signed. Ships were permitted to clear on Consular Clearances. On September 1, the Nationalist Government in Nanking rescinded the surtax order.

SUMMARY OF LIGHTS, LIGHT-VESSELS, LIGHT-BOATS, BUOYS, AND BEACONS IN CHINESE WATERS, 1927.

CUSTOMS DISTRICT.	LIGHTS.	LIGHT-VESSELS.	LIGHT-BOATS.	BUOYS.	BEACONS.	TOTAL.
Pakhoi	—	—	—	3	—	3
Kiungchow	4	—	—	3	2	9
Kongmoon	4	—	—	—	2	6
Samshui	2	—	1	—	1	4
Wuchow	—	—	—	14	—	14
Canton	25	—	—	16	17	58
Swatow	6	—	—	3	1	10
Amoy	4	—	—	10	16	30
Foochow	6	—	—	15	14	35
Santuo	2	—	—	1	1	4
Wenchow	2	—	—	1	2	5
Ningpo	6	—	—	1	5	12
Shanghai	16	4	—	39	36	95
Chinkiang	13	—	6	8	21	48
Wuhu	13	—	3	—	13	29
Kiukiang	35	—	17	—	36	88
Hankow	18	—	18	—	18	54
Yochow	15	—	5	34	94	148
Changsha	4	—	—	2	33	39
Shasi	—	—	—	—	101	101
Ichang	—	—	—	—	21	21
Chefoo	9	—	—	4	6	19
Tientsin	6	1	2	1	9	19
Newchwang	—	1	—	11	14	26
Antung	2	—	—	—	—	2
Harbin	68	—	—	151	804	1,023
Total	260	6	52	317	1,267	1,902

INLAND WATERS STEAM NAVIGATION: VESSELS REGISTERED, 1921 TO 1925.

PORT	ON REGISTER AT END OF YEAR.				WITH-DRAWN ALS.	ON REGISTER AT END OF YEAR.		
	1921.	1922.	1923.	1924.		NEW REGISTRY.	Foreign Flag.	Chinese Flag.
	No.	No.	No.	No.				
ANTUNG	10	16	19	27	5	20	8	28
DAIREN	2	4	5	15	4	33	11	44
NEICHWANG	8	13	28	20	31	14	17	31
TIENSIN	27	41	52	48	11	16	36	52
LUNGKOW	1	2	1	1	—	—	—	1
CHEFOO	16	24	26	26	10	2	29	31
KIAOCHOW	4	14	9	9	15	3	4	7
CHUNGKING	3	4	7	8	18	17	—	17
SHASI	11	12	16	19	7	4	22	26
CHANGSHA	94	103	109	120	24	33	92	125
HANKOW	279	324	330	347	45	94	289	383
KIUKIANG	45	50	53	57	8	9	48	57
WUHU	48	49	46	46	22	16	26	42
NANKING	22	24	27	30	10	6	12	22
CHINKIANG	35	37	39	40	5	5	34	39
SHANGHAI	359	397	420	441	112	142	348	490
SOOCHOW	16	15	10	10	—	8	1	9
NINGPO	21	21	22	22	—	—	22	22
WENCHOW	7	5	4	7	—	—	5	5
FOOCHOW	32	38	39	42	11	14	39	53
AMOY	48	67	83	90	23	41	55	96
SWATOW	53	62	78	92	19	21	80	101
CANTON	600	640	708	755	107	260	494	754
KONGMOON	7	10	15	18	4	18	4	22
SAMSHUI	6	5	8	8	2	7	3	10
WUCHOW	31	34	39	53	17	32	19	51
NANNING	34	34	21	21	9	18	4	22
KIUNGCHOW	1	—	—	—	14	—	—	—
PAKHOI	—	—	—	1	3	—	2	2
TOTAL	1,820	2,045	2,205	2,373	577	839	1,715	2,399

PLAC.	1925.		1924.		1923.		1922.		1921.		TOTAL
	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	
American	5,859,851	5,608	6,359,589	55,715,295	48,886	51,965,230	4,994	47,698,139	4,670	4,510,901	214,566
British	23,499	21	36,937	360	44,055	44,055	40,075	454,472	168	38,855	84,703
Chilian	128,904	202	128,904	202	104,676	202	—	—	—	—	54,817
Danish	1,844,326	547	1,793,828	547	1,644,279	525	1,487,121	454,472	168	83,290	27,063,389
Dutch	2,008,834	1,915	2,185,806	2,380	1,839,731	1,948	1,626,586	1,707	502	89,603	4,728,090
French	2,486,057	604	2,085,968	539	1,369,016	364	447,050	126	4	74	27,063,389
German	699,837	1,418	599,513	1,021	1,369,016	364	447,050	126	4	83,290	84,703
Italian	35,081,116	27,261	34,759,884	26,294	33,288,617	25,063	32,961,333	32,281	363	24	27,063,389
Japanese	2,422,556	1,937	2,079,533	1,544	848,138	588	959,463	699	508,497	24	4,728,090
Norwegian	17,919	9	87,604	44	65,703	33	—	—	—	30	84,703
Polish	629,426	1,825	1,046,046	2,912	581,507	1,512	251,250	498	1,148	30	214,566
Portuguese	279,287	223	176,197	183	255,138	368	259,829	1,148	—	42	—
Russian	28,964	28	32,664	23	24,014	10	—	—	—	114,736	—
Spanish	28,964	28	32,664	23	24,014	10	—	—	—	60,196	—
Swedish	189,071	172	238,172	122	114,408	34	—	—	—	28,644,588	—
Non-Treaty Powers*	966	3	127,659	95	142,754	210	—	—	—	52,146	—
Chinese Shipping*	29,908,706	44,734	29,418,575	44,806	29,022,086	45,830	28,644,588	52,146	58,973	28,644,588	124,131,361
Junkst	3,094,230	44,110	3,869,788	49,945	3,411,761	56,415	4,213,157	4,213,157	58,973	4,213,157	182,722
TOTAL	128,202,625	167,746	141,432,827	186,382	131,304,556	182,722	124,131,361	186,428	114,619,544	186,428	124,131,361

SHIPPING: VESSELS ENTERED AND CLEARED, 1921 TO 1925.

* Vessels of Foreign type, owned by Chinese, and sailing under the Chinese flag. † Vessels of Chinese type, built and owned by Chinese, entered and cleared at the Maritime Customs.

REGULAR LINES, CARGO AND/OR PASSENGER.

Ocean Steam Ship Co., Ltd. & China Mutual S. N. Co., Ltd. (Blue Funnel Line).			
Canadian Pacific Ocean Services.			
"Glen" and "Shire" Lines.			
Ellerman & Bucknall S. S. Co., Ltd.			
"Ben" Line of Steamers Ltd.			
"Prince" Line			
Lloyd Triestino.			
Holland-Oost Azie Lijn.			
Hamburg-Amerika Linie.			
East Asiatic Co., Ltd. of Copenhagen.			
Swedish East Asiatic Co. of Gothenburg.			
Dodwell Line (James Chambers & Co.)			
Struthers and Barry.			
Tampa Inter-Ocean S. S. Co.			
Pacific Mail Steamship Co.			
Norddeutscher Lloyd, Bremen.			
Messageries Maritimes.			
P. & O., B. I. E. & A. Lines			
N. Y. K. Line.			
Oregon Oriental Line			
Dollar Steamship Line.			
American Oriental Mail Line.			
O. S. K.			
Soviet Mercantile Fleet.			
Wilh. Wilhelmsen Line of Norway.			

Steamer.	Built.	Gross Register Tonnage.
CHINA MERCHANT'S STEAM NAVIGATION Co.—(Continued).		
Hsin Kiangteen	1921	3659
Hsin Wah	1940	1940
Irene	1890	1343
Ka Ho	1891	1680
Kiang An	1921	3141
Kiangching	1900	1682
Kiang Hsin	1905	3372
Kiang Shun	1921	3141
Kianglah	1900	1682
Kiangteen	1870	2012
Kiang Wah	1912	3696
Kiangyu	1883	3098
Kuling	1885	498
Kung Ping	1894	2705
Kwang Chi	1887	505
Kwang Lee	1883	2159
Kwang Tah	1883	2474
Kwei Lee	1893	—
Taishun	1896	1962
Too Nan	1881	1537
Tung Wah	1906	1176
Yu Sun	1900	1696

Steamer.	Built.	Gross Register Tonnage.
ASIATIC PETROLEUM CO. (NORTH-CHINA) LTD. (British)		
Asiatika	1909	318
Ah Kwang	1913	612
Chin Kwang	1926	537.65
Fu-Kwang	1922	1402
Hai Kwang	1926	898.62
Shu Kwang	1924	731.54
Tien Kwang	1925	730.93
Yang Peh	1916	311
CANTON NAVIGATION COMPANY, LTD. (British)		
Wuchow	1909	436
CHIU ON S. S. CO., LTD. (British)		
Hydrangea	1916	1131
Chia On	1904	20
CHINA IMPORT & EXPORT LUMBER CO., LTD. (British)		
Tseang Tah	1915	769
Hsin Tseanglah	1918	986
CHINA MERCHANT'S STEAM NAVIGATION Co. (Chinese).		
Feiching	1883	1539
Hue-ai	1873	1344
Hsin Chang	1905	2000
Hsin Chi	1892	1846
Hsin Fung	1891	1846
Hsin Kong	1906	2146
Hsin Ming	1907	2133

Steamer.	Built.	Gross Register Tonnage.
CHINA NAVIGATION COMPANY, LTD. (British)		
Anhui	1925	3494
Anking	1925	3494
Antung	1926	3494
Changchow	1901	1948
Changlo	1917	248
Changning	1921	251
Chang Sha	1922	2493
Changteh	1914	244
Chekiang	1914	2171
Chenan	1903	2209
Chengling	1915	141
Chengpa	1924	28
Chengta	1914	2218
Chinhau	1903	2207
Chinkiang	1898	1986
Chinlung	1917	250
Chuchow	1925	30
Chungking	1914	2171
Chunsan	1921	158
Chusan	1914	2218
Chuling	1920	207
Fatshan	1887	2616
Fengtien	1905	1765
Foochow	1895	1994
Hanyang	1901	1956
Hsin Peking	1905	2866
Huichow	1905	2001
Hupeh	1901	1951
Ichang	1898	1984

Steamer.	Build.	Gross Register Tonnage.	Steamer.	Build.	Gross Register Tonnage.
CHINA NAVIGATION CO., LTD.—(Continued).					
Kaifu	1921	2655	Wantung	1921	1114
Kanchow	1905	2001	Wenchow	1923	1112
Kangting	1926	423	Wangpu	1921	3204
Kaying	1922	2626	Woosung	1918	3426
Kian	1907	1195	Wuchang	1914	3204
Kiangsu	1921	2661	Yingchow	1905	2000
Kialing	1925	423	Yungling	1923	81
Kingyuan	1921	2653	Yunnan	1901	1953
Kintang	1926	423			
Kiukiang	1898	1985	CHINESE GOVERNMENT STEAMSHIP ADMINISTRATION. (Chinese)		
Kiangchow	1921	2653	Hwah Jah	1900	6026
Koh Kham	1922	144	Hwah Lee	1900	1682
Kueichow	1905	2001	Hwah Ta	1900	1682
Kwangchow	1921	2626	Hwah Yih	1899	5174
Kwangsze	1898	1985			
Kwangtung	1921	2626	CHING KEE S. N. CO., LTD. (Chinese)		
Kweiyang	1921	2644	An Lee	1906	1643
Liangchow	1905	1999	Chenglee	1916	1200
Linan	1903	2211	Chian Lee	1907	2888
Luchow	1905	2000	Chan Lee	1919	1203
Nanchang	1922	2485	Englee	1901	1383
Nanning	1922	2485	Feng Lee	1902	1632
Neuchuang	1922	2485	Foo Lee	1900	1376
Nankin	1883	2485	Hsin Lee	1916	1198
Ninghai	1925	2732	Hung Lee	1901	771
Ningpo	1898	2484	Kung Lee	1914	549
Putung	1923	1985	Kwang Lee	1897	1033
Poolung	1919	48	Mao Lee	1911	1962
Poyang	1891	86	Shenglee	1891	924
Shantung	1915	2551	Tai Lee	1919	1829
Shansi	1898	2549	Teh Lee	1916	612
Shasi	1910	1984	Tong Lee	1902	1408
Shengking	1895	1327	Tsenglee	1918	967
Shunfien	1904	1650	Yiu Lee	1913	494
Shutung and Flat	1909	1758	Yung Lee	1906	628
Siangtan	1905	271 in all	Shun Lee	1902	1529
Sinkiang	1915	1195			
Siushan	1926	2646	CHEONG YUE STEAMSHIP CO., LTD. (Chinese)		
Soochow	1921	296	Pihrang	1888	1643
Suiting	1926	2604	Devabongse	1890	1604
Sunning	1917	296	Yue Ying Wa	1876	1351
Szechuen	1916	2590			
Taifoo	1920	2555	DAIREN KISEN KABUSHIKI KAISHA.		
Taifoo Hang	1917	2604	Anzan Maru		Tonnage.
Taming	1924	83	Choiun Maru		3,890
Tatung	1891	32	Chohet Maru		2,245
Tean	1904	2209	Dairen Maru		1,717
Tientsin	1895	2548	Hakushin Maru		3,748
Tungting	1900	2202	Isshin Maru		1,482
Tungchow	1914	1992	Kojan Maru		1,440
Wanhien	1921	2036	Kojo Maru		2,189
Wanliu	1920	2104	Manshu Maru		1,681
		867	Manatsu Maru		5,266
		1111	Oyama Maru		3,645
					3,857

Steamer.	Built.	Gross Register Tonnage.
INDO-CHINA STEAM NAVIGATION CO., LTD.—(Continued).		
Laisang	1901	3460
Lee Sang	1907	1655
Loonguo	1906	3923
Luenho	1905	2868
Mausang	1920	3372
Ming Sang	1907	1650
Min Wo	1925	287
Nam Sang	1902	4035
Ping Wo	1922	
Shun Wo	1917	220
Siang Wo	1926	2671
Sui Sang	1923	3229
Sui Wo	1896	2672
Tingsang	1922	2256
Tuek-Wo	1904	3770
Tung Wo	1914	1337
Wai-Shing	1903	1865
Yat Shing	1904	2284
Yu Sang	1912	1844
Yuen Sang	1923	3229
Yunguo	1927	250
JAVA-CHINA-JAPAN LIJN. (Dutch)		
Tjibesar	1922	10,820
Tjibodas	1906	4660
Tjikandi	1921	7903
Tjitarang	1922	9505
Tjikembang	1914	8013
Tjikini	1907	4597
Tjileboet	1918	5707
Tjiliwang	1905	4809
Tjimanoeik	1911	5620
Tjipanas	1903	3815
Tjisalak	1917	5787
Tjisondari	1915	8039
Tjitaroem	1910	5775
Tjisaroa	1925	7089
KAILAN MINING ADMINISTRATION.		
Kaiping (Owned)		Flag.
Amur		British
Atlantic		Norwegian
Corona		Swedish
Damplo		Norwegian
Ditmar Koel		German
Elida Clausen		Norwegian
Haukefiell		"
Hermes		"
King Sing		Chinese
Knut Hamsum		Norwegian
Loonghua		Chinese
Promise		Norwegian
Ratnefiell		"
Sanyo Maru		Japanese
Shinsei Maru		Japanese
Skrjmer		Norwegian
Tonjer		"
Unita		"
Wing Hong		British

Steamer.	Built.	Gross Register Tonnage.
DAIREN KISEN KABUSHIKI KAISHA.—(Continued).		
Roko Maru		3,228
Ryohai Maru		724
Ryuhou Maru		3,191
Saitsu Maru		1,037
Sakaki Maru		3,402
Tencho Maru		1,261
Tientsin Maru		2,317
Toke Maru		4,168
Yeian Maru		3,825
Yeijun Maru		2,156
Yekishin Maru		993
Yen Dai Maru		3,461
DOUGLAS STEAMSHIP CO., LTD. (British)		
Hatching	1899	2080
Hai-Hong	1898	2067
Haiyang	1908	2289
Hai Ning	1924	2017
HAN YEH PING IRON & COAL CO. (Chinese)		
Han Ping	1908	952
HONGKONG, CANTON & MACAO STEAMBOAT CO., LTD. (British)		
Kinshan	1903	2773
Lungshan	1923	3068
Sui-An	1899	1682
Sui-Tai	1899	1619
Taishan	1925	3173
HOONG ON S. N. CO., LTD.		
Chang Hsing	1896	2950
Chang On	1890	1661
Teh Hsing	1889	1642
INDO-CHINA STEAM NAVIGATION CO., LTD. (British)*		
Chak Sang	1917	2358
Chang Wo	1891	1065
Cheong Shing	1905	1989
Chip Shing	1906	1984
Fausang	1921	2256
Foo Shing	1903	2284
Fook Sang	1905	3100
Fuh Wo	1922	953
Han Wo	1919	248
Hang Sang	1901	2143
Hin Sang	1905	2929
Hop Sang	1901	2149
Hosang	1922	5698
Kia Wo	1925	953
Kiang Wo	1901	2209
King Wo	1923	617
Kum Sang	1920	5415
Kung Wo	1921	4636
Kulsang	1922	5847
Kut Wo	1895	2665
Kwai Sang	1917	2320
Kwong Sang	1902	2283

*The str. Lien Shing built in 1924, 2,416 tons was lost off the Amberst Rocks in 1926.

Steamer.	Built.	Gross Register Tonnage.
LUEN S. S. CO., LTD. (British)		
Luen Ho	1905	2868
Luen Yi	1905	2868
*The str. Lien Shing, built in 1924, 2,416 tons was lost off the amherst Rocks in 1926.		
MOLLER & CO.		
Loong-Hwa	1918	2499
Ex. s.s. "Warouta"		
Hai-Yen	1903	1449
Ex. s.s. "Balga"		
Yung-Ning	1894	2615
Ex. s.s. "Camira"		
Kwong-Foh	1896	2255
Ex. s.s. "Chui-Sang"		
King-Sing	1900	4204
Ex. s.s. "Waimatino"		
Henli	1903	1199
Ex. s.s. "Joan-Craig"		
NINGPO SHAO SHING S. N. CO., LTD. (Chinese)		
Hsin Ningshao	1914	2551
Ning Shao	1905	1920
Yungshin	1885	999
Changyang Maru	1921	1033.29
Built		Tonnage.
NISSHIN KISEN KABUSHIKI KAISHA. (Japanese)		
Feng Yang Maru	1915	3977.13
Huashan Maru	1926	2089.96
I Yang Maru	1921	943.46
Kashitwa Maru	1924	222.32
Kialing Maru	1927	about 356
Lushan Maru	1920	2531.05
Matsu Maru	1923	217.91
Momo Maru	1911	34.26
Nan Yang Maru	1907	3310.29
Paling Maru	1907	2422.68
Siang Kiang Maru	1903	935.42
Siang Yang Maru	1907	3302.47
Sui Yang Maru	1917	3078.08
Sungshan Maru	1921	2529.69
Tachang Maru	1901	2421.45
Tachi Maru	1901	1891.95
Tahung Maru	1905	1643.49
Tafoo Maru	1900	2555.21
Talee Maru	1900	2005.34
Tangshan Maru	1926	2089.96
Tanwang Maru	1927	about 1,500
Ume Maru	1904	118.85
Wooling Maru	1906	1458.56
Yohyang Maru	1906	3298.01
Yuen Kiang Maru	1903	875.32
Yang Yang Maru	1922	1037.98

Steamer.	Built.	Gross Register Tonnage.
SAN PEH STEAM NAV. CO., LTD. (Chinese)		
Fengpu	1907	1819
Fulang	1907	1819
Fu-Yang	1922	750.00
Hsin-Ning-Shin	1906	2175.27
Hua-Shan	1910	2750.00
Ningshin	1913	2897
Shinon	1893	1753
Shin Ping	1903	1895
Wan-Hsiang	1903	2096.00
Tai-Shan	1907	1752.98
Fei-Hu	1906	1734.84
Ming-Hao	1906	1734.84
Shin-Shih	1898	1966.55
Wu-Hsing	1927	625.00
SHIAWHING S. S. CO., LTD. (Chinese)		
Hohsing	1900	2030
Lienhsing	1891	1559
Shawhsing	1895	1276
Tong An	1891	1141
Tonguen	1901	573
Yungshing	1915	832
Yu-hsing	1891	1559
SOUTH CHINA S. S. CO. (Chinese)		
Huach Wu	1893	4249
Huach Cheng	1894	2600
SOUTH MANCHURIA RAILWAY CO.		
TUGS.	Built	Tonnage
Boshin Maru	1908	31
Boto Maru	1908	224
Bujun Maru (Bunkering vessel)	1924	800
Choshun Maru	1912	64
Choto Maru	1912	61
Dairen Maru	1921	440
Heito Maru (Dredger)	1911	569
Hokusan Maru	1920	109
Hokuto Maru	1910	58
Holten Maru	1921	429
Kaiyo Maru	1905	69
Kinto Maru	1914	75
Kokuto Maru	1921	109
Meiji Maru	1908	31
Miyoko Maru	1904	41
Nansan Maru (Hopper)	1910	462
Nanto Maru	1910	152
Ryusan Maru	1910	416
Sansan Maru	1910	416
Scito Maru	1915	76
Shino Maru	1913	73
Soya Maru	1907	107
Taisan Maru (Hopper)	1912	419
Teisuto Maru	1909	102
Tokiywa Maru	1899	36
Yento Maru	1908	223

STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK. (American).

Steamer.	Built.	Gross Register Tonnage.
S/S Mei An	1901	934
" Mei Chuen	1923	975
" Mei Foo	1912	912
" Mei Hsia	1926	1048
" Mei Nan	1918	364
" Mei Ping	1927	About 1060
" Mei Tan	1917	199
M/V Mei Hung	1912	242
" Mei Lu	1927	305
" Mei Ming	1912	241
" Mei Shan	1915	274
" Mei Yan	1915	274

Ta Ta S. N. Co. (Chinese).	Built	Tonnage
Kuang Tsiang	1912	387
Ta Ching	1922	861
Ta Chie	1923	877
Ta Ho	1902	604
Ta Te	1891	801
Ta Ning	1903	153

CHAPTER XVI.

THE NANKING OUTRAGES.

Nanking was evacuated by the Northern forces on March 23, 1927, and occupied by Southern troops under General Cheng Chien, the following day. The Nationalist Forces immediately made for and attacked and looted the Foreign Consulates, as well as Foreign firms and residences and missionary institutions. In the course of the day Dr. J. E. Williams (Vice-President of the University of Nanking), an American; Mr. Huber, the Harbour Master, Dr. L. S. Smith (a British Medical practitioner) and a French and an Italian Priest were murdered. A British Bluejacket on H.M.S. *Emerald* also succumbed to a sniper's bullet. Mr. Betram Giles (British Consul General) Captain Spear (British Intelligence Officer) Major Nemoto, Police Superintendent Mori, and Miss Anna Moffatt of the Presbyterian Mission were wounded. Several foreign women were subjected to the grossest indignities and it is reported, were outraged. Looting and attacks upon foreigners continued throughout the day, and it was not until a party from the American Consulate which had reached Socony Hill, in sight of the river, signalled for assistance to the foreign warships, that action was taken. H.M.S. *Emerald*, and the American Destroyers *Moag* and *Preston* opened fire about 3.30 p.m. placing a barrage of shrapnel round the hill, and the molestation of foreigners immediately ceased, though it was not possible to secure their complete evacuation—as a result of an ultimatum from the Foreign Naval Authorities—until the evening of the 25th.

The following documents contain the statements of Foreign eyewitnesses of the outrages :

Official Report from British Vice-Consul.

"Apart from a few minor incidents the Northern Troops had left the city peacefully on Wednesday night, 23rd March. Early on Thursday morning troops belonging to the 4th Division of the 6th Army under General Cheng Chien, mainly Hunanese, entered the suburbs of the city in uniform. The British Consulate was surrounded by 9 a.m. and the Consul-General was deliberately attacked in the Consulate grounds by one of the two sentries posted by the looters. He hid for a time in the office with Mrs. Giles, two other ladies and other men but they were soon discovered and robbed of their valuables by successive bands of looters who became increasingly truculent and forced the party to leave the office. They took refuge in the gate-house, whence they were rescued, after further painful experiences, at half-past five on Friday afternoon by agents of the Swastika Society, the Chinese official Red Cross Society. The International Export Company's factory was attacked about 11 a.m. by looters with cries of 'Kill the foreigners', and the occupants and guards had to flee. Meanwhile, the United States Consul had left his Consulate also in the hands of the looters and made his way with great difficulty with a party to the Standard Oil Company's hill, where a large number of foreigners were assembled.

There the attacks of the soldiers became so persistent and heavy that the United States Consul decided, about half-past three, to signal for the help of the naval guns, which the senior naval officer had previously informed him were ready to open fire in the last resort. The shelling of the ground round the hill caused the attackers to retire and the refugees escaped over the city wall. The other main body of foreigners were collected at Nanking University and they, likewise, were stripped of their valuables and even of their clothes, and were eventually got away by the efforts of the Swastika Society who were delegated by military authorities to take actions first as a result of the naval bombardment and, secondly, of the threat of its renewal. This society remained in touch with the United States Consul from about 6 p.m. on Thursday until the next evening.